Reproducing The Virginity Imperative: Women’s Collusion and Men’s Complicity Among Young Iranians living in Montreal by Ghassemi Zavieh, Zahra (Mona)
Reproducing The Virginity Imperative: Women’s Collusion and Men’s Complicity 
Among Young Iranians Living in Montreal 
 
 











Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of Master of Arts (Anthropology) at  
Concordia University 





© Zahra (Mona) Ghassemi Zavieh, 2017
 iii 
CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY School of Graduate 
Studies  
This is to certify that the thesis prepared  By:   Zahra (Mona) 
Ghassemi Zavieh 
Entitled:   Reproducing The Virginity Imperative: Women’s 
Collusion and Men’s Complicity Among Young Iranians Living in 
Montreal 
and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
degree of Master of Arts (Anthropology) 
complies with the regulations of the University and meets the 
accepted standards with respect to originality and quality.  




Approved by  
_ Dr. Meir Amor_________________________Chair  
_ Dr. Setrag Manoukian___________________ Examiner  
_ Dr. Homa Hoodfar______________________Examiner  
_ Dr. Sally Cole_________________________ Supervisor  
______________________________________ Chair of 
Department or Graduate Program Director  







Reproducing The Virginity Imperative: Women’s Collusion and Men’s Complicity 
Among Young Iranians living in Montreal 
 
Zahra (Mona) Ghassemi Zavieh 
The present work centres around the question of the virginity imperative, a social 
contract and regime of power that regulates women’s bodies through disciplinary devices 
surrounding the socially constructed notion of female virginity. Through participant 
observation and interviews with young people of Iranian origin residing in Montreal, I 
explain why the virginity imperative persists among this population. Through description 
of women’s social navigation (Vigh 2006) of marriage and education, I argue that 
women’s apparent collusion with restrictive norms does not undermine their agency, but 
indicates their ability to make decisions that maximize social benefits given their 
particular circumstances. The argument extends to women’s performance of virginity, 
which is a face-saving tactic and instrumental in the practice of hypergyny among women 
I interviewed. Nevertheless, I argue, the virginity imperative operates to categorize 
women according to a virgin/whore dichotomy, rendering unliveable the lives of those 
who do not adequately perform virginity. Attitudes that define sex as defiling to women 
contribute to a gendered politics of knowledge resulting in women’s limited expression of 
sexuality as compared to men’s, which, along with the patriarchal bargain (Kandiyoti 
1988), plays a role in women’s lack of expression of dissent. I argue that men’s 
preference for virgin women is incompatible with the love marriages they claim to aspire 
to, and that men lack reflexivity of the consequences for women of attitudes that 
reinforce the virginity imperative. Bringing an end to these painful consequences requires 
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Āberu: reputation, “face”.  
Āberudāri: saving face.  
Āmizesh: Literally, mixing. Sexual intercourse.  
Aghd: The ceremony in which a young couple is married from a religious (Islamic) 
perspective. After the aghd, the couple are considered “mahram” as husband and wife, so 
they may have physical contact and see each other freely. They may also have sex 
without religious sanction, but some families (and clerics) may prefer that they not do so 
until after the wedding (aroosi), which is a separate ceremony. Part of the reasoning for 
this is that the woman does not lose her virginity before everything has been finalized and 
officialised, in case the couple breaks up.  Some do the aghd and aroosi at the same time, 
but longer engagement periods are becoming more common.  
Ahādith: Plural of hadith. Sayings attributed to the prophet Muhammad.  
Alāghe: love, interest. This is much less strong than “eshgh”. It may also refer to things a 
person likes.  
Aroos: bride.  
Aroosi: wedding ceremony. While the wedding vows are said during the aghd, the aroosi 
is the party where the family and relatives are invited. Many of my interlocutors told me 
that Iranians try to impress others (and save face) by holding big weddings (it is 
necessary to invite many guests. For example, my husband and I opted for a small 
wedding in his small town of about 200 guests, mostly from the groom’s side. Many of 
my extended relatives did not show up due to the travel distance).    
Āshurā: the 10th day of Moharram, on which Shi’a muslims commemorate the martyrdom 
of Hussein, the prophet Muhammad’s grandson, in the desert of Karbala.  
Azab: a virgin man. Not commonly used but only used if specifically referring to the fact 
that a man has not had sexual intercourse. Arabic: sweet scented stream.  
Az zire saghfe pedar be zire saqfe shohar raftan: going from under the roof of the father 




Bākere: virgin. Almost exclusively used in reference to women/girls.  
Bāzāri: Literally “of the bazaar”. One who sells goods in the bazaar, a traditional Iranian 
marketplace.  
Bekārat: virginity, usually refers to women’s virginity. The term is sometimes also used 
to refer to the hymen.  
Bisho’ur: (pejorative) foolish, witless.  
 
D 
Dāmād: groom.  
Dokhtar: girl, virgin, unmarried woman. Also daughter. 
Dokhtar dādan: giving a daughter (in marriage).  
Dokhtar-e Torshide: An unmarried woman who is deemed to have passed the prima age 
for marriage. Literally translated as “girl gone sour”, this is the farsi equivalent of the 
English expression “old maid”. The term “dokhtar” here thus does not refer to age but to 
singlehood.   
Dor-dor: the practice of Tehrani youth to ride around (especially the richer parts of town) 
showing off their cars and seeking interaction with the opposite sex and potential mates. 
Joyriding.  
Dustdokhtar: girlfriend 





Eib: a fault or defect. Used by some parents to indicate their children’s private parts.  





Fāheshe: Prostitute/slut.  
Fāheshegari: prostitution.  
Fitna: chaos.  
Fiqh: religious jurisprudence.  
 
G  
Gheirat: sexual honor or jealousy 
 
H 
Hāl: a person’s psycho-emotional state. Also refers to the present.  
Hamsar: Literally, same head. Meaning spouse, with a connotation of equality.  
Hayā: modesty 
Hejle: the practice of relatives checking, on the wedding night (i.e. shabe zafāf) whether 
the bride was a virgin by displaying bloodstained cloth.   
Hijabi: refers to a woman who wears the hijab (Islamic head and body covering).  
Hoviate jensi(ati): gender identity 
 
I 
Idda: A waiting period of three months to four months and one week, required after the 
dissolution of temporary or permanent marriage, before the woman can marry again. This 
requirement is intended to ensure paternity in case the woman has become pregnant from 
the previous marriage. The length of the idda period depends on the length of the 
menstrual cycle and whether the woman is getting her periods.  
 
J 
Jahizieh: trousseau. Some scholars have translated this term as “dowry”, but I prefer 
“trousseau” because the household items included in the jahizieh are first and foremost to 
be used by the bride in maintaining the home, unlike a dowry which is payable to the 
groom’s family. It is true that historically in Iran there was some patrilocality and that 
perhaps in that case the distinction is not an important one, but as most urban families 
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nowadays are neolocal, the use of the term “dowry” does not accurately reflect the 
relation of the goods in question to the people involved in their exchange.  
Jins: sex-gender (See Najmabadi 2013) 
Jinsi: sexual 
Jinsiat: sex, gender 
Jinsiati: pertaining to gender  




Khāstegāri: A system of courtship traditionally prevalent in Iran and still in use today by 
many families (although in some cases it has become a formality). The prospective 
groom visits the family home of the young woman he desires (or family members have 
arranged for him to meet with the intention of marriage), usually accompanied by family 
members. If both parties and their families remain interested, there will be several visits 
during which the two young people might discuss matters related to marriage and the 
families will make various negotiations. If all goes well, there will be a bale borun 
(saying yes) ceremony and the couple will afterwards be married. The degree to which 
the prospective bride has a say in this or the degree to which the union is “arranged” 
varies. Traditionally, it was not appropriate for a young woman to “choose” her own 
husband, but today they might meet each other (at university or through work or friends) 
and then together decide that the young man will come to the khastegari of the young 
woman.  
Konkur: Iranian university entrance examination. In Iran, all university applicants must 
take this exam, and a higher ranking (lower number) leads to more opportunities in terms 
of both the prestige of the universities one may attend and the type of educational 
programs one may choose (with more prestigious fields requiring a higher ranking). 
 
L 





Mahram: A mahram is a relative whom one is forbidden to marry (thus subject to the 
incest taboo), or in the case of the husband, one has already married. Under most 
interpretations of Islam this includes a woman’s brothers, father, her grandfathers (and 
anyone further up the line of direct descent), her uncles and great-uncles, but not cousins. 
Parallel cousin marriage on the father’s side has traditionally been especially common in 
such societies, as it maintains patrilineally transmitted wealth in the family. Because a 
mahram (except in the case of spouses) is subject to the incest taboo, men and women 
who are mahram may socialize and have personal contact with relative ease.  
Mahr/Mahriyeh: a marriage gift payable to the wife at any time after marriage. Nowadays 
this is usually gold coins. A Hajj trip and a copy of the Qur’an are often automatically 
stipulated as part of the mahriyeh in marriage contracts in Iran.  
Mard: man.  
Mardsālār: patriarchal 
Mardsālāri: patriarchy, in the sense that men hold power and women do not.   
Mazhab: religion.  
Mazhabi: religious.  
Mo`āmele: transaction 
Mo`āmele-ye pāyapāyi: bartering transaction 
Moderne: modern 
Mohabbat: caring.  




Nafaqeh/nafaqa: maintenance, or living expenses of the bride, which must be provided 
by the husband.    
Nafs: spirit 
Najib: pure, noble.  
Nejābat: purity, nobility 
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Niāze jensi: sexual need (this particular usage is common in Farsi although it is not in 








Parde (or Parde-ye-Bekārat): hymen. Parde also means curtain.  
Pesar: boy.  
Pezeshke qānuni: a physician who makes diagnoses in legal cases.  
 
R 
Rābete: relationship.  
Rābeteye jensi: literally sexual relationship, sometimes refers to the sex act.   
Rasm: tradition.  
Roshanfekr: intellectual,  in some contexts refers to someone having liberal and Western 
values. Roshanfekre dini also exists: a religious reformer (towards liberalization 
modernizer).  
Ru harfe baqie harf zadan: speaking over others. Giving one’s opinion and having it 
accepted over others’.  
Ruspi: sex worker (polite term). 
 
S 
Sardie jensi: literally, sexual coldness. Low libido, low appetite for sex.  
Saresh be tanesh biarze: their head being worth their body. Indicates that a person is 
worthy (not a waste of a body).  
Sarparast: guardian. 
Sat-he farhangi: social level (can be associated with Bourdieu’s concept of social 
capital).  
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Shabe Qadr: The holiest night in the Islamic calendar.  
Shabe Zafāf: see Zafāf.  
Shamsi: Literally “of the sun”. The Iranian solar calendar. “Shamsi” means “solar” in 
Arabic. The full term is “Hejri Shamsi” because this calendar, like the lunar Islamic 
calendar, is based on the start date of the prophet Muhammad’s hijra, or move from 
Mecca to Medina.   
Shir Baha: milk price, a compensation for the wife's breastfeeding of any children from 
the union. 
Shohar: Husband. 
Shoharesh bedim: See shohar dādan.  
Shohar dādan: To give [a young woman or girl] to a husband (in marriage).  







Tamkin: submission. Specifically, a wife’s sexual submission to her husband. This is 
sometimes referred to as “conjugal debt” (such as by Mahdavi 2009).  
Tan dādan: literally “giving one’s body”. To endure (something unpleasant).  
Tavānāyi’e māli: monetary ability.  
Tiz-hooshan: Literally meaning “The sharpminded”, tiz-hooshan is the name used in Iran 
for “schools for the gifted”. 
Tozih-ul-masā’el: Also known as resāleh, literally, “explanation of problens”. These are 
books written by clerics to clarify religious doctrine. All clerics of mojtahed status 
(meaning they can be followed as a “source of emulation”) have one, allowing for a 
certain degree of religious plurality within shi’ism1.  
 
U 
                                                        
1 Thanks to Setrag Manoukian for this detail.  
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Unjā: “over there”; used by some mothers to indicate their daughters’ private parts.  






Zāye: Wasted. To become zaaye is to become shamed or embarrassed. To say something 
has become zaaye is to say that something very bad has happened, a calamity has 
occurred.  
Zafāf: wedlock (Arabic)  
Shabe zafāf: wedding night, night of consummation “the night when ‘avvalin āmizeshe 
kāmel’ (first complete sexual intercourse) between a girl and boy (wife and husband) 
occurs which is usually the first night of marriage” (Shirin’s definition).  
Zan: woman or wife. Implies marriage and non-virginity . 
Zan gereftan: getting a wife. The same expression does not apply to husbands, suggesting 
the gendered gift-giving relationship between a woman’s father and her husband.  






If I have any agency, it is opened up by the fact that I am constituted by a social world I 
never chose. That my agency is riven with paradox does not mean it is impossible. It 
means only that paradox is the condition of its possibility.  
—Butler 2004, 3. 
 
The deep crimson of newly shed blood on white fabric is easily identifiable, and 
while bloodshed often implies an act of violence, the presence of such stains has in 
certain contexts been celebrated. In vivid contrast to the white of nuptial bed sheets, or 
the handkerchief given to the bride for the express purpose of its collection, the red of 
blood, or the absence thereof, is heavily imbued with meaning. While this practice, called 
hejle in Farsi, has been largely abandoned by educated, urban Iranians, it sometimes lives 
on in another form: a certificate of virginity issued by a doctor. The story of the 
bloodstained handkerchief has not been forgotten, however. It was repeated to me by 
many of my research participants during my fieldwork. Young men and women of 
Iranian identity and origin residing in Montreal, my interlocutors constituted an upwardly 
mobile and cosmopolitan segment of the Iranian population. Perhaps they would bring up 
the practice of hejle due to the vividness of its account. The fate of a woman, more than 
that—her honour—depended on her ability to produce the red-stained handkerchief for 
the groom, to be triumphantly presented to relatives waiting at the door. Although to 
many contemporary women and men, such a practice may appear arcane, even offensive, 
the values of the sex-gender system (Najmabadi 2013) underlying such practices seems to 
nevertheless hold strong. In this thesis, I focus on what I call the “virginity imperative”, a 
body of practice and comportment that stipulates that women must remain virgins until 
marriage.  
In the summer of 20162, I conducted participant observation in a number of 
Iranian cultural and religious institutions and student groups in Montreal, as well as 
interviews with a total of 30 young people of Iranian origin, recruited through my in-
person and online interaction with these different groups. Drawing from that fieldwork 
                                                        
2 Late May through August. 
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and occasionally punctuated by observations drawn from my own experiences growing 
up as the daughter of Iranian migrants, as well as my travels to Iran3, my thesis aims to 
understand the significance of virginity among Iranians residing in Montreal. As I will 
expound in later sections, however, this population, while it has its own particular 
demographic characteristics, can not be regarded as entirely separate from its population 
of origin, as the ease of transnational migration and communication has rendered borders 
more fluid than those drawn on maps may suggest (Adelkhah 2016). I have therefore 
refrained from referring to my study population as a “diaspora”, for as I found, this term 
did not resonate with my interlocutors, who generally refer to themselves as Iranians. The 
term “diaspora” also has particular connotations of separation from homeland and 
longing to return, both of which did not necessarily apply with many of my interlocutors, 
some of whom easily traveled between Canada, Iran, and sometimes other countries, and 
some of whom had no intention of returning to Iran.     
 
Although there have been several waves of migration of Iranians to North 
America, especially starting after the Second World War (Powell 2005), none of these 
compared in size or diversity to that following the 1979 Islamic Revolution (Moghissi 
and Goodman, 1999). Several thousand Iranians arrive in Canada each year, with census 
data indicating 163, 290 Iranians in Canada in 2011 (The Canadian Encyclopedia, 
accessed May 2016). Chaichian (2012) claims that Iranian emigrants since 1979 have 
adopted an “‘internationalist national identity’ that allows them to respond to the 
demands of a global market while still maintaining their Iranian cultural identity”, which 
flourishes in Canadian metropolises such as Toronto, affectionately nicknamed 
“Tehranto” by residents of Iranian origin. Purported reasons for emigrating include a lack 
of jobs and job security for young people in Iran, the higher pay they can expect to 
receive overseas, and the lack of ability to “grow and blossom intellectually” in Iran 
(Motevalli, 2014). Salmani et al. (2010) have proposed “a social justice model” as the 
primary cause of the recent phenomenon known as brain drain, in which educated 
                                                        
3 Since 2007 I have visited Iran five times for a total of roughly ten months, spending the majority of my 
time in the buzzing metropolis of Tehran and the quiet rural town of Vazvan. I have also visited several 
other cities and villages for shorter periods.  
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Iranians leave the country4. Torbat (2002) also argues that political rather than economic 
factors are responsible for brain drain from Iran to the United States. The Iranian 
community in Canada is diverse in terms of class, ethnicity, religion, politics and 
ideology, and thus forms a “vibrant mix of sub-communities with a common language” 
(The Canadian Encyclopedia, accessed May 2016). 
 
My research pool displays several dimensions of this diversity. Many of my 
interlocutors were not originally from Tehran, although the vast majority had lived there 
for some formative period of their life. Other cities where they lived or had family roots 
included Esfahan, Mashhad, Gilan, Ahvaaz, Arak, and Sari.  A few were from small 
towns and villages, and represented different ethnic backgrounds. Some had parents from 
different ethnicities or from different cities, and told me that this impacted on the way 
they were raised because their parents, coming from different cultures, had different 
approaches to religion and religiosity, or to childrearing. My participants’ own attitudes 
to religion also varied. While all were of Shi’a background, some had been raised by 
religious families, others by secular ones. Several of the women I interviewed wore hijab, 
but some of them told me they were “less religious than [they] looked”, while some who 
did not wear hijab told me that they were religious. Some of my interlocutors told me that 
they had become more religious, in terms of practice, than their parents, partly through 
the influence of the Iranian schooling system. Others had gone in the opposite direction, 
rejecting religion altogether. Still others had converted to or developed an interest in 
Christianity or in other spiritual practices, sometimes eventually rejecting these as well.   
 
 Despite all this variety in backgrounds and personal beliefs, I contend that the 
Iranian variant of the sex-gender system is deeply imbedded and has not observably 
changed in this single migrant generation5. The literature on sexuality in Iran (Afary 
2009, Mahdavi 2009, Rahbari 2016, Mir-Hosseini 2004, Tremayne 2006, Sadeghi 2008) 
                                                        
4 During the early twenty-first century, Iran’s brain drain, with between 100,000 and 250,000 educated 
young people leaving the country each year, was one of the highest in the world (Afary 2009).  
5 Time will tell whether my interlocutors do change their views. Most had only been in Canada a few years, 
and as I show later in the thesis, some had changed some of their views. Others remained skeptical about 
the possibility of substantial ideological change among adult migrants.  
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indicates that a virginity imperative has long existed and continues to exist there, as it 
does in other regions of the world where inheritance and kinship structures are patrilineal 
and determining paternity is therefore important. Such gendered systems of sexual 
control are continued in or brought into colonial as well as diasporic and migrant contexts 
including North America, despite challenges by feminist movements. I was curious to 
know whether they persisted among my study population. How had Iranian women living 
in Canada built more liveable lives while negotiating their social structure? How had they 
responded to the virginity imperative, and how, if at all, did it continue to shape and 
affect their lives? Did they resist, or uphold it? If they resisted, what kind of arguments 
did they make against virginity imperatives, and on what forms of knowledge did they 
draw?  
One interlocutor, Erfan, suggested that people who leave Iran after the age of 18 
or so do not change their fundamental beliefs. I noticed that responses to some questions 
were fairly stable. Many of my participants were confused when I asked them about their 
gender identity (a question that, to most Iranians, is not a question at all, but a given (see 
Najmabadi 2014)). Most had never questioned the concept of marriage (see Najmabadi 
2014), and the majority, typical of middle-class Iranians (see Haeri 1990), regarded 
temporary marriage in contempt. Most also suspected that casual sex was harmful to the 
individuals involved. A few, however, were aware of and interested in learning about the 
different concepts on gender and sexuality that they had encountered in Canada.  
Because of my interest in women’s narratives and taking the approach of feminist 
ethnography, from the start my focus was on women, of whom I interviewed 21. I also 
interviewed 9 men. For all the interviews, I set a target age range of 18-35.  I ended up 
interviewing one woman who was 37 and one who was 39, and I was hard-pressed to find 
interviewees in the lower end of the range (only six women out of the 21 interviewed 
were in their twenties, with the youngest being 21 years old, and all the men were in their 
thirties). There are at least two reasons for this, the first being an ethical and 
methodological consideration and the second being linked to the available pool of 
potential interviewees. First, I was reluctant to approach young people who lived with 
their parents as I was concerned about complications regarding privacy and consent 
(especially if I was meeting them in a venue where members of their family were 
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present). Second, independent first generation immigrants must first amass the means to 
travel to another country. Thus, they have either built work experience through which 
they could apply for skilled labour immigration, or they had applied to universities as 
international students, which often means they held at least a bachelor’s degree to 
establish a student record acceptable by universities in Canada. 
I was interested in hearing from those in different stages of dealing with virginity 
imperatives, and my resulting interview set included individuals who were married and 
unmarried, (including three divorced women), sexually experienced and sexually 
inexperienced. All were cisgendered and most reported being heterosexual, with two men 
stating that they had had sexual experiences with other men, one woman reporting that 
she was bisexual but had realized this later on in her life and was currently engaged to a 
man, and another woman stating that she might have been interested in women but the 
question had never occurred in her teenage years. Many were students, and several were 
employed full-time.6 
Several of the women (not the majority) were feminists who questioned and 
critiqued dominant Iranian gender norms, which as we shall see, fundamentally rest on 
sexual inequality. The very structure of Iranian marriage, and, indeed, historically, gender 
relations in general, is based on an understanding of the sexes as having fundamentally 
different needs, abilities, responsibilities, and desires. The unequal basis of gender 
relations survived the “modernization” and feminist projects of the Women’s 
Organization of Iran under the Pahlavi era, and took new fervour after the establishment 
of the Islamic Republic (see Afary 2009). While, since 1979, Iran has to some degree 
                                                        
6 Due to my own status as a student and my initial use of student networks to find and access 
interviewees, many of my interviewees were students. As my research progressed and my “net” 
expanded, I also met several whose primary occupation was paid employment. I learned through one 
of my later interviewees that it was my biased networks and status that had led me to believe that 
the majority of Iranians in Montreal were students, and that in fact there were many working 
Iranians, but that these two networks did not mix much due to their different needs and interests. My 
online and offline networking and participant observation among Iranians did indicate a different 
“feel” to these two subpopulations: student groups emphasize navigating the student life (I attended 
a workshop, hosted by Kanune Towheed, which runs the Telegram group MontrealName, intended to 
welcome new Farsi-speaking students), while those who work emphasize business networking and 
self-promotion (such as the networking fair set up by the facebook group “business montreal”. 
Another group present on Facebook, “affection&solidarity group montreal” had, at the time of the 
research, a banner promoting their donor, a real estate agent, posters of whom were also 
prominently displayed at an art show they ran). Some of my interlocutors did mention that 
immigration and landing was easier as a student than as a skilled worker. 
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“opened up” (Mahdavi 2009), I was surprised to find many of my interlocutors echoing 
claims of fundamental psychobiological differences between men and women. Taking a 
cultural constructivist position, I venture that, raised with such an ontological viewpoint, 
individuals learn to embody these claims and see them as the natural order of things. 
Thus, when it is said that men want sex and women want marriage, men come to express 
desire in sex and women to express a desire in marriage. Social norms may prohibit them 
from doing otherwise. Disturbingly, I found that there is an attitude held by some men 
that separates women who are worthy of marriage from those who are sexually available: 
a virgin/whore dichotomy based on an understanding of sex as fundamentally debasing to 
women.  
The high valuation of virginity, which I regard as a social construct, is of course 
not unique to Iran.  Many scholars have written on the topic in different contexts, and 
there are clear links between this literature and that on honour and shame in so-called 
Mediterranean societies (Peristiany 1965; Schneider 1971; Mernissi 1982; Kandiyoti 
1988, Cole 1991).  The echoes of the “honor and shame” value system can be observed 
far beyond the Mediterranean, with the Arabic and Farsi equivalent of these terms being 
expressed in the concepts of gheirat (sexual honour and jealousy) and hayā (women’s 
modesty and shyness) (Mir-Hosseini 2004). Because most of my interlocutors did not use 
the discourse of gheirat and hayā in their disucssions (although a few did), I do not 
elaborate on these concepts in the body of the thesis. Perhaps my research participants, 
leaning towards secularity and “modernity”, have moved away from this discourse, 
which has religious overtones. Nevertheless, such discourses may have affected some of 
their behaviours and attitudes, and contributed to the facework (Goffman 1955) necessary 
to performing virginity, as well as closed attitudes towards female sexuality. It bears 
mentioning that there are also parallel values and practices in the western hemisphere, an 
example of which is “purity culture” among certain Christian Americans (Eltwahawy 
2015). Of course, migrant populations also carry their beliefs with them, which brings me 
to the Iranians of Montreal.  
Migrant populations offer some unique characteristics for study: those who have 
made the decision and gathered the means to leave their country of origin can be broadly 
labeled part of an “upwardly mobile” class. To leave one’s homeland for the unknown is, 
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presumably, to take an outward view. Especially for young immigrants, it can mean an 
openness to change.  On the other hand, migrant populations, faced with a hostile new 
environment, sometimes become particularly protective of certain of their values. As 
Moghissi (1999) has observed, this is also the case for Iranian migrants. Having 
conducted interviews with women of Iranian origin in Montreal, Toronto, and 
Vancouver, she claims that “maintaining communal dignity and cultural identity” has 
been emphasized in their communities “at the expense of gender equality and democratic 
rights” (Moghissi 1999, 207). That research, is, however, a bit dated. I concur that this 
attitude can be observed to an extent in the religious Iranian Shi’a community, which is 
the community in which I was raised. Some of my participant observation occurred in 
three different Iranian mosques or religious centres, and I spoke with people from such 
communities. One of my interview participants, who arrived in Canada at a young age 
and was also raised in these communities, attested to the conservative attitudes of her 
parents and surrounding community, including regarding interactions with the opposite 
sex, which was not dissimilar from my own experience.  
However, the majority of my participants were more recent arrivals. Although my 
sampling (discussed in the section on methodology) was based on convenience and not 
representativeness (I entered those communities where Iranians gathered that were 
accessible to me, and could only interview those who agreed to participate), there has 
certainly been much immigration during the intervening years. Given Iran’s young 
population and the profile of those who immigrate (often young people seeking to 
continue their education or find better employment opportunities), a great proportion of 
these new immigrants are youth. Many scholars have also cited growing dissatisfaction 
and unrest among youth regarding the regime and the economic situation, and the new 
generation is more globally connected than the previous. One can observe certain 
attitudinal differences between this and the generation that immigrated in the 80s. Thus, I 
imagined my study population as one in which change was likely to be observable. 
However, my findings suggest that despite some modifications in norms surrounding 
dating and courtship, marriage values and values surrounding virginity remain largely 
unaltered. I thus orient my arguments against the findings of Mahdavi (2009), who, 
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focusing on the elite youth of Upper Tehran, claims that there is a “sexual revolution” in 
the works among Iranian youth7.  
Given that, as several of my female interviewees expressed, the continued 
emphasis on virginity represents an unfair burden on girls that disproportionately places 
limits on their personal freedom, including attempts at control by parents or partners, I 
believe it is a problem to be addressed. My thesis will detail the perspectives and 
concerns of women who participated in my research, while also presenting some of the 
men’s attitudes, in hopes of giving a fuller picture of the situation.  
Theoretical Framework and Argument 
 
In order to understand virginity, one needs to consider the broader discourse on 
sex and gender in general and marriage in particular. I use Najmabadi’s concept of sex-
gender (2013) as opposed to Rubin’s sex/gender (1975), to highlight the fact that in the 
“Iranian context”, the bifurcation of the two concepts recognized by Western activists, 
although it has been taken up by Iranian feminists, is largely unrecognized by the broader 
public. My understanding of marriage is informed by Lévi-Strauss's (1969[1949]) 
concept of the exchange of women and particularly Rubin’s (1975) feminist elaboration 
of it. That the giving in marriage of women by men is fundamental to the structuring of 
society—although mutably so, according to Rubin—offers an explanation for why men 
seek to control the sexuality and/or fertility of their kinswomen, the implication being 
that women do not have the option to give themselves, ownership of their bodies lying in 
the hands of men.  
I also rely on Najmabadi's (2008) concept of the Iranian “marriage imperative”: 
marriage is a rite of passage to adulthood for both men and women, but perhaps 
especially of women, given the terminology of dokhtar (girl/virgin) and zan (woman), the 
former being valid until a woman is married (the same distinction not typically being 
made of men).  
                                                        
7 While my study location is different from Mahdavi’s, it must be noted that many of my participants could 
have been (and some certainly were) living in Tehran at the time of Mahdavi’s research, which makes 
broad generalizations about Iranian youth in general and fails to adequately consider class and gender 
dynamics and inequalities in sexual relations.   
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I am working within the framework of the structure-versus-agency debate: I wish 
to highlight women’s agency in both resisting and co-opting virginity imperatives, and 
the broader sex-gender system, to their own ends. It is in this context that both hymen 
repair surgery, (as disruptive of, but also colluding with, prevalent attitudes regarding 
virginity (Kaivanara 2015)) and practices of hypergyny (which appears anti-feminist, but 
which can be utilized pragmatically by women in the service of social mobility) become 
relevant.  
While resistance is a fascinating topic, and some of my female interviewees told 
great stories about their own resistance (secretly having/talking to their boyfriends, 
marriage used to escape the pressures of home, education used similarly, divorce), there 
has been some criticism of the focus placed by anthropologists and others on “the 
romance of resistance”. Abu-Lughod (1990) argues that one can display agency even in 
situations when one is not necessarily resisting. It is with this lens that I wish to examine 
what I feel is a more prevalent response to the “virginity dilemma”: collusion.  
Among the women I spoke with, the majority did not identify as feminist, though 
most acknowledged the problematic nature of virginity values. In their own lives, 
however, the majority hadn’t displayed much outward resistance. They instead accepted 
the dominant narratives around them and engaged in face-saving in order to convey an 
image to others,  including myself, of an acceptable Iranian woman. Likewise, many of 
the men did not have much interest in challenging the dominant norms. But as it is 
women’s sexuality that is under scrutiny, perhaps women simply have too much at stake.  
Indeed, women have much at stake in part because it is their successful 
performance of virginity that can ensure them marriage to a desirable man—one who is 
older, taller, more educated, and richer—and thus a future that is socially and 
economically secure. As I realized that hypergyny was practiced by my research 
participants because it afforded a chance at social mobility to women, I came to link it 
with women’s acquiescence to virginity imperatives. In order to secure a desirable match, 
a woman’s safest option is to ensure her virginity before marriage, either through sexual 
abstinence or through hymen reconstruction surgery. This collusion (even scheming, as 
one man I spoke to put it), and conformity with virginity imperatives contributes to 
reproducing the virginity imperative and its valuation by men who either are none-the-
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wiser or who “would rather be lied to”, as one of my female interviewees put it. But to 
fail to adequately perform virginity would mean more than losing the possibility of a 
“good” marriage. It could mean no marriage at all in a society where marriage is deemed 
necessary and where a married woman has a much higher status than an unmarried one 
(see Mahdavi 2009), in addition to the loss of face of the woman and, indeed, her family.    
Hence, for some women, who can save face and thereby improve their social and 
economic lot, conforming to the virginity imperative is beneficial. Nevertheless, the 
continued existence of the virginity imperative can be quite harmful for others: not 
bleeding on one’s wedding night can lead to marital conflict that could potentially be life-
threatening in certain circumstances. In other circumstances, such as that of my 
interlocutor Sara, the policing of the body through forced virginity testing can be 
incredibly stressful and an affront to one’s dignity. Thus I argue that virginity imperatives 
are not simply a cultural practice assented to by men and women, but are a mechanism by 
which women’s bodies are policed, controlled, and categorized as desirable or 
undesirable, suitable for marriage or available for fucking.   
 
Some Notes on Method  
 
The fieldwork for this thesis was originally intended to take place in Iran. Due to 
circumstances surrounding the arrest of Dr. Homa Hoodfar, who had recently retired 
from teaching at Concordia, only a few weeks before the thesis proposal was submitted, 
traveling to Iran seemed ill-advised. Consequently, it was not possible to formulate an 
entirely different research project, and the most expedient solution seemed to be to 
continue with the project as initially conceived, using the rich base of historical and other 
literature about Iran, and adding to that some additional literature about the Iranians in 
Canada. Therefore, although this research took place among Iranians in Canada, the 
reader should keep in mind that the question of “Iranianness in Canada” or questions of 
adjusting to life in a new country, although they may be broached, are not central to the 
research question.  
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The thesis relies heavily on a series of interviews that were conducted from June 
through August of 2016. There are several reasons for the interview-based nature of this 
inquiry. First, given the broad influence of the research topic, a broad “sampling” 
approach seemed more appropriate than a focus on a few individuals. Second, given the 
sensitive nature of the topic and the variety of related experiences, a broad sampling 
“reach” was also necessary in order to elicit the kinds of stories that would adequately 
illustrate the complexities and complications of the virginity imperative. Dr. Hoodfar had 
originally suggested I interview 30 women and 15 men, and as these numbers were fairly 
consistent with the sample sizes of sociological studies on similar topics (Moghissi 1999; 
Moghissi and Goodman 1999; Shirpak, Maticka-Tyndale and Chinichian 2007 and 2011), 
I started out with this goal in mind. Therefore, I attempted, within the constraints of the 
short time allotted for graduate anthropology research at Concordia University, to attend 
as many events as possible held by varied Iranian groups in Montreal, and to advertise 
my research on the Facebook pages of such groups.  
It soon became clear that although there was a certain overlap in attendees to 
some of the events, it would be very difficult to truly “get to know” people during the 
research, as many events were one-off, and those groups that held regular events held 
them rather infrequently, and there was no guarantee that a particular individual would be 
present at more than one event held by a particular organization. In other cases I had 
difficulty consistently attending events (such as Iftars during the month of Ramadan) due 
to the difficult timing, or had to choose between events held at the same time in different 
locations.  
Consequently, I proceeded by approaching individuals at events and informing 
them of the research in question. This was often an awkward process, and since for 
confidentiality reasons, I generally only attempted to approach people while they were 
alone, it was sometimes difficult. Sometimes the opportunity did not arise and I went 
home “empty-handed”, not having found any potential interviewees. More often, I tried 
obtaining contact information and only subsequently revealed the research project 
(usually by contacting those individuals via telegram). As this method often led to 
rejections, I drew more and more heavily on ad-based interviews towards the end of my 
research. I had initially posted ads to a couple of student Facebook groups in order to 
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“jump-start” the interviews. Having settled into fieldwork, I had aimed to reduce my 
reliance on this method. But when halfway through my fieldwork I realized that I could 
not complete my intended number of interviews by the end of the summer, I reduced the 
goal to 20 women and 10 men, and around the beginning of August, I increasingly found 
Facebook groups or telegram groups (sometimes recommended or suggested by 
participants) where I would make posts about my research and solicit interviews.   
These difficulties are in part due to the nature of urban ethnography. I had 
difficulty finding a core community. Most of my fieldwork sites were not closed 
communities but instead formed an open network, where participants were free to come 
and go. Further, since, at least in the venues I was attending, public discussion of 
sexuality is rare, I was hard-pressed to find anything especially important or relevant in 
my fieldwork observations, which forms a third reason for the focus on interviews. 
Although I received plenty of comments on my marital status (many older women I 
encountered in mosques, some of whom had known me since my childhood, commented 
on how early I had married), in the end I decided not to focus on these interactions in my 
thesis.  
Another concern led me to my decision not to include the interactions I had in 
religious spaces in my thesis. Due to my awareness of the Canadian government’s spying 
in Iranian mosques, I felt uncomfortable observing and writing about people in these 
spaces. It wasn’t clear how to obtain consent (especially given that people attend mosque 
gatherings on-and-off, and large numbers of people attend on special occasions), and 
since I was recognized as a member of the community, no-one questioned my presence. 
On the other hand, I have also heard concerns over the years from those more suspicious 
of the Iranian government that Iranian government spies attend such spaces, and did not 
want to be perceived as such either (I sometimes wonder if some of the rejections I 
received upon soliciting interviews were based on worries due to such an assumption). 
Consequently, I felt that I would rather avoid writing about my observations in religious 
spaces altogether. While some of my other material from participant observation is surely 
interesting, the interviews address the topic much more directly, so for time and space 
considerations, my thesis focuses on interview data almost exclusively.  
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The first few interviews with women were considered “pilot” interviews. I 
conducted them with women I knew, who provided some feedback on the questions. The 
goal was to use the knowledge gained from these initial interviews to improve the 
question set. Interviews were open-ended with many of the questions open to 
interpretation. I adopted a conversational style, asking further questions if the interviewee 
started on an interesting topic, and sometimes adding some of my own experiences to the 
discussion in an attempt to make interviewees more comfortable. In general, however, the 
goal was to finish the set of interview questions that I had decided were “useful”. Most 
interviews took between an hour and an hour and a half to complete. I originally intended 
to conduct life histories as well, and although I conducted one, time and space constraints 
did not allow me to conduct additional life histories or include the material from the first 
life history in the thesis. I believe life histories would nevertheless constitute a valuable 
addition to this research, although I hope that the present work does shed some light on 
this important topic.    
A Note on Translation and Transliteration 
 
As all but one interview took place in Farsi, all interview excerpts, unless 
otherwise indicated, are translations. My approach to translation is as follows. I attempt 
to remain close to the original narration of the text, not changing turns of phrase that are 
particular to Farsi if the meaning is clear and they do not generate confusion. The idea 
here is one I borrow from Viveiros de Castro, who believes “a good translation … is one 
that betrays the destination language, not the source language” (Viveiros de Castro 2004, 
3). Where no direct translation is available, I include the italicized Farsi term and a 
footnote explaining it. Where more than one translation is possible or there are important 
subtleties that are lost in translation, or the term in question is a recurrent key term, I 
include the original Farsi term italicized in parentheses. Important Farsi or Arabic terms 
are also included in the glossary. Where such losses are minor or acceptable and the 
intended meaning comes across in a simplified English translation, I take the liberty of 
making that simplification for the sake of readability. Code-switching to English is 
indicated by underlining.  
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For transliteration, I have used the system of the International Journal for Middle 
East Studies without diacritical marks except for ‘ (‘ayn) and ā (long alif).  
 
Chapter Summary  
 
The text is organized into three chapters, each of which focuses on different 
themes related to the core topic of virginity.  
In the first chapter, I focus on the tension of structure and agency by using Vigh’s 
concept of social navigation to illustrate the meanings of the twin themes of education 
and marriage for young Iranian women. I argue that social structure and individual 
agency are co-constructed: The existing structure provides the limits for individual 
agency, but individual agency can also disrupt the existing structure. This argument 
applies to the two domains of life I look at in the chapter: marriage and education.   
I provide some background on the structure of Iranian marriage and argue that it 
fits Claude Levi-Strauss’s theory of “the exchange of women”. Gayle Rubin’s feminist 
analysis of the former suggested that while Levi-Strauss was correct in positing “the 
exchange of women” as the basis of many societies, he was amiss in suggesting that this 
form of exchange formed the basis of culture, as this was a structure that could be 
modified.  
I also look briefly at the history of education in Iran, noting how expectations 
with regards to education have changed. By examining these two aspects of life, I argue 
that Iranian women construct their own lives based on the contingencies that are present 
in their environment, and provide excerpts from my interviews with such women.  
I also briefly consider the fact that while spouse selection has become more of an 
individual endeavour, its basis appears to remain, for many of my interlocutors, a 
decision based at least partly on economic rationality rather than ideals of romantic love. 
This background is necessary for the following discussion on virginity.  
In the second chapter, I tackle what I call “the virginity imperative”, or the social 
requirement to perform virginity, which I regard as a social construct. Virginity is a 
further constraint on women’s lives that must be navigated. In patriarchal and patrilineal 
societies, it is necessary for the maintenance of face and for assuring one’s marriage 
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prospects. These efforts are particularly necessitated by an attitude that sees sex as a 
relation of domination rather than equality (Mernissi 1982). I argue that while some 
women benefit from adequately performing virginity, those who do not are dehumanized 
via relegation to “whore” status in the virgin/whore dichotomy. The risk of being seen as 
a “whore” renders the performance of virginity all the more necessary. Furthermore, the 
devices of the virginity imperative (the policing of female bodies through virginity 
testing) make rebellion against virginity imperatives a difficult endeavour, and can inflict 
psychological trauma. Through illustrations from interviews with women, I argue that 
women need to perform virginity in order to continue living liveable lives and, also to 
secure access to a husband, in particular one who will provide for them financially.  
In the third chapter, I shift gears to focus on interviews with men. These 
narratives highlight some of the problems presented by the mixing of “traditional” and 
“modern” gender norms for young Iranians. While also revealing the stark contrast in the 
degrees to which young men and women’s lives are regulated, my interviews with men, 
when considered together with those with women, also show the difference in men and 
women’s sexual consciousness: among my interlocutors, men easily discussed matters of 
sexuality, while women usually did not.  
I attribute this difference in part to the belief I found was held by at least one male 
interlocutor, that sex is unholy. I hold that such a belief is incompatible with the true love 
that the same interlocutor desires and hopes to find in a spouse, instead advocating that 
egalitarian relationships are necessary precedent to such love. I discuss sexual pleasure as 
subject to a politics of knowledge that renders it less accessible to women. I then attempt 
to develop how women might go about re-appropriating their own pleasure. I argue that 
feminist discourses have long been silenced in Iran, and that sexuality and virginity are 
public issues. Women must enter the public discourse, but they are prevented from doing 
so through mechanisms such as the patriarchal bargain and limitations on their 
consciousness shaped by the politics of knowledge that limits their expression of their 
sexuality. In such contexts they are obliged to cope by employing “weapons of the weak” 
(Scott 1985, cited in Afary 2009), and “resorting to trickery” (Mernissi 1982). Assuming 
that men do not want to fall subject to the forgoing, it us necessary that they allow 
women space in the public discourse that regulates their own bodies.   
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Chapter 1: Constructing a Liveable Life: The Continuing Role of 
Marriage for Educated Young Iranian Women in Montreal 
 
 
For my mother and father it was not very pleasing for me to [leave my 
hometown to live and study in Tehran]. But I proved myself to them. 
You know … If I was in [my hometown], I would necessarily have had 
to live with my mother and father. Exactly because I knew this, at the 
age of 18 I was not a very studious kid, but I sat and I studied and I 
ranked 20th in the konkur.8 So that I could go to Tehran and live alone. 
I fought for it.  
 
And they really were placed in a situation where…For my parents 
studying was infinitely valued. Because of studies a person can do 
anything. It doesn’t matter at all [what they do]. Meaning I’m sure […] 
if the same Iranian said I want to come [to Canada] for work, it would 
be hard.  
 
But for studies, all parents’ tongues are short. You know? Because my 
parents, for example, they would stop [my sisters and I] from doing 
anything and everything during high school. For what? So that we 
would study. Now we had studied. Now what were they going to say? 
You know? Education is a weapon that with it you can… even in more 
traditional (sonnati) and religious (mazhabi) families, with studies you 
can marry late, with studies you can go to this and that city, with 
studies you can, [pauses] education is really a valuable weapon in the 
hands of… [laughs] girls. 
 
--Ensieh (31)9  
                                                        
8 Italicized terms are defined in the glossary.  
9 In order to maintain confidentiality and protect the identities of my interlocutors, all names for individuals 
identified by their first name only are pseudonyms (Those whose full names are included were individuals 
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This excerpt from my interview with Ensieh nicely summarizes some of the themes 
that I intend to address in this chapter and throughout this work. Ensieh’s commentary 
illustrates how young women’s agency works within the framework of their social 
structure. In this chapter I will highlight how this agency is mobilized through the twin 
themes of marriage and education. I argue that for young Iranian women, these two goals 
are not necessarily contradictory, but can both be tools toward achieving a better life. 
Ensieh’s narrative also highlights the fact that, as illustrated with further examples below, 
for the women I interview, living away from family prior to marriage is not normative, 
and families try to avoid such situations if possible.  
Ensieh explained that her sister also would have liked to move out on her own, but 
that since she was attending a university in their hometown, this was not possible.  
 
Ensieh:  See, my own sister is two years older than me. She has studied 
medicine.  She also really had a problem with this issue. […] Then 
when her age had gone up she didn’t like to live with [our] mom. Not 
necessarily that [our] family is bad or that she has problems with them. 
It’s just that when a person reaches a certain age it just really feels 
bad… 
Mona: But apparently in Iran this is the norm.  
Ensieh: It’s pretty much the norm. Until marriage you live with your 
family. Really this is the norm. The norm is pretty much that, you 
know?  Even for example myself…  
Mona: But they [young people] like it [to live away from home].  
Ensieh: But everyone likes for there to be such a possibility. For my 
sister there wasn’t. Because if in [our hometown] she went and lived in 
another house, even towards the end my father had accepted it, but my 
sister herself would say “If I go to another house people will talk 
                                                                                                                                                                     
who would have been easily recognizable, and they consented to the inclusion of their names). In addition, 
I have chosen to leave out or occlude, where necessary, certain specific details from the life narratives that 
may increase the likelihood of the identification of my interlocutors. I include summaries of certain 
demographic characteristics in the introduction. Omitting that data in life narratives does not subtract from 
them or from my argument, which does not address local peculiarities but a broader pattern. 
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behind my back. They’ll keep saying ‘What has happened between 
you?’” 
Mona: Ah, they’ll think there’s a problem… 
Ensieh: If there’s no problem what reason would a person have to live 
away from their family? 
 
Ensieh tells us that for young Iranian women, the possibility of living away from 
home is often trumped by efforts at “face-saving” (Goffman 1955, as cited in Hashemi 
2015), a concept that will appear again in later chapters. On their part, some young 
women value and, indeed, “fight for”, the increased independence afforded by living 
alone. Further, education, which is valued by parents, is a strategy for achieving this goal.  
Marriage, likewise, is another method through which women can attain 
independence from their family of origin. Although marriage does entail, to use the Farsi 
idiom, “leaving the roof of the father to go under the roof of the husband10”, it does 
afford a certain freedom and independence and in some ways may be preferable to being 
single (Mahdavi 2009, Afary 2009). Although marriage and education are sometimes 
regarded as antithetical, with some scholars arguing that women should be educated in 
order to avoid early marriage,11 what I wish to highlight here is this: notwithstanding the 
fact that both marriage and education are regarded as desirable by urban Iranian parents, 
as socially valued achievements, both marriage and education are strategically utilized by 
young women to navigate and improve their social circumstances to their own liking. 
One of my main observations presented in this chapter is that despite the social 
imperative to marry, marriage is often seen by young women as an opportunity rather 
                                                        
10 In Farsi, “Az zire saqfe pedar be zire saqfe shohar raftan”. It is often necessary to live under the roof 
of a mahram man, for the lack of such a guardian, or sarparast, is deemed unacceptable by more 
traditional, or sonnati families, as we will see was the case for Sara, introduced later in the chapter. 
The lack of the presence of such a guardian can lead to pity or stigma. Acccording to my interlocutor 
Ali, whom I introduce in chapter 3, it is such bisarparast women who, without the social and 
economic support of their families, are more likely to “endure” (tan bedan) to the religiously 
condoned but socially stigmatized arrangement known as sighe, or temporary marriage.   
11 See Tremayne (2006) for a review of some of the literature on this topic and for a discussion of the 
situation in Yazd, Iran, which at the time of Tremayne’s writing was very different from that of my 
interlocutors. 
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than something to avoid12. Hence, “early” marriages, especially in urban contexts, must 
not be looked at with the presupposition that they were coerced, but rather, the agency of 
young women in choosing such marriages in an attempt to navigate and to take control of 
their own lives must be taken into account. This pragmatic utilization of parental, and 
societal, expectations in order to attain something personally desirable is a theme I will 
return to in later chapters. Importantly, it is central to my argument regarding virginity. In 
that case, societal expectations are conformed to in order to attain desirable outcomes in 
one’s personal life, such as the improved living conditions afforded by hypergyny. On 
both accounts, it is important to highlight the co-presence, indeed the co-construction, of 
structural conditions and personal agency: structural conditions provide the framework in 
which agency may act, and are in turn subject to modification by agents.  
As Abu-Lughod (2003) has argued, the absence of resistance to dominant norms 
does not indicate the absence of agency.  And as I will argue in later chapters, absence of 
overt resistance to what I call, to borrow Najmabadi’s phrasing13, “the virginity 
imperative”, leads to its reproduction. In the case of my research participants, their stories 
indicate intentional and selective conformity with respect to societal norms while 
resisting specific manifestations of parental control (thus, the idea of marriage may not be 
resisted, while whom one marries may be a subject of conflict). The life histories of these 
women must be read as agentive consequences of their own calculated actions, not as 
mere subjection to oppressive structural impositions. To understand my interloctors’ 
actions, then, I think it is relevant to consider Vigh’s theory of social navigation, which is 
informed by “attentiveness to the way in which agents seek to draw and actualize their 
life trajectories in order to increase their social possibilities in a shifting and volatile 
social environment” (2006, 11).  
Given the social upheavals of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the “class 
reshuffling” (Mahdavi 2009) that followed, the subsequent war with Iraq, and sanctions 
by the U.S. and other Western nations that are only recently, and with contestation from a 
number of political actors on both sides, beginning to be lifted, the economic situation in 
                                                        
12 On the other hand, for men, whose personal freedom and independence is greater prior to marriage than 
afterwards (partly due to the fact that they are not subject to virginity imperatives, at least not to the degree 
that women are), marriage is sometimes put off or avoided by men, as some of my female informants 
alluded.  
13 Najmabadi discusses “the marriage imperative” in her own work.  
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Iran over the past few decades has been far from predictable.  Furthermore, the changes 
in social discourse and shifts in degree of morality policing (Mahdavi 2009, Khatam 
2010) over various presidential administrations, which have swung between reformist 
and conservative candidates14, indicates a socially tumultuous situation that suggests 
conflict between those who see Iran’s future in joining the global economy and those who 
wish to maintain isolationist policies. The situation is indicative of a deep rift in the 
worldviews of the populace, which can lead to social tensions and may contribute to a 
sense of instability. The value of the Rial has hit an all-time low in recent years15 and 
youth unemployment is high (Mahdavi 2009), particularly among women.  In such a 
situation, it is reasonable for individuals to “hedge their bets” by doing their best to 
ensure any available means of economic security.  
 Hedging one’s bets can mean maintaining traditional marriage practices and 
gender ideology. For those Iranians immigrating to Canada, the pressure to marry 
remains, through parental pressure and through the way their social situation in Iran has 
informed their understanding of the world. Nevertheless, several of the young Iranians I 
spoke with had alternative ideas about what was desirable when it came to marriage, 
although given social pressures of what Najmabadi has called the marriage imperative, 
the degree to which they are able to actualize these desires is more open to question. 
                                                        
14 In recent years, election results have swung from the moderate Khatami first elected in 1997 and re-
elected in 2001, to the socially conservative and politically isolationist Ahmadinejad first elected in 2005 
and re-elected in 2009, to the moderate Rouhani first elected in 2013 and re-elected in 2017, under whose 
term dialogue with the US was opened for the first time since the inception of the Islamic Republic. In the 
2017 election, the runner-up Ebrahim Raisi won 38.30% of the vote (with a turnout of 73.33% of the 
electorate), the highest percentage any runner-up has achieved since the revolution of 1979 replaced the 
Shah’s monarchy. Even in the infamously contested 2009 re-election of Ahmadinejad, the runner-up, Mir-
Hossein Mousavi, had won only 33.75% of the vote (with a high voter turnout of 85%). This shift from the 
landslide elections of the 1980s indicates deep divisions among Iranian voters, which reveal themselves in 
the surprise results of some of the recent elections and most poignantly in the 2009 post-election protests. 
Of course, when considering these numbers it must be borne in mind that the Supreme leader and elected 
Council of Guardians filter candidates so that only those they deem suitable can run for the presidency, so it 
is difficult to gauge, based on these numbers alone, the true preferences of the populace. What I mean to 
illustrate here is simply that the political situation in Iran has been far from predictable in recent years, as 
my argument is that lack of predictability encourages a holding on to traditional means of social and 
economic security.  
15 There was a steep drop in the value of the Rial in 2013, and in 2016 the Rouhani government proposed 
shifting the unit of currency to the older unit, the toman (worth 10 rials and still more commonly used 
colloquially), a move that may partly have been a response to the recent decline in the Rial’s value. See: 
Bertrand, Pierre (08/12/2016).  Iran considers currency change. Euronews. 
http://www.euronews.com/2016/12/08/iran-considers-currency-change. Accessed June 19, 2017.  
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 My interlocutors were almost unanimously against what they saw as the pecuniary 
extravagance of many contemporary marriage ceremonies in Iran, and the majority were 
in favour of affectionate or love-based marriage that involved mutual compatibility of the 
partners, as opposed to strictly arranged marriages. Although none of my interlocutors 
mentioned themselves having had such arrangements, several mentioned that “white 
marriage”, a sort of de-facto cohabiting arrangement (perhaps similar to the ‘urfi 
marriage practiced in Egypt (El Feki 2013)) which, while not legally recognized, is 
becoming increasingly popular in Iran.  
 A few of my interlocutors questioned the very premises of marriage as it is 
defined in the Iranian Islamic legal tradition (further described below). Specifically, one 
woman interlocutor, Irsaa, in the context of my asking about temporary marriage16 
questioned not only that practice but the very idea of mahr (in the context of permanent 
marriage as well) as inherently demeaning to women because it implied that the woman 
was selling her body, rather than partaking in an equal relationship in which she also 
experienced sexual pleasure17. While the majority of Iranian women are not opposed to 
receiving mahr18, as, although sometimes husbands become reluctant to pay it when 
                                                        
16 This is a form of marriage that is legal according to Shi’ite doctrine, but is frowned upon by middle- and 
upper- class Iranians because it is seen as socially stigmatizing to women who contract them. Married men 
who take temporary wives are disliked (by their first (permanent) wife, by their wife’s family, and also by 
many members of middle- and upper- class society). Women are seen to (and generally, do) desire 
permanent marriage due to the economic and social stability it implies. According to many clerics, virgin 
women are not allowed to enter a temporary marriage without their father’s permission, while men (virgin 
or not) do not require permission. Another reason families may not desire their daughters especially to enter 
temporary marriage is that temporary marriage does not benefit the families of the individuals involved 
because it is a contract between individuals rather than families (thanks to Homa Hoodfar for this detail). 
Like permanent marriage, the religious rules governing temporary marriage favour men’s sexual pleasure 
over women’s bodily autonomy. A temporary marriage is seen primarily as “a marriage of pleasure”, but 
men’s pleasure is privileged. For example, men can have as many temporary wives as they please, even 
simultaneously, while women can have one at a time if not already married, and must wait three or four 
menstrual cycles, known as idda after the end of the contract and before contracting a subsequent marriage. 
The idda period is meant to ascertain paternity in case the woman has become pregnant. Her child will then 
be considered legitimate.  
17 A similar critique is made by a sex worker in Abbas Kiarostami’s film Ten. She tells the married woman 
who, having offered her a ride, is questioning her means of living that what they each do is not that 
different: the married woman sells “in bulk” while the sex worker herself sells “in retail”.  
18 Indeed, it has fairly recently, within the last decade or so, become popular to ask for large sums, often 
gold coins in the amount of the year of the woman’s birthdate (the current year of the Iranian calendar, at 
the time of writing, being 1396). Contrast this with sums popular during the early years of the revolution: 
five gold coins to represent the five most holy figures in Shi’ite Islam (the prophet Muhammad, his son-in 
law Ali, his daughter Fatima, and his grandsons Hassan and Hussein) or twelve gold coins representing the 
twelve Imams of twelver shi’ism (descendants of the prophet starting from Ali and ending with Mahdi). 
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women ask for it in divorce, it is often a powerful bargaining chip in a legal system that 
works largely against them (See Longinotto and Mir-Hosseini 1998). As for temporary 
marriage itself, many of my interlocutors, both men and women, saw it as demeaning to 
women (as Haeri (1990) has also indicated is the case among the Iranian middle-class), 
but Ensieh instead saw it as a progressive institution that accorded certain rights and 
respectability in the context of sex work.  
 In addition, there has been an increase in openness about sexual activity among 
young people (Mahdavi 2009) as confirmed by one interlocutor, Narmin, who insisted I 
talk to people in the lower bracket of my target age-range19, and by a few of my contacts 
in Iran. Furthermore, there is an increasing number of women not married by forty-five 
years of age, and of women who do not want children20. I have listed these various 
unconventional practices and ideological stances to highlight the fact that the situation in 
Iran and among my interlocutors is far from static. Indeed, as is also the case elsewhere in 
the Middle East (see El Feki 2013), there is much debate surrounding marriage, sexuality 
and the rights of women within marriage and in society. The reader should bear this in 
mind when considering the next section.  
In this chapter I attempt to illustrate the “dialectic between individual agency and 
social forces” (Vigh 2006, 11) by highlighting some of the accounts of women I 
interviewed. But first, it is necessary to provide some background on what both marriage 
and education mean in an Iranian context.  
The Structure of an Iranian Marriage: The Exchange of Women 
 
Afary asserts that in the 1860s marriage was nearly universal in Iran (2009, 21). 
Najmabadi's (2008) concept of the "marriage imperative" affirms that this remains the 
case today. Marriage was (and to a certain extent, remains) a contract between 
households, in which specific members held specific roles, and a number of economic 
exchanges occurred in the process. Among urban bāzāri and elite families, whom Afary 
                                                                                                                                                                     
While mahr is necessary in an Islamic marriage contract, it can also be symbolic: often a copy of the 
Qur’an and a trip to Hajj is automatically marked down as mahr in notary offices, and nothing more than 
this is required.  
19 Regrettably, I did not succeed in finding and setting up interviews with a sufficient number of younger 
people (closer to age 20).  
20 Personal communication with Homa Hoodfar.  
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calls the "old middle class", mothers usually found potential spouses, while fathers or 
other male guardians negotiated the financial details. The groom's family promised to pay 
mahriyeh (a marriage gift payable to the bride at any time after the marriage), as well as a 
small shir baha (compensation for the woman’s breastfeeding of children produced 
through the union), while the bride's family was responsible for their daughter's jahiziyeh 
(trousseau). The husband was also responsible to provide nafaqeh (living expenses, or 
“maintenance” for the wife) (Afary 2009, 21-22).  
The many exchanges involved in the marriage contract show its economic and 
social importance to all parties involved. The jahiziyeh, for example, was accumulated by 
the bride's family over a period of many years, and served as an incentive for the girl to 
get married (Afary 2009, 23). Since men were breadwinners (an expectation that remains 
to this day among most families), a girl's marriage had the added benefit of relieving an 
economic burden on her family by transferring responsibility for her living expenses to 
the groom.  
Today, both law and social norms dictate the woman's reception of mahriyeh and 
nafaqeh, and jahiziyeh remains a must as the bride's family's contribution to the couple's 
new life, while the groom's family provides wedding expenses. Providing official 
religious sanction to these practices, traditionalist fiqh-based texts on marriage "revolve 
around the twin themes of sexual access and compensation, embodied in the concepts of 
tamkin (submission [man's right and woman's duty]) and nafaqa (maintenance [woman's 
right and man's duty])” (Mir-Hosseini 2004, 4). 
Given that young, unmarried women did not traditionally have much economic 
independence as they were generally confined to the domestic sphere (Afary 2009), 
women were not in a position to negotiate the terms of their own marriage.  The 
exchange structure present in this marriage system thus leads me to propose that Levi-
Strauss’ (1969[1949]) theory, in which he posits marriage as based on “the exchange of 
women” between men, is especially applicable in this context. Lending support to my 
claim, Tremayne has argued that in Iran, unmarried girls "effectively remain the property 
of their fathers and under their authority until they marry, at which point the 
responsibility is transferred to the husband" (2006, 80). Further support for this argument 
is provided by the common idiom in Farsi that the girl’s family gives their daughter and 
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the groom gets a wife21. The idiom is asymmetrical, with the giving and receiving 
occurring in one direction—it would be odd to say that one is giving their son or getting a 
groom.  
The traditionalist clerical establishment in Iran agrees that women's bodies, or at 
least their sexual parts, belong to men. Marriage is defined in classical fiqh texts as “a 
civil contract to render sex between a man and woman licit” (Mir-Hosseini 2012, 128). 
Modeled after the contract of sale, the marriage contract “places a wife under her 
husband’s qiwama, a mixture of dominion and protection” (Mir Hosseini 2012, 128).  A 
definition of marriage by Muhaqqiq Hilli, "one of the most prominent Shi'a jurists" (Mir 
Hosseini 2004, 4), goes as follows: "a contract whose object is that of dominion over the 
vagina, without the right of possession" (Hilli 1985, cited in Mir Hosseini 2004, 4). Such 
dominion requires that a man have “unhampered sexual access” (Mir Hosseini 2012, 128) 
to his wife, which gives him the right to control his wife’s movements outside of the 
house and prevent her from engaging in non-obligatory forms of worship, such as fasting, 
that may interfere with this unhampered access (Mir-Hosseini 2012). Such clerics believe 
"that men are superior to women, so it is natural for men to dominate" (Mir Hosseini 
2004, 3). It bears mentioning, nevertheless, that other clerics advocate more moderate 
views, with "neo-traditionalists" advocating complementarity between the sexes and 
"revisionists" proposing gender equality (Mir Hosseini 2004). Mir-Hosseini (2013) tells 
us that there is an emerging reformist and feminist scholarship in Islam that is in the 
process of rereading textual sources “in the light of the changed conditions of women and 
contemporary notions of justice in which gender equality is now inherent […] severing 
the link between sexuality and inequality in Muslim legal tradition that has sustained 
gender inequality” (2013, 143). This link, however, cannot be ignored when considering 
non-egalitarian attitudes surrounding sexuality that persist in societies where these legal 
traditions have held sway.  
The idea of “the exchange of women” gives some indication of why women’s 
virginity (further addressed in Chapter 2) is disproportionately emphasized in relation to 
that of men. As one of my female interlocutors, Irsaa, mentioned, the term “dokhtar’e 
bākere” (virgin girl) comes naturally, whereas “pesar’e bākere” or “marde bākere” 
                                                        
21 Respectively, dokhtar dādan and zan gereftan.  
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(virgin boy and virgin man, respectively), are not typical in Farsi. I was told by other 
interlocutors that there was an Arabic term for a male virgin, azab, but I had never heard 
it before, and with reason: it was only used in very particular contexts, specifically, 
religious (fiqh) discourse which necessitated such a distinction. It follows that if women 
are gifts to be exchanged, they ought to be delivered to their recipients “intact” and in 
their original packaging, as otherwise, they are flawed, damaged, or as a metaphor that 
dates back to Shakespeare goes, “deflowered”.  
In Iran, families historically tended to marry off their daughters at a very young 
age, which allowed them to control the marriage process and guard their daughter’s 
chastity. This practice was condoned by pre-Islamic law under the Sasanid dynasty22, as 
well as Islamic law, according to which a girl's age of legal majority was nine lunar 
years, although a father or male guardian could arrange a marriage contract on the girl's 
behalf even before this age (Afary 2009). Although some changes were made under Reza 
Shah raising the minimum age of marriage (from nine to fifteen for girls and from fifteen 
to eighteen for boys) (Afary 2009), after the Islamic revolution of 1979 the minimum age 
of marriage for girls was brought down to nine years (Hoodfar and Assadpour 2000). 
During the reformist Sixth Parliament, the state raised the legal age of marriage for girls 
to thirteen (Afary 2009). Nevertheless, as companionate marriage23, in which the husband 
                                                        
22 The Sasanian dynasty ruled Iran from 224 to 651 AD.  
23 The trend in promotion of companionate marriage, although roughly contemporaneous with similar 
trends in Europe (such as with the Bloomsbury Group of which Virginia Woolf was a member) and in the 
United States (Simmons 2009), has different results in the context of Iran (as discussed by Najmabadi 2005 
and Afary 2009) than that in Western countries. Iranian elites at the time were impressed by European 
modernization and sought to emulate it, and with this came a discourse on the importance of women’s 
education (Najmabadi 1998). Many girls’ schools were opened under the argument that women, until 
recently synonymous with the household, were (in the context of parliamentary reform where men were 
expected to become modern citizens of the state) now managers of the household who would be better 
educators of children if they were themselves educated, an argument which worked until women began to 
enter universities in the 1930s, at which point a shift in discourse was necessary (Najmabadi 1998). 
However, the Iranian context was different from that of Europe and North America. In addition to strictly 
arranged marriages, some of the issues critiqued by then-revolutionary writers such as Mirza Fath Ali 
Akhundzadeh (1812-1878) and Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani (1854-1896) included polygamy, temporary 
marriage, pederasty, and sodomy. These writers promoted women’s unveiling, believing that this would 
solve the problem of pederasty (status-defined homosexuality having been prevalent in Iran until then (see 
Najmabadi 2005)), as men’s inclinations to amrads (young men who had yet to grow beards) were a result 
of a perversion of a natural inclination towards women that could not be satisfied when the latter were 
veiled. Thus the discourse on companionate marriage was accompanied by a shift towards compulsory 
heterosexuality in emulation of Europe. In her classic memoir, the Qajar princess Taj al-Saltana (1884-
1936) expressed a need for romantic love within marriage, as well as a need for women to earn an 
honorable living to free them from prostitution and poverty in the context of the insufficient incomes of 
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and wife share mutual affection, began to be emphasized in the nineteenth century, 
beginning with literary works published between 1920 and 1940 (Afary 2009), women’s 
average age at first marriage has risen, and continues to rise as women attain higher 
levels of education; it was 19.7 in 1976 and about 22 in 1996, and the gap between the 
age of rural and urban women at first marriage is decreasing (Nomani and Behdad 2006, 
Zangeneh 2005, Howard 2002, Aghajanian and Mehryar 2005, as cited in Afary 2009). 
Thus there is roughly a ten-year difference between the mean age of marriage today and 
the legal age of marriage (Afary 2009).  
Nevertheless, child marriage continues to be legal in Iran under certain 
circumstances. For girls under 13 and boys under 15, it is legally required that the 
marriage be approved by a judge who deems it “beneficial to the welfare of the child” 
(Justice for Iran 2013, 6), while international human rights do not consider child marriage 
beneficial under any circumstances.  According to a report by the organization Justice for 
Iran, in 2012, 1537 girls below the age of 10, and 29827 girls between 10 and 14, were 
forced to marry. The girl in such a marriage, is, of course, unable to consent. The 
continued occurrence of such marriages, which by international standards are considered 
a form of slavery, emphasizes my point that the legal structure of marriage in Iran is 
arranged in such a way that the woman (or, in the case of child marriages, the girl) need 
not freely enter the union, but may do so under coercive circumstances, implying once 
again that her body is not her own.  
In ending this section, I wish to highlight Gayle Rubin’s analysis of the exchange 
of women: "If it is women who are being transacted, then it is the men who give and take 
them who are linked, the woman being a conduit of a relationship rather than partner to it 
[…] The relations of such a system are such that women are in no position to realize the 
benefits of their own circulation" (Rubin 1975, 174). Rubin’s argument shows that this 
                                                                                                                                                                     
male heads of household among the urban working population. Despite these efforts, the discourse on 
companionate marriage in Iran was not accompanied by the same shifts experienced in the West in the 19th 
and 20th centuries, including women’s increased participation in the economy and the women’s rights 
movement, which achieved legal changes according women more rights within and without marriage, 
rendering marriage more optional and divorce more acceptable (Afary 2009). For Iranian women, who had 
fewer rights within marriage, the institution until very recently remained child-centered, and many devoted 
their lives to an ensuring their daughters got a proper schooling while themselves remaining in unhappy 
marital unions (Afary 2009). The situation may have begun to change for this most recent generation of 
Iranian women, who are more educated and among whom there is a trend for later marriage and childbirth.   
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type of marriage system is fundamentally based on gender inequality, a theme I have 
touched on above and will return to in following chapters. Importantly, Rubin takes issue 
with Levi-Strauss’ conceptualization of the exchange of women as being at the origin of, 
and by extension intrinsic to, culture (Rubin 1975, 176). Because culture is, by definition, 
inventive, Rubin sees the theory of the exchange of women as "an initial step toward 
building an arsenal of concepts with which sexual systems can be described" (Rubin 
1975, 177), and eventually, dismantled in favour of more egalitarian ones.  
My interlocutors did not describe marriage in terms of Levi-Strauss’s theory. And 
as Mir-Hoseeini (2012) tells us, the logic of “women’s sexuality as property and marriage 
as a form of sale … is so repugnant to modern sensibilities and values, so alien from 
contemporary Muslims’ experience of marriage, that no author can openly admit to 
following it, but it comes to the surface [in the reasoning of ‘neo-traditionalist’ texts on 
‘women’s rights in Islam’]”. While the majority of my interlocutors did not place much 
emphasis on romantic love, they did emphasize the mutual understanding and affection 
that would be appropriate to companionate marriage. But as we’ll see in later chapters, 
some of the attitudes they presented (such as men’s emphasis on virginity) are not 
compatible with companionate marriage, which implies mutual respect and equal 
personhood of the partners. In companionate marriage, I argue, a woman should be free 
to choose her marriage partner and to give herself in marriage. In recent years, Iranians 
have been moving towards such a model of marriage (Moaddel 2008, cited in Afary 
2009). The dissonance between this new form and the retention of virginity imperatives 
must be understood as due to the fact that the latter belong to the old system. Recognizing 
“traditional” Iranian marriage structures as a form of exchange of women allows us to 
deconstruct it to its elements and reconfigure new, more egalitarian forms in love and 
marriage.  
The Marriage Imperative 
 
The “marriage imperative”, as Afsaneh Najmabadi (2008) has called it, falls upon 
every young Iranian, barring exceptional circumstances. It is such an accepted life stage, 
marking the passage to adulthood, that, to my surprise, none but one of my female 
interviewees responded in the positive when I asked whether they had ever resisted the 
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idea of marriage itself. Marriage is also an opportunity for women to gain upward social 
mobility, as hypergyny is typically practiced by Iranians, as I can attest from my lifelong 
observations among the Iranian community in Montreal as well as discussions with my 
interlocutors. 
In Iran, as the literature (Afary 2009, Mahdavi 2009) suggests, married women 
have a greater degree of freedom than unmarried women, which explains why marriage is 
desirable to young women (and not just their families and communities). For women who 
leave home, this sometimes involves some negotiation: in some cases women I met and 
interviewed had married just prior to leaving Iran, and, on the other side of the coin, some 
families showed concern with their single daughters living away from home, as seen in 
the case of Ensieh.   
As in other countries in the region, the age of marriage in Iran has risen for both 
sexes (Dejong et al., cited in Tremayne 2006, 66) in recent years. Nevertheless, marriage 
remains the norm for both genders.  
If a woman fails to marry before a certain age, she is stigmatized. For instance, in 
Yazd, a town that has "retained most of its traditional and religious characteristics in spite 
of approaching one of the highest levels of socioeconomic development within the 
country" and a high female literacy rate (Abassi-Shavazi, cited in Tremayne 2006, 75), 
there is a high incidence of early marriage (defined as marriage before the age of fifteen) 
(Tremayne 2006). Tremayne's ethnographic work revealed many negative evaluations of 
girls who had remained unmarried beyond what was perceived as the ideal marriage age: 
"Unmarried girls above thirteen years of age were stigmatized as 'something being 
seriously wrong with her' and as being 'spoilt goods' (Tremayne 2006, 79). Girls over the 
age of twenty were referred to as having "gone sour" (dokhtar-e-torshideh) (Tremayne 
2006, 84), and even if such a girl had a respectable career, she would still live with her 
parents and be regarded as "an object of pity and wonder" (Tremayne 2006, 82). On the 
other hand, many of Tremayne's interlocutors laughed at the notion of "early marriage", 
as no stigma was attached to such marriages, which were regarded as ideal. While the age 
at first marriage is not as low in all parts of the country, the stigmatization of unmarried 
girls happens elsewhere as well, and women's marriage prospects decrease as they age. 
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Tremayne argues that "the practice of early marriage has adapted itself to modernity and 
its imperatives" (Tremayne 2006, 67).   
Besides simply avoiding stigmatization, there are several additional reasons why a 
young Iranian woman would want to get married. Along with productive employment 
and housing, marriage is among the socioeconomic benchmarks that have traditionally 
defined adulthood in the Middle East (Hoodfar 1997, as cited in Hashemi 2015). 
Tremayne supports this notion with her description of an unmarried young woman as 
being uncertain of her future and identity, and thus in a state of limbo (Tremayne 2006, 
84). But employment and housing are traditionally the responsibility of men: even if a 
wife is employed, the husband is responsible for her financial up-keep, as in Islamic 
tradition, he is regarded as the breadwinner (Hoodfar 1997, as cited in Hashemi 2015). A 
woman may thus want to marry to relieve the economic burden on her father (Tremayne 
2006, 79). In addition, marriage may provide her with a certain degree of freedom 
(Vieille 1978, 456 ; cited in Afary 2009) and a means by which she could improve her 
social status (Afary 2009, Mahdavi 2009). There is also the religious aspect: traditionalist 
texts on "proper Islamic family life" regularly include chapters on "the virtues of 
marriage" (Mir Hosseni 2004, 3), which, as a few of my interviewees reminded me, is 
popularly described as "half of the faith".  
One may wonder then, what the motivations for marriage are for secular, educated 
Iranian women living in Canada. For them, marriage may remain a form of social capital 
in their communities, as well a way of assuaging concerned parents (I recently 
encountered a visiting Iranian couple in their seventies who were worried about the 
marriage prospects of their son and daughter, both in their thirties and living in 
Montreal). Furthermore, these women may also sense a feeling of unrootedness (as we’ll 
see in Chapter 3). They may also aspire to marry due to the potential of upward mobility 
if they can find a husband of higher status, as we’ll see later in the chapter.    
Education for Iranian Women 
 
It is clear from my interviews that education is another strategy for social mobility 
aspired to by many Iranians. Those who move from smaller towns to Tehran, or from 
Iran to other countries, are often motivated by the possibility for the improvement in their 
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living conditions that such movements may entail. In the case of my interview 
participants, except for a couple of cases who told me they spent their entire life in 
Esfahan (now Iran’s second-largest city in terms of population) almost all my 
participants, despite the diversity of their origins, had spent some part of their life in 
Tehran. It would not be amiss to consider Tehran the hub through which an individual 
aspiring to upward mobility will move. Whether one was born there or went there for 
university, the road to Canada would almost always pass through Tehran.  
The discourse on women’s education in Iran began in the late 19th century, when 
early texts began to promote women’s education because as “managers of the household” 
and educators of children, women’s own education could not be allowed to lag behind 
(Najmabadi 1998). Although today we might claim instead that women ought to be 
educated for their own sake, these texts must be taken in historical context. They were 
written within a general ethos of modernization and progress, and their authors were 
concerned that Iran was lagging behind Europe partly due to women’s lack of education. 
They present, as Najmabadi argues, a sharp contrast with earlier texts in which women 
are hardly “managers of the household”, but synonymous with it. The strategy of these 
early proponents of women’s education succeeded for a time, and girls’ schools began to 
multiply in Iran, particularly in Tehran. However, by the 1930s, as women began to seek 
higher education, the very arguments that had resulted in women’s access to education 
began to limit it. At that time, women began to reframe and re-envision home as also the 
nation, embracing some of Reza Shah’s projects that would put them at the service of the 
latter (Najmabadi, 1998).  
There has been a certain shift in gender roles in today's Iran, with women playing 
a more public role than in the past. While in some ways the Islamic revolution overturned 
the Shah's modernizing project, women continue to be employed in certain public sectors 
and their rates of education have only risen. In fact, women were active participants in 
the revolution, although they were later encouraged to resume their domestic role 
(Sadeghi 2008). Nevertheless, the state employs women in a variety of public sphere 
positions, which ironically allow them to escape the domestic obligations that the Islamic 
Republic actively encourages as the proper role of women (Afary 2009).  
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There is, nevertheless, a tension. Women’s role in the home is emphasized by 
conservative members of government, including the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah 
Khamene’i. Women's university enrolment exceeded that of men for the first time in 
Iranian history during the reform era of 1997-2005 (Sadeghi 2008, 253). Since then, there 
have been various attempts to place quotas that limit women’s university enrolment, such 
as by barring women from entering certain fields. While the proponents of such 
limitations claim that they are acting in the interest of women as women graduates from 
these fields have found limited employment, their attitude and choice of corrective 
measure reflects the biases towards women entering certain male-dominated fields, and 
re-enforces the idea that men are the ones who ought to get jobs and “bring home the 
bread”, as it were. On my first trip to Iran in 2007, I was told by a male cousin that I 
ought not to enter civil engineering because “it’s a man’s field” and by an uncle that these 
high numbers of university-educated women were “taking jobs away from men”, the 
implication being that men ought rightfully to have jobs, and women, not so much. The 
idea that women’s place is in the home has not entirely gone away.  
As I was told by one of my early interviewees, with the revolution of 1979, the 
enrolment of girls in high school and higher education increased, owing partly to the fact 
that families, many of whom held traditional values that included the place of a woman as 
being in the home, had more trust in sending their daughters to school, and specifically, 
school away from home, under the guidance of the Islamic Republic. This fact is also 
confirmed by Afary (2009). The stories of my interlocutor Sara, further introduced in 
Chapter 2, suggest that these families were justified in their trust: the dormitory in the 
school she attended had tight control over the young women’s personal interactions, with 
strict curfews and an apparent obsession with the possibility of homosexual interactions 
occurring among roommates who were intimate. She told me that such roommates would 
often be switched to different dormitory buildings with no explanation. She and some 
friends were also severely shamed when they snuck out to a party when they were 
supposed to be attending a nighttime prayer session during Shabe Ghadr24.  
                                                        
24 (I) The holiest night in the Islamic calendar, in Arabic Layl-at-ul-Qadr, is also referred to in Farsi as 
Shab-e-Qadr. During this night, during which it is said that the Qur’an was revealed, muslims often remain 
awake all night, praying. In shi’ite tradition there are three Shabe Qadrs (19, 21, 23 of Ramadan) because it 
is unclear on which night the revelation occurred. It is also a night of mourning, as Ali-Ibn-Abi-Talib, the 
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Nowadays, attitudes toward women’s education have largely shifted. This is not 
limited to urban areas. I know a woman who lives in a small rural town in the province of 
Esfahan where many of the residents, all known to each other, practice family farming. 
She resents having been taken out of high school by her older brother in order to be 
married. Her eldest daughter has a masters’ degree and lives in Tehran.  Her younger 
daughter was recently accepted to university in Esfahan and stays in a dorm there, 
travelling back home on weekends. This dramatic change between generations is 
indicative of the power of the Islamic Republic in shifting the discourse on women’s 
education.  
Education, nevertheless, seems to remain at the service of the family, and may 
also be viewed as an opportunity to broaden or improve the marriage pool: Sara’s family 
threatened her by telling her “You don’t want to study? That’s fine. We’ll just sell you 
cheaper”, an indication that families also see the marriage of their daughters as an 
opportunity for social and financial advancement, and may see education as a step in 
achieving such advancement. On a recent trip to Iran, I visited the campus of Tehran 
University, and was amused to find prominent posters encouraging student marriage.  
This type of strategy seems to indicate that the government, like some families, 
sees women’s education as partly an opportunity to find them a husband25. The 
government continues to emphasize women’s roles as wives and mothers, and women, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
prophet Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, was reportedly struck during prostration in prayer by the 
sword of Ibn Muljam on the 19th, (40 AH, or 27 January 661 AD) and died of his wound on the 21st. This 
means that it is particularly disrespectful from a religious point of view to party on this particular night. It 
appears that in Iran, like Moharram and Āshurā ceremonies (see note below), Shabe Qadr has been 
subverted or co-opted by youths who are not interested in religious ceremony but would rather have a little 
fun.  
(II) During the crowded street processions of which, apparently, young women dress well and apply make-
up to attract young men, whose chanting and drumming (especially with “modern” equipment such as 
electronic speakers) some see as “showing off” rather than devotion (personal communication with an older 
gentleman during my trip to Iran in Fall 2016). As I witnessed in the small town of Vazvan in Fall 2016, in 
these ceremonies men participate in the chanting, drumming, chest-beating, and self-flagellation with 
chains in the main part of the street while women follow the procession from the sidewalk. If women do 
participate (as they did on the night of Āshurā, the night before the 10th of Muharram, during my trip), they 
will walk in a separate contingent behind the men, and will only chant and beat their breast softly as 
opposed to loudly. It seems that perhaps the motivation of some young people in participating in these 
religious rituals lies less in the ritual itself than in the potential of meeting prospective mates.  
25 The promotion may otherwise indicate a concern with “morality”, as marriage may be seen to alleviate 
the desire for male and female students to mingle with the intent of sexual or romantic liaisons. Universities 
are the only educational institution which are co-ed, although gender segregation does occur within the 
buildings (the dorms described by interlocutors are gender-segregated, and upon entering the library of the 
university I visited, I noticed designated areas for male and female students to sit and study).  
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who constitute roughly 60%26 of the university entrances, are sometimes barred from 
entering certain fields, perhaps in part due to the idea that men are to be the breadwinners 
in marriage. This last idea is, interestingly, accepted by many educated women, who 
continue to practice hypergyny.  
Good Girl/Bad Girl: Navigating the Social Field through Calculated Compliance 
 
Ensieh was my second female interviewee whom I did not know beforehand 
(having first conducted three “pilot” interviews with acquaintances), so I was a bit 
nervous when I first met her. My contact with her was initiated through an advertisement 
I posted on a Facebook group run by one of the Iranian student associations in Montreal. 
She sent me an e-mail, and we set up a rendez-vous. She arrived at the designated 
intersection by bicycle, and wearing a light flower-printed black top. I introduced myself 
with a prepared script, and gave her a copy of the interview consent form to peruse. She 
was a sociology student, and had responded to my ad because she was curious about 
other Iranians doing social science research in Montreal. 
Later, we met at Café Caravane. It was my first time there, and I noted that the 
walls were covered in paintings of rebellion. One that struck my eye in particular was of 
the 2009 street protests in Tehran following the re-election of President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad.27  
The space was an appropriate one in which to meet Ensieh, who as it turned out had 
been politically active in Iran. She had also been a rebellious teenager: smoking and 
sneaking illegal beer into her tiz-hooshan middle school in Isfahan, boldly interacting 
with boys where some other girls wouldn’t dare greet them, going out to cafes and the 
theatre, which she made sure to emphasize were generally deemed “inappropriate” spaces 
for teenaged girls in her context. “Really, there’s no example I can give you here because 
here people go to the club and it’s considered normal. Whatever was not normal for a 
teenaged girl [I would do].”  She enjoyed the feeling of doing things that she was not 
                                                        
26 This 2012 article cites the rate of female enrolment at 60% of total university enrolments: Erdbrink, 
Thomas. "Single Women Gaining Limited Acceptance in Iran." The New York Times. June 12, 2012. 
Accessed July 26, 2017. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/13/world/middleeast/single-women-gaining-
limited-acceptance-in-iran.html. 
27 The artist, I found upon inquiry, was Sebastian Astwo: http://www.astwo.com/ . On his website, Astwo 
calls this style of painting “Pol-Hip-Hop”. 
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“supposed” to do—indeed, it seemed that this had been her sole raison-d’etre as a teen. 
When I asked her, as I did in all my interviews, about her sexual orientation, she 
responded thoughtfully, that had it been as much of a taboo for her to associate with girls 
as it was for her to associate with boys, she probably would have pursued sexual 
relationships with girls as well. But given the ease of access to members of one’s own 
gender that Najmabadi (2013) argues is afforded by with the normativity of 
“homosociality” in Iran, the lack of taboo surrounding access to members of her own sex-
gender28 meant the possibility of sexual contact with the same sex lacked the enticement 
that relations with boys did.  
The interview excerpt I have cited at the beginning of this chapter was generated by 
my asking, when Ensieh was telling me about her life (where she had lived and for how 
long, and so on), whether her parents were comfortable with her leaving her hometown to 
study elsewhere. As this interview took place early in my fieldwork, at this point I knew 
very little about the conditions young women navigated in Iran. What I did understand 
regarding young women’s options for living arrangements was based on my own 
experience as the daughter of Iranian migrants to Montreal. As a teenager, I had at times 
expressed a desire to live alone, which were met by attempts at dissuasion followed by 
firm statements that it wasn’t going to happen. My parents’ responses ranged from my 
father’s arguments regarding how unwise this would be from an economical vantage 
point (clearly living with family was more economically efficient), to my mother’s 
matter-of-fact statements that such an arrangement would be quite improper. In her view, 
it wasn’t a “good sign” for a young woman to live alone, or even a young man for that 
matter, she would say, judging acquaintances who had done just that. Somehow this 
judgement was reversed when she met the man who later became my husband—“it 
means he can manage himself”, she suggested, but I digress.  
I recounted to Ensieh that when I applied (at seventeen) to several high-calibre 
universities in the US, my mother suggested that the family might move in order to 
accommodate my studies. I was deeply upset by this. On the other hand, a male cousin 
living in Iran had told me that many young women quite easily lived alone at his 
university campus in Esfahan. Ensieh responded that this was not the case. Her analysis 
                                                        
28 Najmabadi’s usage. See introduction for a brief discussion of this choice. 
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of my cousin’s comment was as follows:  “See, in us Iranians it is such that we all want 
to save face (āberudari bokonim) 29. Now, whatever in our minds we think is āberu, we 
start to promote that. Yes, we are like this. No, it wasn’t like that.”  
Perhaps my cousin’s comment was also prompted by the fact that as a man, he 
simply wasn’t aware of the struggles his women classmates had likely endured in order to 
study away from home and live alone. It is not unlikely that, like Ensieh, their endeavours 
had been met with some resistance.  In Ensieh’s particular case, she was able to 
maneuver her parents’ valuation of education in order to get something she wanted: the 
personal freedom and independence that was afforded by living alone. A similar strategy 
was utilized by Sara (35):30  
 
Me: Are you married?  
Sara:  I was married and separated.31  
Me: Oh?  
Sara: I married at 22, 21 rather. My marriage was for the sole reason 
that I did not want to return to [my hometown]. My family is very 
sonnati and very strict and very mardsālār. Especially in that period 
when I was a teenager and then became a young adult. This was the 
70s. 70 Shamsi.32 Until in 79 I went to the university in Tehran in 
137833 I was accepted in Tehran and went to [a well-known university 
in Tehran]. But my family was very strict. They wouldn’t even let me 
go to Tehran. With a thousand and one tricks I was able to choose my 
field in Tehran and get accepted there. But when my studies were 
ending […] Since the time I got accepted in Tehran they were trying 
to get me transferred. But when my studies were ending, I knew there 
was no way for me not to return to [my hometown] and live in my 
father’s home. The only possibility was to either get married or come 
                                                        
29 I have already mentioned “saving face”. These are equivalent concepts, āberu being a local manifestation 
of Goffman’s concept. 
30 I will more fully introduce Sara in the next chapter. 
31 Sara used the terms jodā shodam (I separated) rather than talāq gereftam (I got a divorce). 
32 Roughly the 90s in the Gregorian calendar. 
33 Gregorian: 2000. 
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back. So I… It was the prevalent attitude in our family that if you 
hadn’t gotten married, as a girl, you could not speak over other people 
(ru harfe baqie harf bezani). I, who was very much a rebelle34, and 
had gotten the notebook indicating my choice of field from the post 
office and had changed it so I wouldn’t get accepted [in my 
hometown] and would instead get accepted at Tehran or elsewhere… 
It was not possible for me to stay in Tehran and work unless I got 
married. As a result I got married. With the first person… I became 
friends with someone and got married in Tehran. Just so that I 
wouldn’t have to return.  In reality my main reason was so that I 
wouldn’t have to return to [my hometown]. 
 
Looking back at some of the basic data I gathered from my female interviewees, 
an interesting pattern emerges. Some were married and had arrived with their husbands. 
It at least a couple of cases, these marriages had occurred because of their arrival: in 
Ensieh’s case, she married her partner because the Canadian government would not 
accept their joint immigration application otherwise. Another interviewee mentioned that 
it would not have been proper to not marry her then-boyfriend when they decided to 
move to Canada. Among the unmarried women, a few lived with a female roommate or a 
sister, and there were others who lived alone. It may be significant that those who were 
single and had family here did live with family. In the narratives of my interviewees, 
moving away from the family home, if single, usually occurred for study, which 
sometimes entailed living in university dormitories. This fits the pattern described to me 
by Ensieh.  
It appears that, for many Iranians, resistance, for the sake of propriety, to a 
daughter living away from home, gives way in the face of the prospect of her receiving a 
good education. While it may be the case that in some parts of Iran people remain 
                                                        
34 My spelling here reflects Sara’s pronounciation of the term rebel, which she has “farsified”, suggesting a 
reference to the French feminine version of this term rather than the English, but lacks the French rolling 
“r” sound. 
 45 
sceptical of the value of education for girls,35 this is by and large not the case for the 
urban classes aspiring to upward mobility.  
When I sat down to interview people it became time and time again evident that 
education was extremely important to the parents of these individuals. This was 
something I had myself experienced firsthand. Not only that, but Iranians I grew up with 
in Montreal tended to pursue degrees in the sciences and engineering, as did most of 
those who arrived later as university students. Of course, university application and 
immigration selection processes may favour these students. But Ensieh tells me another 
reason why science and engineering degrees are important:  
 
Mona: Apparently most Iranians [in Canada] change fields. The majority first go 
into engineering and such.  
Ensieh: Yes, well, you know, it’s a middle-class strategy. If at that time 
you don’t go into engineering, that’s the thing that has the higher 
possibility of jobs and at the same time it is something that for 
everyone is more acceptable. Because it is valued. It’s not just us. I 
have Pakistani friends too; for them it’s the same thing.   
 
Another interviewee, Shirin, makes a similar assessment: “As a matter of fact human 
sciences was one of my interests. Because I couldn’t risk not having a job and not having 
a source of income, I didn’t take that direction”. Shirin’s observation fits well with what 
seems to be her general life strategy, in which she appears to aim to improve her lot 
through consciously making choices that maximize her potential for upward mobility.  
Shirin: Marriage as Economic Strategy 
 
Despite the fact that education is increasingly available to women in Iran, and 
indeed, the majority of those who enrol in university are women, marriage remains a 
domain in which the desire for upward mobility is exercised. This became apparent to me 
during my fieldwork when I met Shirin, after which the reasoning behind the preferences 
I had been hearing about for a taller, richer, more educated husband finally became clear.  
                                                        
35 See Tremayne (2006). 
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Shirin was one of the last women I interviewed. A male interviewee had put me in 
touch with her, and after a couple of failed attempts, we met and had a lengthy 
discussion. Shirin was an excellent research participant, speaking at length about many 
important issues to my research, often anticipating them without my prompting.  
Shirin had dyed hair, wore bright lipstick, and to my best guess, had had a nose 
job. She was 31 and single, and I suppose the makeup was a habit she had picked up 
when, while living in Tehran, she carefully coiffed herself in attempts to attract boys in 
Tehran. At one point she lamented to me that not only did she struggle to find men of 
substance, but also had a hard time finding female friends with whom to go dor-dor 
(joyriding).36  Shirin was not averse to the idea of marriage—but not just any marriage, 
she made clear—a particular marriage (ezdevāje khāss): “Yes but a particular marriage. A 
person whose head is worth their body (saresh be tanesh biarze). We always wanted to 
change… well this is my social level (sat’he farhangi) and I’m not satisfied with it. So let 
me go up and be satisfied there. A boy that would make us happy…” 
Shirin had only been in Canada for a few months, which was the shortest length 
of time since arrival for any of my interviewees. She was born to a family she described 
as of medium religiosity and fairly traditional, but “thankfully”, not too traditional. From 
the beginning of Shirin’s narrative, it was clear that her family was concerned with social 
mobility, and this was a value that Shirin herself seemed to follow as rational and 
reasonable. She had three sisters, and described herself and her siblings as “superior” to 
relatives regarding education. Shirin expressed a certain disdain for traditional women’s 
roles, which some of her relatives embraced along with patriarchal values. She mentioned 
a relative who had had three daughters and who intended to get pregnant again until she 
had a son. She described how another relative would “show off” her boy-child to Shirin, 
and exclaimed, “What has she ever done? I am not sure she even got her [high school] 
                                                        
36 Literally “round and round”, this is an activity of youth in (well-off) upper Tehran, in which young 
people drive in circles aiming to find members of the opposite sex (with the attractiveness of men hinging 
in part on the expensiveness of their cars). Shirin did not tell me where she lived in Tehran, but she clearly 
stated a motivation to improve her social-economic class. Therefore, her participation in dor-dor does not 
imply that she lived in upper Tehran, but it does suggest that she actively attempted to mingle with upper-
Tehrani youth. As Mahdavi (2009) indicates, youth of different socioeconomic backgrounds and from 
different parts of town participate in this activity.  
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diploma, and she has not worked a day in her life37. All she has done is gone and slept 
with her husband”.   
Shirin expressed that her immediate family was a bit different: her father had 
always pushed her and her sisters to pursue their studies and “go out and be in the world”. 
It was important for Shirin to have a better life than her parents. She had to be “better” 
than her mother, receiving a higher education, because “that’s how the world works”, she 
explained to me. In the pursuit of a better life, Shirin was in search of a husband who was 
“better” than her, and didn’t discard the possibility of hymen reconstruction surgery38 in 
order to secure such a marriage.  
I felt Shirin was a unique interviewee, perhaps because of her willingness to 
openly talk about the issues I was interested in, but also due to her specific positionality 
and candidness regarding them. I had spoken to women who didn’t have much to say 
because they had no sexual experience, and perhaps more importantly, did not experience 
conflict with parental or societal ideals of being a “good girl” or a “good daughter”. 
Several other women I had spoken to were outspoken feminists and therefore had plenty 
to say. Shirin didn’t fit either of these categories. My impression of her was of the 
stereotypical upper-Tehrani girl, complete with “the look”, or perhaps one who, as one 
can gather from her expression of desire for upward mobility, at least aspired to belong to 
that class. In fact, her aspirations were indicated to me by many of my other interviewees 
in the form of stereotypes: I commonly asked questions both regarding what my 
participants desired in an ideal spouse, and what they felt other individuals of either sex-
gender in general wanted in a spouse.  Many protested that it was not proper to 
generalize, but the responses they did give were fairly consistent. One of the common 
themes regarding what women wanted was money. Shirin had something to say about 
this:   
                                                        
37 I have translated Shirin’s words directly (ye ruz tu omresh kar nakarde) although this phrasing does not 
recognize the unremunerated work of women in the home. It also bears mentioning that, in Iran, many 
women have long been employed in agricultural and nomadic economies or, in urban areas, contributed 
their labour to informal economies, although they viewed their work in such areas as an extension of 
housework and considered themselves full-time housewives (Afary 2009). “In a survey of 350 working-age 
women in the more affluent northern area of Tehran in 2001, about 94 percent were earning an income, but 
only 53 percent described themselves as employed” (Moghadam 2009 as cited in Afary 2009).  
38 I discuss this topic further in a later chapter. 
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I say unfortunately, in Iran it is dictated a lot that you as a woman are 
very foolish (bisho’ur)39 to want your husband to have money. But 
foolish is the person who says that. Because all the psychologists and 
sociologists say that a certain amount of monetary ability (tavānāyi-e 
māli), well it’s necessary for a life.  
In Iran they really suppress and say an iron-worshipping girl. Now 
what’s an iron-worshipper? That has a story. But the meaning is that 
you have no right to want your husband to have an appropriate 
financial situation. Because the spirit (nafs) of marriage is important. 
Love (eshgh) and I don’t know, following the tradition of the prophet, 
that marriage is the tradition of the prophet. But really girls really, 
especially when their age has gone up, and they have reached a high 
place socially and monetarily, it’s really hard for them to go with 
someone who is lower than them from this perspective. But well some 
are forced to. My divorced co-workers, they all had damaged 
husbands. All of their husbands were lower than them. 
 
As we can see, like Sara (who married her husband to get away from 
home) and Ensieh (who married, as we will see below, in order to save her 
joint immigration application to Canada with her partner), Shirin’s attitude 
towards marriage is pragmatic. Like the other women, she is using the social 
situation in which she finds herself to achieve ends she regards as desirable. 
This decidedly unromantic view corresponds with what I found to be a 
surprising result of my fieldwork: when I asked them to define love, nearly 
all of my interviewees responded with biological explanations. When I asked 
whether love was important for marriage, they almost all did respond in the 
positive, but gave caveats. Perhaps love was secondary to other, more 
“logical” considerations, or “love at first sight” was a myth, and it was 
important instead that love be cultivated. Even if young people are now more 
                                                        
39 A more literal translation is “witless”. The Farsi term is highly pejorative, a connotation that is not 
carried by either of these translations. 
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likely than in the past to seek out their own marriage partners, it seems they 
are less often motivated by a belief in romantic love than by the same sense 
of economic rationality that their forebears used to arrange their children’s 
marriages. Further inquiry in this area may prove fruitful, as my observations 
go against certain trends, such as the popularity of Valentine’s Day in Iran. 
Perhaps my finding is due to the reliance on narratives and the filtering effect 
of immigration I have mentioned in the introduction: members of the 
upwardly mobile middle class may have an interest in presenting themselves 
as rational rather than emotional40. Nevertheless, I feel it is important to state 
that the popular idea of a sharp distinction between “love marriage” and 
“arranged marriage” is not a useful one. Clearly, the women and men I 
interacted with during the course of my research, while not participating in 
arranged marriages, are just as pragmatic as were prior generations.  
On the Limits of Agency  
 
Ensieh, unlike most of my interviewees (who responded in the positive and 
without hesitation when I asked them whether it was always obvious to them that they 
would one day be married), did not regard marriage as inevitable. In fact, she had been 
critical of the institution. She had met a boy around the age of twenty-one and by her 
mid-twenties the fact had become official with her parents, mostly because there was an 
expectation on their part that she let them know about such relationships. Although she 
had chosen her partner, she felt, in retrospect, that all was a matter of circumstance: that’s 
how her life had played itself out. She and her partner hadn’t gotten married until 
Immigration Canada had threatened to close their skilled-worker immigration application 
if they did not. “We don’t have these partner-shmartner games for Iranians”, she reported 
they had informed her.   
Rather than assert her agency in the domain of her marriage, Ensieh downplayed 
it. To Ensieh, marriage was an institution that “society needs more than we ourselves do”, 
and “whether we believe in it or not, we are all following the pattern expected of us”. 
Now, at 31, she was separated from her husband, who had returned to Iran after they had 
                                                        
40 Thanks to Setrag Manoukian for this idea.  
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arrived together in Montreal together two years prior. During my subsequent meetings 
with her at a restaurant and in her home, she became increasingly open regarding the 
nature of the separation and her questioning of the path she had taken in life.  
Ensieh’s ambivalence regarding her marriage, and the circumstances that 
surrounded it, reveal that there are limits in the extent to which young Iranian women 
make their own lives. As Vigh puts it, “it must be stressed that we are not free to move 
entirely as we want. Anyone who has ever sailed will testify to the idiocy of trying to 
navigate with indifference to the forces of the environment” (2006, 14). Inevitably, 
certain structural factors will shape these women’s life trajectories. But those structures, 
as I hope to have made sufficiently clear, can always be toyed with, manipulated, and 
played to one’s own tune. Like strings on a sitar, they can be tuned to one’s liking, but 
can only be tightened so far before they break.   
In this chapter I have offered excerpts from interviews with three women to 
illustrate some of the attitudes and strategies young Iranian women take up in order to 
address the exigencies of life. The fabric of their lives is structured by patterns woven by 
societal norms. Aware of this, they utilize the pre-existing weave as a jumping point for 
their own creative endeavours, shaping their own lives through manipulation of the 
available patterns.  
This chapter shows how marriage and education, two major rites of passage to 
adulthood often employed strategically to achieve a higher socio-economic position, are 
approached pragmatically by young women. The young women I interacted with 
recognized the value of these achievements and, in general, did not openly oppose them, 
but instead utilized them strategically in order to attain some of their life goals. While 
such strategies may be more or less effective and may result in undesirable outcomes 
(such as with Sara’s husband, whom she later divorced, the reason for which will become 
clear in the next chapter), they illustrate young women’s agentive manipulation of the 
existing societal framework.  This sets the tone for the next chapter, which looks at 
virginity imperatives as societally imposed on women, but also as responded to, or as 
strategically manipulated, by them.     
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Chapter 2: The Virginity Imperative: Power, Pain, and 
Performance  
 
“We have two kinds [of virginity]: one spiritual (ruhi) and one bodily (jesmi)”.  
–Rana (32). 
 
When I started discussing virginity with my female interviewees, they often 
asked me what I meant by it. “I’m asking you,” I would respond. “I want to hear what 
you think it is.” The results were interesting. While there were certain trends, with 
women focusing either on physical or moral aspects, there wasn’t any obvious 
answer that came out of my query. By the time I was done interviewing, I still didn’t 
have a single clear definition of the term bekārat, and was no clearer on what it 
really meant than when I begun my inquiry.  
The answer to this conundrum becomes clear when one stops trying to pin 
down virginity and instead takes a step back and examines the various attempts to 
pin it down. In this chapter, I argue that virginity is a social construct, which entails 
a social contract: the virginity imperative. Some may attempt to make it concrete by 
defining it biologically: virginity, or lack thereof, is inscribed on women’s bodies by 
the intact presence, or absence, of the hymen.  Of course, we know that an intact 
hymen or a broken one is not a reliable indicator for whether a woman has had 
penetrative vaginal intercourse (let alone other kinds of sex), but physical 
examination remains a method by which virginity is “determined”.41  On the other 
hand, virginity is also often claimed as a moral trait.  
Given the moral importance of virginity, it is a social requirement that 
unmarried women present as virgins in order to be regarded as “good” women, and 
                                                        
41 Traditionally, as far as I know, there has been no physical means to “determine” male virginity. And 
given that valuing female virginity has been promoted in patriarchal cultures in which, even if men are 
expected (based on religious doctrine, for instance) to be virgins upon their (first) marriage, their chances at 
marriage, and their social standing in general, are not particularly harmed if they are understood not to be 
virgins. However, at a recent student conference at which I presented, I was informed by a student in the 
audience, who had conducted research in Iran, that some of her interlocutors had seen a program on state 
television promoting the idea that it was possible to determine male virginity by examining the man’s 
knees. The audience had laughed at this suggestion. I interpret the endorsement of such a method 
(documentation regarding which I have not myself found) as an attempt by those who promote female 
virginity as an indicator of morality to render this regime of classification and its disciplinary devices 
(which are occasionally used for political ends) more palatable by suggesting the possibility of physically 
determining virginity is not gender-specific, and that the practice is therefore just and fair. 
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by extension marriageable women. Thus the contract: by adequately performing 
virginity, women can expect to attain certain social goods that would otherwise be 
unavailable to them. I call this “the virginity imperative”. The moral—and 
sometimes, physical (as in displays of “hymeneal”42 blood)—aspects of virginity are 
thus necessarily performed by those women who wish to maintain their 
reputations, which affect their opportunities for marriage, which, as I outlined in the 
previous chapter, is a significant and valued life achievement and means of 
accessing social and economic capital. I argue that virginity, like gender (Butler 
1994) is performative. In the end, it does not matter what the ideal of virginity is, for 
it is only an ideal. What does matter is that a woman’s performance of virginity 
“passes”: that it is deemed legitimate in the eyes of society, and therefore succeeds 
in securing the goal of marriage.  The virginity imperative is thus also a regime of 
power which, through disciplinary devices, controls and classifies women.  
In this chapter I look at the ways in which various women I spoke with 
construct and otherwise discuss virginity, and also how they perform virginity both 
in their day-to-day interactions and in their interactions with me. I argue that this 
performance is necessitated by the fundamentally unequal gender relations that are 
established in marriage (as discussed in Chapter 1). The performance is a kind of 
“facework”. After establishing virginity as a structural constraint, I argue that 
women agentively work within this constraint to further their goals, and, to use a 
felicitous phrase used by Butler (2004) and taken up by Najmabadi (2014), create 
more liveable lives.   
The Virginity Imperative 
 
In using the term “virginity imperative” I am referring to an implicit social 
contract, but also to its disciplinary devices: a broad range of phenomena regulating 
women’s bodies through the concept of virginity, which is constructed as both 
                                                        
42 In a conversation, during a student conference, with a young woman who was not Iranian but was of 
middle-eastern origin, she recounted to me that where she comes from the display of hymeneal blood upon 
marriage remains a contemporary practice, “but everyone knows that it is really chicken-blood; it’s just to 
satisfy the old ladies”.  
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physical and moral. This includes the requirement to remain a “virgin” until 
marriage, which often means maintaining an intact hymen, and so carefully avoiding 
any activity that may lead the hymen to break. The virginity imperative also 
includes the requirement of maintaining the image of a “pure” woman—one who of 
course does not engage in pre-marital sexual intercourse, but also one who avoids 
activities that may lead to the questioning of her “purity” (Hashemi 2015), which 
can include, for example, intermingling with members of the opposite sex to a 
degree greater than what is deemed proper by her community, or staying out late at 
night.  
The demands of the virginity imperative begin in childhood, when damage to 
the hymen is an almost constant preoccupation of family members, often female. My 
interview question “When did you first learn about virginity?” elicited many tales by 
my female interlocutors of a vague understanding inculcated in childhood, wherein 
they were taught to be careful not to hurt their genital area (which, as my questions 
elicited, mothers often vaguely referred to as unjā (“over there”) or, in certain cases, 
using the word eib (which denotes a fault or defect). As I was reminded time and 
again, in some families young girls were barred from various sports activities in 
order to avoid damage to the hymen. One of my interlocutors recalled her younger 
sister being stripped naked and examined by female relatives after she had fallen 
while playing outside.  
As they get older, girls’ movements and interactions with men and boys are 
carefully guarded, because even “talk” can damage their reputations and chances for 
marriage. Men, on the other hand, can almost do as they please (Mernissi 1982), as 
evidenced by the example of Sara’s husband, whom we will meet later in the 
chapter. These concerns continue until such time as the woman is married, but do 
not necessarily end there.  
When a young woman is married, her husband, or perhaps his family, may be 
concerned with “proof” of the young woman’s virginity.  The preoccupation with 
such “proof” is ancient and widespread in patriarchal societies. I do not attempt to 
address the historical, cultural, or geographical origins of the practices of “proving 
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virginity” through the display of hymeneal blood, but as an indicator of their age, 
they are alluded to in the Old Testament:  
 
And the damsel's father shall say unto the elders, I gave my daughter unto this 
man to wife, and he hateth her; 
And, lo, he hath given occasions of speech against her, saying, I found not thy 
daughter a maid; and yet these are the tokens of my daughter's virginity. And they 
shall spread the cloth before the elders of the city.   
(Deut. 22:16-17, King James Bible).  
 
Virginity imperatives are important in societies that are patriarchal and 
patrilineal, in part because ensuring a young woman’s abstention from sexual 
intercourse prior to marriage helps assure that her children are indeed the 
husband’s. These societies have therefore devised a means of “proving” virginity, 
and virgin women are more highly valued as brides. Although virginity does not 
ensure fidelity, other linked practices, such as men choosing to marry younger 
and/or less educated women, may contribute to a man’s confidence that his wife 
will be less likely to “stray”43. Furthermore, in such patriarchal societies men are 
given license to control the movements of their wives and female relatives. This was 
indicated in Chapter 1 in the discussion of the Islamic marriage contract, but is also 
enshrined in the concept of gheirat.  
According to Afary, in late-nineteenth-century Iran, "A girl's supposed lack of 
virginity on her wedding night was a 'permanent taint' that dishonored her and her 
entire family" (2009, 28). It was not uncommon for an older woman to wait at the 
door to present the bloodstained sheets to relatives, a piece of cloth at once 
considered proof of the groom's virility and the bride's chastity. If the bride was 
deemed not to be dokhtar-e bākere (a virgin with intact hymen), there would be 
trouble. In order to guard against such contingencies, some families would obtain a 
                                                        
43 Thus hypergyny (women marrying men of higher status), whose economic benefits to women were 
discussed in the first chapter, potentially benefits men who want more docile, “domesticated” wives. We 
can see how the education of women, also discussed in the first chapter, would threaten this social order.  
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midwife's testimony that their daughter was a virgin before the wedding (Afary 
2009, 29). As some of my interlocutors attested, such practices still exist in Iran as 
they do elsewhere: in Morocco it has become fashionable to obtain a certificate of 
virginity from a doctor to display along with the bride's blood-stained 
undergarment (Mernissi 1982, 187).  
Not conforming to the virginity imperative has undesirable consequences for 
women, ranging from the extreme case of honour killings, to marital conflict, to 
hasty marriages arranged by the young woman’s family with the aim of preserving 
honour or “saving face” (Hashemi 2015), to simply being shunned by one’s 
community and being unable to find a husband.  
The last of these consequences can be particularly damaging in those 
societies where marriage is a rite of passage to adulthood, which, as mentioned in 
Chapter 1, is the case with Iran, something the Iranian scholar of gender Afsaneh 
Najmabadi has described as “the marriage imperative” (2008). Furthermore, 
marriage becomes necessary or important to economic security and social status in 
situations where women don’t have the same economic opportunities as men.  
 To attribute the virginity imperative to religious requirements would be a 
mistake, as virginity remains important even among secular families. Furthermore, 
a religion-based argument doesn’t fully account for the fact that virginity 
requirements are highly gendered. In Islam (Iran's majority religion and the 
purported basis of many of its laws), like the other Abrahamic traditions, pre-
marital and extra-marital sex is considered sinful (Mernissi 1982, 186). But in 
practice, the pressure is disproportionately on women, and there is no "test" for the 
groom akin to those put to the bride. This may be partly explained by the fact that 
there is no requirement of exclusive sexual access of wives to their husbands. 
Indeed, according to Islam, a man can have up to four permanent wives and many 
concubines, and, in Shi'ism (once again the majority sect in Iran) as many temporary 
wives as he desires. Regardless, the fact that secular or non-religious Iranians as 
well as others continue to value virginity tells us that the source of the requirement 
must be sought elsewhere.  
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Regarding the gendered nature of virginity imperatives, Mernissi, who 
discusses Moroccan and other Arab societies, argues that "men ask the impossible: 
they want access to women for brief sexual encounters before marriage, but once 
they have decided to marry, they launch into a frantic search for a virgin whom no 
other man has 'defiled'" (Mernissi 1982,185). Kaivanara's (2015) research shows 
young Iranian men's preference for virgin brides, suggesting that Mernissi’s 
argument of two-and-a-half decades ago can be extended to the Iran of today. 
Mernissi goes on to say that "the picture of a male virgin trembling with purity and 
innocence on the eve of his wedding is, for the Arab man, the height of absurdity" 
(Mernissi 1982, 185). In contrast, "young women resort […] to a demeanour of 
innocence which they adopt all the more fiercely in proportion to the jealousy and 
suspicion of their fiancé" (Mernissi 1982, 187). Mernissi attributes these 
performances to the failure of men in the societies she references "to see sexual 
pleasure as a relation between equals rather than as a mechanism for establishing 
hierarchy and enforcing power, domination and therefore dehumanization" 
(Mernissi 1982, 186)44.  
As I will show in this chapter, the performance of innocence was a strategy 
employed by my female interlocutors, a strategy necessitated by the Iranian context 
in which, as established in the previous chapter, the spousal relation is indeed one of 
inequality. In the next chapter, I will show that some Iranian men’s attitudes toward 
sex are not far from the attitudes Mernissi argues are prevalent among Arab men, 
thus coming full circle to show that virginity imperatives act as a regime of power 
that is enforced in a context of sexual inequality.  
As for Iran, Sadeghi argues that there is a "gender double standard 
[consisting of attitudes that] privilege men's desire and sexual agency at women's 
expense" (Sadeghi 2008, 255). Sadeghi cites a study that concluded that 55 percent 
of Iranian men believed their partner ought to respond to their sexual needs 
whether or not she was interested, and 81 percent of Iranian men and women 
                                                        
44 Although, due to the work of women activists, many legal changes have occurred in recent years in the 
societies Mernissi discusses as well as Iran, tradition and cultural values do not necessarily change with the 
pace of legal codes.  
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believed that women must be virgins before marriage, but only 15 percent of men 
(and 60 percent of women) were against premarital sexual relationships for men 
(Mojgan Kahen 1997, cited in Sadeghi 2008, 255). It bears mentioning that, while 
such views may not be solely attributable to Islam, they are in line with neo-
traditional clerics' views that "man is the slave of his own desire" and that "a woman 
is better able to control her desire than a man" (Mutahhari 1991, cited in Mir-
Hosseini 2004, 7), and with the spirit of the marriage contract described in Chapter 
1. Clerics like Mutahhari support their views with a selective reading of Western 
psychological and sociological studies (Mir-Hosseini 2004, 7). 
Finally, a reference to women’s own personal understanding of virginity is in 
order. While there are some girls who view their virginity as "an obstacle to be 
managed in their relationships with boys" (Sadeghi 2008, 255), the younger 
generation, whether or not they place it in an Islamic framework, still regards 
virginity as an indication of women's modesty, to which they accord high ideological 
value (Sadeghi 2008). It is in this context that the facework of virginity becomes 
necessary.    
 
Virginity as an Aspect of Face 
 
“Where and when did you first learn about sex?” I asked Mahdieh.  
“From my husband, ” she replied.  
 
I was quite taken aback. This was a standard question in all my interviews, 
and Mahdieh was the first (and only) to give this particular answer.  She was a bit 
older (37), as she had been sent to me by another woman I had interviewed, Irsaa, 
who had been particularly enthusiastic about my research. Naïvely, I had assumed 
Irsaa had transmitted my interview criteria, and when Mahdieh had contacted me, 
not asking any questions, I had not bothered to elaborate on my research or the 
criteria. We met in a quiet public library, and it was only then that I realized my 
blunder. Since we had both come out all this way, we proceeded with the interview, 
 58 
which was the only one I did not audio-record, as Mahdieh preferred that I not do 
so45.  
 So far, when I had asked interviewees (both men and women) where they 
first learned about sex, the answer had almost always been “from friends” or in a 
few cases with the women, from an older sister or relative. In a couple of cases, such 
as that of Narmin, women told me that their mothers had been so ashamed to 
discuss sexual matters, including the practical issue of dealing with periods, that 
they had delegated this particular discussion to others. As Narmin indicated, her 
mother “preferred to erase the statement of the problem”46, thinking that this would 
make the issue go away.  
Such responses confirmed the idea that among Iranians, at least up until the 
present generation, it is quite uncommon for parents to discuss sexual matters with 
their children (Rahbari 2016)47. Sexual knowledge is deemed inappropriate for 
children and its display by unmarried women is considered especially improper. 
This assertion holds true in the broadest sense, which I illustrate with a personal 
anecdote: as a young as-yet-unmarried adult, I had, on a family picnic with the Noor 
Cultural Centre, upon hearing a woman ask “what is an IUD?”, enthusiastically 
volunteered an explanation. My mother had taken me aside and told me that what I 
had done was zesht (ugly/improper), as even if I had the information it was not 
appropriate for me to flaunt it. Worse, it turned out that I had misheard the 
question, and the woman was not asking about intra-uterine devices after all. To this 
day, my father exhibits great discomfort when broaching matters related to 
sexuality; on one occasion when he deemed it absolutely necessary to explain to me 
                                                        
45 As a consequence, the contents of my interview with Mahdieh presented in this chapter may not be an 
exact reproduction of what she said, but, as with my other interviews, are presented in the most accurate 
manner possible. In this particular case I could only rely on my quickly jotted-down notes and my memory 
to refer to in this reproduction, rather than a full audio file.  
46 “Madaram tarjih midād surat’e mas’ale ro pāk kone”. There is an analogy here to schoolwork. Rather 
than addressing such problems, her mother “solved” them by “erasing them” and pretending they didn’t 
exist.  
47 I find it necessary to caution the reader that Rahbari’s article, published in the Wiley Blackwell 
Encyclopedia of Family Studies, is overly generalizing, but nevertheless speaks to certain societal “truths”. 
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what a hymen looks like and why I ought to have mine checked by a doctor48, he had 
become visibly red in the face49.  
I did not hide my surprise in response to Mahdieh’s response. I recalled my 
mother, who is in her fifties, telling me at some point during my childhood or 
teenage years, that a Pakistani friend of hers (whom I assume is similar in age to my 
mother, or somewhat younger) had not learned about sex until after she was 
married. I told Mahdieh about this, adding that “perhaps it’s not that unusual”.  
 
But at this point, Mahdieh qualified her answer:   
 
“Well, I had tried to look it up on my brother’s laptop50 and I saw some 
videos. But my first experience was with my husband”.  
 
This response was revealing. Perhaps she misinterpreted my question at first: I was 
asking about knowledge, but not of the carnal, embodied type. But the fact that 
Mahdieh was quick to respond about “learning about sex from her husband”, later 
clarifying that she had perhaps seen or heard something about it beforehand, 
together with other aspects of her conversation and manner, led me to believe that 
she was primarily concerned with maintaining appearance as a good, proper, “pure” 
woman, one who, despite being from a family that was not particularly religious, 
wouldn’t, to use her own words, “go around naked”.  
                                                        
48 This came after a quarrel that followed my mother’s revealing to my father that I had been using 
tampons, which she had learned upon searching my schoolbag.  
49 It is important to note, for what it is worth, that my parents moved to Montreal in 1991 and have lived 
here ever since. Judging from my interviewees’ descriptions of their parents’ attitudes, I think it is safe to 
say that my own parents’ attitudes have not changed from what was common in Iran for their generation.  
50 I find it interesting that this is not her own laptop, but her brother’s, a fact of which she makes sure to 
inform me. During my trips to Iran and conversations and observations there, I have gathered that young 
people (especially young men) have access to pornographic videos (and any other material that would be 
deemed objectionable by the authorities, such as uncensored foreign films) through a “black market” as 
well as the Internet. High-speed Internet access, while far from ubiquitous, is becoming more and more 
common in Iran, but youth continue to share files through hard drives and USB sticks.  My guess is that 
Mahdieh is talking about a pornographic video, but it appears from her narration that, while viewing it is 
innocent enough of a confession, it would not be deemed proper for her to possess such material on a 
personal device of her own. 
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Knowing very little about me, Mahdieh, quite recently arrived from Iran, 
seemed to be using her own judgement of what was proper in order to portray to 
me (a fellow Iranian in at least some sense) what she deemed to be the desirable 
appearance. Her display of innocence was even more evident when she asked me 
(perhaps as an earnest question, I thought, though I chose to remain silent) whether 
the valuing of virginity was not something that she should transmit to her daughter. 
This is an example of facework (Goffman 1955, as cited in Hashemi 2015), 
which refers to the work individuals need to do in social interactions in order to 
protect their “face”, which is defined as “an approved social image or front” 
(Hashemi 2015). As Hashemi argues in her essay on underprivileged youth in two 
cities in Iran, purity is an important aspect of face. Hashemi’s description of purity 
encompasses what she calls “sexual cleanliness”. Hashemi, whose research focuses 
on class mobility, doesn’t elaborate on the latter term, but I assume that she is 
catching on the same idea I express when I discuss the moral dimensions of 
virginity.  
Virginity as Performative 
 
The facework engaged in by Mahdieh requires a performance on her part. 
This is not to say that I doubt her claims, but that she intentionally negotiates the 
manner in which she chooses to depict herself. Other female research participants 
also “performed” virginity whether or not they engaged in pre-marital sex.  Even in 
the particular case of Shirin, who had had sexual relations, she made an interesting 
effort at claiming this category/label: 
 
Me: Do you see yourself as a virgin? 
Shirin: Well, from the perspective of reality or from the perspective of way of 
thinking? 
Me:  (laughing) See… 
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Shirin: Meaning do you mean [to ask] if I am a virgin or … ? See because the 
definition is … it depends on the person’s definition. If you say it’s something 
physical, well then […]  
Regarding nejābat (chastity/purity). I don’t like fooling around. I feel… I don’t 
feel, I am sure. Well I listen to psychological things a lot. The human spirit is 
not something that you want to tamper with.  
For example that I be with three people at the same time, and then I trick 
them; at noon I sleep with one person and… I’m sure this is not good for my 
spirit. And these things are not going to make my spirit happy.  
I see myself as najib from this perspective because I don’t fool around. 
Meaning I haven’t had sex for a long time. And then with whoever I was, I 
tried to be with them, meaning it was not that I always want to be with a few 
people at once or to quickly switch between people. Not at all. And then 
whenever I am with someone I insist that they stay stay stay. And then when 
I come out for a long time nobody touches me. No-one. I don’t like it.  
Me: So… sorry… so you have had sex.  
Shirin: And that, [the same as] the number of the fingers of a hand. 
  
 In this interview excerpt, Shirin makes it clear that despite being neither 
sexually inexperienced nor physically “virgin” (she recounted to me how her hymen 
was broken manually without her consent by a man she was seeing at the time) she 
doesn’t “sleep around”. In other words, she is not a whore. A common trope 
regarding virginity is the virgin/whore dichotomy, discussed by Naber (2006) in an 
Arab-American context and also touched on by Mahdavi (2009). The dichotomy is 
useful in showing why it is important to perform virginity: according to this trope, 
which is present in many societies that value female virginity, one is either a virgin 
or a whore, the latter being subject to strong social stigma. Thus, not fully meeting 
the “virginity checklist”51 may necessitate an attempt to emphasize a distinction 
from the category of “whore”.  
                                                        
51 I thank Tristan Biehn for this term. 
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The many possible definitions and deployments of the concept of virginity 
lead me to posit virginity as performative, a category that is produced and 
reproduced through its very performance. Like water trickling over rocks and 
carving its path until a riverbed is formed, virginity imperatives, once set in place, 
tend to stay on course. It is up to a brave few to carve new channels and re-route the 
course of the river.   
Control and Co-optation: Navigating the Virginity Imperative 
 
 We have seen that virginity is a constraining factor on women’s lives. It is 
expected and therefore necessary. As a constraining factor we may expect it to be 
met with some resistance. But, like marriage and education as addressed in the 
previous chapter, we see that not only do many women not resist virginity, but they 
actively deploy it. This utilitarian approach resounds well with Afary’s depiction of 
women under the Qajar period (1785-1925 A.D.) : 
 
"Women were largely disenfranchised and lived under the authority of men 
[…] There was a difference between what fiqh or even custom required, and 
the lived experience of women. Within [existing] constraints, women worked 
ceaselessly to carve out spaces for themselves and to turn to their advantage 
the very constraints imposed upon them. In short, they worked to become 
agents of their own lives" (Afary 2009, 19-20).  
 
Here again we see the theme of structure and agency. Women’s agency is 
evident not only in their attitudinal performance of virginity, but also in their 
performance of its physical aspect. "Tricks" to navigate the physical aspect of 
virginity imperatives have probably existed as long as the institution itself has been 
in place. In her discussion of "Virginity and Patriarchy", which focuses on Morocco 
but generalizes to Arab and Mediterranean societies as well, Mernissi cites the 
sprinkling of chicken blood on the underpants of "so-called virgins", which were to 
be displayed after the wedding night (Mernissi 1982,188). Afary (2009, 29) 
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highlights several options available to girls who lost their virginity before marriage 
in late nineteenth century Iran, which included hymen reconstruction surgery.  
Today, young Iranian women may deploy various strategies, besides the 
obvious abstention from sexual intercourse, in order to preserve their physical 
virginity. For example, they may avoid the use of tampons, and avoiding certain 
sports that are considered potentially damaging to the hymen, such as horseback 
riding. One of the women I interviewed described her experience at a water park in 
Iran where unmarried women were given the option of using a device that would 
supposedly protect their hymen from the water pressure when using the water 
slide. She and her friends opted not to use the device, but some of them later became 
concerned and checked each other in the bathroom.  
Those women who chose to engage in sexual relations may opt to perform 
non-vaginal sexual acts, such as anal intercourse, in order to preserve their hymen 
for marriage (Sadeghi 2009, 255; Kaivanara 2015). One of my male interviewees, 
Ali, also attested to his fact. Mahdavi found that some young women engaged in 
same-sex relations for the same reason (Mahdavi 2012), and Afary cites the example 
of a woman who explained that, in the university environment of mid-1980s Tehran, 
“[w]ith a woman you felt no matter what you did, you could not lose your virginity” 
(Afary 2009, 288). While these techniques all evidence creativity in manoeuvering 
virginity imperatives, they tend to re-entrench gendered structures of inequality 
through the performance of appropriate gender roles in which unmarried women 
are constructed as necessarily virginal. Indeed, the virgin/whore dichotomy I 
mentioned above can be considered one manifestation of a “differential between the 
human and the less-than-human” (Butler 2014, 2), or, if that argument seems 
extreme (though I maintain it to be the case and will illustrate with further 
examples in the next chapter), at least of the “marriageable and the less-than-
marriageable”, whereby, “the very terms that confer ‘humanness’ on some 
individuals are those that deprive certain other individuals of the possibility of 
achieving that status” (Butler 2014, 2).  
Even if the hymen is broken, there is a solution, at least, "for those with 
higher economic and modern social capital" (Sadeghi 2008, 255; see also Mernissi 
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1982). Hymenoplasty, or hymen reconstruction surgery, which is today secretly 
practiced in Iran as in other countries where virginity is highly valued, is the final 
option when all else fails. But once again, the practice of hymenoplasty, like the 
precautions against damage to the hymen cited above, re-entrenches the virginity 
requirement. For Mernissi, "artificial virginity is not only degrading for the woman 
who buys it, but also for the man who penetrates her and for the couple which is 
created, a couple locked forever in deception" (Mernissi 1982, 184). Kaivanara 
(2015) has gathered that some sexually active unmarried Iranian women reject the 
procedure on these grounds. On the other hand, Kaivanara (2015) has suggested 
that the prevalence of hymenoplasty undermines the emphasis on virginal brides, as 
it renders impossible the distinguishing of "true" virgins from "fake" ones 
(Kaivanara 2015). Indeed, the men I interviewed were well aware of this strategy, 
but nevertheless, I got the impression from several that they nevertheless held 
female virginity in high esteem, a fact on which I will elaborate in the next chapter. I 
have to assume that these men had somehow convinced themselves that, despite the 
existence, even prevalence, of means of “faking” virginity, they themselves would not 
fall victim to such “tricks”.  
The phenomenon of hymenoplasty is important as it forcefully brings into 
question the entire premise of virginity tests (here I refer both to the "test" on the 
wedding night and on medical examinations intended to shame women arrested for 
political reasons52. If such tests do not distinguish modesty, nor even sexual 
abstinence, as they are intended, what do they reveal? Apparently, only an 
inordinate pressure on women to perform to a questionable ideal, an ideal which 
many of them nevertheless perform, even embrace. But here we have a problem.   
Notwithstanding the practicality of the deployment of virginity by certain 
women who, as I have mentioned, are in fact working within the constraints given to 
them, my research also made clear that some women were in fact subject to genuine 
harm as a consequence of the virginity imperatives. One such woman was Sara, who 
was briefly introduced in the first chapter.  
                                                        
52 See Eltahawy (2015) for examples of politically motivated “virginity testing” in the Arab context and 
Mahdavi (2009) for examples in the Iranian context. 
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Sara’s Story   
 
I met Sara in a café on Sherbrooke street on a warm day in July. I already 
knew her through university circles, but I was nervous: I was late, and she had 
another engagement afterwards. The interview took place after she was done her 
work for the day, and I had failed to consider the fact that it was rush hour. I had 
attempted to modify my bus route to make sure I got there on time, and had 
frantically texted her on the way. She had kindly changed the meeting location from 
her office to this café, which was closer to the metro station I would be arriving 
from.   
Not only was I nervous because I was late, but also because I had great 
respect for Sara. Educated and eloquent, I admired her for her strong work ethic and 
passion for research. She was everything I wished to be. When I arrived at the café, 
she waved from an open window, poised as usual. I noticed that we had both cut our 
hair short since we had last seen each other. But this wasn’t our only similarity. As 
the interview would reveal, Sara’s story embodied everything that made me 
passionate about the topic of virginity. In her I saw a reflection of myself. Sara’s 
position as a fellow researcher made her an invaluable interlocutor: as she told me, 
she knew what I was looking for and was happy to tell me her story.  
 Sara was pulled out of high school when her parents found out she had a 
boyfriend. Her parents did not allow her to have a telephone in her room (despite 
the fact that her brother did), subjected her to virginity tests, and tried to marry her 
to a relative:  
“I had a boyfriend when I was in high school. My family found out. Then 
they took me out of school for a long time. On and off. They wouldn’t let me 
properly go to school. And with a thousand and one punishments, physical, 
emotional, all types. It was terrifying. […] My boyfriend was a university 
student in another city. It was limited to telephone. When he came we would 
see each other, but it was mostly long-distance. And then, when I was in the 
third year of high school and by that time they knew I had a boyfriend, there 
was beating and all that.  
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[…] When I was 16 or 17 and they found out I had a boyfriend, my 
mother picked me up and took me to a gynaecologist, so that she could 
perform a virginity examination. It was very scary. There was always so much 
talk about virginity everywhere… a girl shouldn’t ride a bicycle, a girl shouldn’t 
ride a horse, she shouldn’t fall on the ground… this talk had affected me so that 
even though I knew I was a virgin, I was so scared I was about to faint.”  
From that time they fell into the idea that “well, let’s marry her off” (shoharesh 
bedim). And I was very studious. I was always either the top of the class or the 
second. I had a very high average above 1953.  
They arranged for someone to come.  It was one of their friends who 
came for khastegari. And because I knew at that time—I was 17 or 18—I knew 
that this type, in general, who take their son’s hand and go to the khastegari of 
a 17-year-old-girl, and with attention to the fact that my paternal aunt, who 
was very traditional, had introduced them, I knew this person was not my 
type.  I showed up in a very untraditional style and tried to behave in a way 
that they wouldn’t like me. But the opposite happened in fact. But then I stood 
my ground and said no. […] After I was accepted in university, that boyfriend 
of mine came [as a khastegar] with his father, but my family did not accept.  
 
A few years later, at twenty-one, realizing that her parents wouldn’t allow her 
to continue living in Tehran after her studies, Sara decided to marry a man whom 
she had met herself. Ten years her senior and having himself had a divorced woman 
as a girlfriend, he subjected her to the same degrading virginity tests that her family 
had once forced her to undergo.  
 
He was around thirty-one or so, and had been friends with a divorced 
girl, and would have sex with her. And he would tell me all about it. On the 
day when we were supposed to say our wedding vows (aghd), he, without 
having told me anything in advance, had gone himself and gotten an 
                                                        
53 In Iran grades are given out of 20 at all levels of schooling.  
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appointment with a gynaecologist. So that a few hours before we would do 
aghd, he would take me there. He told me that we were going to buy shoes. I 
told him I didn’t want to, I had shoes, but he insisted. In the car he told me “I 
don’t want to live my entire life in doubt”. From there I knew for sure that I 
couldn’t live with him. I had stood up in the face of such things. And I knew 
that this person was not for me. But I couldn’t do anything. Because if I said 
no, it would be messed up (be ham mikhord). And everyone was in our house, 
my dad, my uncle, the whole family. I was thinking about what answer I 
would give to my dad. They would say “you must not be a virgin that you 
didn’t accept to have the test”. I had no road forward and no back road back 
(Na rahe pish dashtam na rahe pas dashtam). […] 
Then when we came home, I was really upset. Meaning it was a deep 
hit for me. I was deeply upset about this issue. I came and told my mother 
with an air of sadness, that he had done this kind of thing (ye hamchin kari 
kard). My mother became so happy. She ran and got the letter to show it to 
my dad. She said, “yes, it is tradition (rasm), we have to do this”.  
 
Sara divorced her husband four years later, continued pursuing her studies, 
and moved to Canada. She rightfully felt that the restrictions and coerced virginity 
testing that her parents, and later her fiancé, had forced her to undergo, were an 
affront to her dignity. But to not undergo the testing would have meant untold 
shame, and would disrupt her plans to create the life she wanted. Here, once again, 
we have a woman navigating difficult waters by acceding to circumstances in order 
to create a liveable life. In this case, however, it is exceptionally clear that the said 
circumstances are rather harsh. To borrow from Butler, many aspects of these 
women’s lives are “a practice of improvisation within a scene of constraint” (Butler 
2004, 1), but it must at the same time be understood that these constraints, along 
with “the terms by which we are recognized as human”, are “socially articulated and 
changeable” (Butler 2004, 2). 
The performance of virginity ends at a critical juncture in the lives of young 
women, that rite of passage into adulthood: marriage. It is usually on the wedding 
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night that the performance reaches its grand finale. Here I will take a step back and 
discuss what I call “hymeneal blood ritual” in various contexts.  
No Hymen? No Diamond:54 The consequences of failed performance  
 
I have argued that women employ the performance of virginity as a tactic in 
face-saving. This performance is practical and necessary in situations where 
economic wellbeing and social inclusion depend on one’s ability to secure a “good” 
marriage. As Shirin told me: “Iranian [men], even if they are 100 times roshanfekr 
(intellectual/enlightened) at the end they want to say that you were not a virgin.” 
Shirin’s comment reminds one of the character Emad in Asghar Farhadi’s 
internationally acclaimed film, The Salesman. Despite his apparently open-minded, 
intellectual worldview, he is unable to communicate with his wife, Rana, regarding 
the driving incident of the film, in which, the viewer must assume, she suffered 
forcible rape or attempted rape. Instead of helping his wife cope with her pain and 
suffering following the incident, Emad’s first concern was to reclaim his honour 
through revenge. Shirin’s comment and the film’s plot both indicate an obsession of 
“even enlightened Iranian men” with the sexual exclusivity and purity of their wives, 
something we will see further evidenced by the interviews with men I discuss in the 
third chapter. The fact that a man might use the comment “you weren’t a virgin” to 
score points in an argument is indicative of a not-so-subtle power-dynamic in which 
women are always subject to scrutiny of their sexuality. A non-virgin is hardly 
worth considering, hardly human, and it is for this reason that women must work so 
hard to ensure that they are perceived as virgins.  
                                                        
54 This phrase is the name of a (most likely US-based) facebook group of “men’s rights activists”, which 
goes to show that virginity imperatives exist in geographically, culturally and historically diverse locations. 
Source: Emily Hodgkin. "'No hymen, no diamond': Male activist Facebook group mocked for demanding 






There is perhaps no time in a woman’s life that this work is so important 
than on the eve of her marriage, as her future is determined by whether the groom 
and his family are convinced by the performance.  
The Violence of Virginity: The Cat Must Be Killed at the Entrance to the 
Wedding Chamber  
 
The breaking of the hymen is a rite of significance in many societies, past and 
present.55 In cultural contexts it has become a ritual marked by the collection of 
hymeneal blood on white fabric, a handkerchief or sheet, even the woman’s 
underwear (Mernissi 1982), depending on local custom. The fabric is then displayed 
to the woman’s in-laws. Among Armenians, this is called the “Red Apple” tradition, 
because if a red bloodspot is found on the bedsheet, a tray of red apples will be taken by 
married women relatives of the groom to the home of the bride’s parents (Poghosyan, 
2011).  
The process of collecting blood from the young woman on the night of first 
conjugal union was mentioned to me by several of my interlocutors as hejleh, and by 
one person, as zafāf. In my Internet searches aiming to learn more about this subject 
and these particular terms, I found very little. It appears that these terms are 
somewhat interchangeable (as indicated by an online dictionary)56 but hejleh refers 
primarily to what has been translated in English as the “bridal chamber”, which 
seems to be where the bride and groom went to consummate their marriage, and 
zafāf is a term of Arabic origin referring to the wedding night, during which 
penetrative sex is expected to occur.  
The ritual is intended to prove the young woman’s virginity and her new 
husband’s virility (Afary 2009, 29), almost as if the ritual is one of war and conquest 
and the nuptial quarters the battlefield. Fatima Mernissi argues that, for societies in 
                                                        
55 An incomplete list of discussions of hymeneal blood rituals includes Mernissi (1982) for Morocco, 
Labidi (2008) for Tunisia, Heyat  (2002) for Azerbaijan, Renne (1996) for the Ekiti Yoruba in Nigeria, and 
Afary (2009) for Iran. Renne also acknowledges the up “until relatively recently … taken for granted” (19) 
status of the hymen as synonymous with virginity in the US. 
56 “Hejle”  (Dictionary Online). Accessed June 22, 2017. 
http://dictionary.abadis.ir/fatofa/%D8%AD%D8%AC%D9%84%D9%87/. 
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which this ritual is practiced, sex is seen as “an act of destruction and degradation” 
(Mernissi 1982).  
In my searches for the meaning of the term hejle I came across the proverb 
“Gorbe ro bayad dame hejle kosht” (The cat must be killed at the entrance to the 
bridal chamber). If we ignore the violence inflicted on the cat, and take the 
expression for its figurative meaning, something along the lines of, “things must be 
nipped in the bud”, it seems innocent enough. Interestingly, according to 
commentators on a web forum57 where I found this proverb discussed, it is in fact 
usually used in reference to shutting down gossiping or complaining voices on the 
occasion of a wedding. This evokes also the symbolic “shutting-up” of naysayers by 
sewing several stitches into the fabric that is held over the heads of the bride and 
groom as sugar is ground over it.58 But what about the origin of the phrase? 
According to one commentator, Flying Solo, who cites “gems from [their] Gramma”, 
the story goes as follows. The bride and groom enter the hejle (bridal chamber, the 
site of hymen-breaking) to consummate their marriage, but there is a cat by the 
entryway that is very noisy and being a nuisance. The groom picks up the cat and 
wrings its neck, demonstrating his strength and showing the bride what he is 
capable of, and thus what fate may befall her if she does not behave. This somewhat 
shocking account suggests that the ritual of hejle is one of violence, and the marriage 
that follows is one based on fundamentally unequal relations.   
Fieldwork Encounters with Virginity Ritual  
 
What is the significance of this practice today? Among my interlocutors, it 
seems to have been largely abandoned. Those who described it to me did so almost 
as a curious tale worth recounting. Mahdieh, whose apparent concern with 
maintaining proper appearances I described above, mentioned having been given a 
handkerchief by her mother to use on her wedding night to wipe her genital area. 
                                                        
57 "Hejleh." Iranian.com. Accessed June 22, 2017. https://iranian.com/main/2009/feb/hejleh.html. 
58 Eduljee, K. E. "Zoroastrian Wedding Customs." Zoroastrian Heritage . Accessed June 22, 2017. 
http://www.heritageinstitute.com/zoroastrianism/marriage/iranian/page2.htm. 
Although this page describes these practices as zoroastrian, many of these ritual elements are also present 
in Iranian Muslim weddings (and I would assume in the weddings of Iranians of other faiths). 
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Mahdieh’s husband had dissuaded her from doing this, telling her it was an “ugly” 
(zesht) practice. At least a couple of other women, however, told me about a more 
recent version of the enactment of this practice, the use of “virginity certificates” 
obtained from gynaecologists or midwives in order to prove virginity prior to 
marriage. Sometimes this is done pre-emptively by the parents as a sort of 
insurance. In the biblical passage I quoted earlier, it was up to the father to defend 
his daughter in the face of the accusation of not being a virgin. The same principle 
applies here.  
It goes without saying that, in the case of women who, for whatever reason, 
either do not bleed when they are expected to (upon first sexual intercourse with 
their new husband), or who have, whatever the cause, already broken their hymen, 
both forms of “proving virginity” can be frightening and risky. Sara’s narrative is a 
testament to this fact. Sara is a very strong woman who stood up for what she 
believed was just. But for other women, escaping this practice of humiliation and 
degradation may be much more difficult. 
For women whose hymens have broken beforehand, there is the option of 
hymen repair. For Shirin, this was a possible option. She mentioned a friend who 
had had the surgery and told her new boyfriend that she was a virgin. However, 
Shirin’s friend had not bled when she first had sex with this boyfriend. She had 
become “zāye” (shamed/embarrassed) and was worried that the same thing would 
happen when she eventually got married. She had gone back to the doctor who had 
performed the surgery, who told her the suture had come loose. For this reason, 
Shirin (who had studied a health-related field) told me, doctors recommended only 
performing such surgeries a few months before marriage, not earlier. However, 
there is reason to be sceptical about the utility of such surgeries. A study undertaken 
in Amsterdam, Netherlands, that followed and counselled women seeking hymen 
reconstruction, found that 17 out of 19 women who went through with the surgery 
(out of 82 women initially seeking it) “reported no blood loss at first marital 
intercourse” (Moorst et al. 2012). With a “failure” rate of nearly 90%, one wonders 
whether women who receive these surgeries actually benefit from them, or whether 
they suffer silently the abuses of husbands who, expecting the blood signature of the 
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virginity contract, remain forever suspicious of whether their wives had remained 
faithful to its terms.  
 As I have mentioned earlier, other means by which one may attempt to avert 
exposure as a non-virgin have existed for a long time. Afary (2009) mentions several 
nineteenth-century practices.  In the “modern version” of the virginity ritual doctors 
may be sympathetic and even lie in favour of the young woman in order to avert the 
possibility of harm to her (Mahdavi 2009), but women undergoing these procedures 
still experience substantial fear and risk. Some may perceive the method of 
consulting a doctor as “more accurate” (given anatomical variation and the fact that 
the necessity of blood loss upon first vaginal penetration is, frankly, a myth), but this 
method represents a continuation of the fetishization of the hymen, appropriation of 
women’s bodies and rendering them subject to public scrutiny, and reduction of 
women’s worth to a culturally constructed (read: fictitious) equation of the intact 
hymen with purity. This model shames and endangers women who fail to 
[adequately] perform virginity.     
 In the Turkish film Mustang, a young woman (one of five orphaned sisters 
subjected to the tyranny of an uncle who decides, once it has been found that they 
have gone swimming with several boys from their school, that they should be 
carefully guarded at home and quickly married off) does not bleed on her wedding 
night. After scrambling and failing to find a spot of blood on the bedsheet, her 
husband (asking her what he should do, to which she responds apathetically), goes 
empty-handed to his female relatives. These in-laws of the bride now consult a 
doctor. During the private examination, the (male) doctor tells the young woman 
that her hymen is thick and therefore difficult to break, and may break later during 
sex or during childbirth. He asks her why she had claimed upon entry to the hospital 
that she had “slept with all the men in the world”. She responds, “What difference 
does it make? I might as well have”.  The young woman is alluding to how, given the 
suspicion surrounding her failure to bleed, by the logic of the virgin/whore 
dichotomy, up until the point where the doctor clears her status as “virgin”, she is 
being classified as “whore”.  It doesn’t matter what she did or did not do, for she is 
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perceived as having committed an unforgiveable transgression that brings untold 
shame on her and her family.  
Discussion of Gender Violence in the Broader Iranian Community 
 
The devaluation of women inherent in the ritualization and euphemizing of 
the act of hymen-breaking and the categorizing work of the virgin/whore dichotomy 
leads to further structural violences. In Asghar Farhadi’s film, The Salesman, an 
older man (with an adult daughter who is getting married), takes an open door and 
a woman in a shower as an invitation. Even after realizing the woman, Rana, is not 
whom he expected (Ahoo, a sex-worker of whom he was a regular client), he takes 
advantage of the situation, citing “vasvase shodam” (I was tempted) as his sole 
excuse when he is finally found and reprimanded by the woman’s husband, Emad. 
The result of his temptation is the violence done to Rana, whose crimson blood, the 
neighbours told Emad, had covered her pale body, the white-glazed bathtub and 
marble tiles. Expecting her husband home at any moment to their new apartment, 
Rana had left the door open while she showered, an act which, perhaps, in the mind 
of her attacker, had defined her as a woman of loose morals, deserving of rape.  
 In a discussion of the film organized by CafeLitt, an Iranian organization in 
Montreal that invites speakers to discuss various literary and scholarly topics, to my 
dismay I heard a woman claiming that “cheating” (as displayed by the elderly man in 
the film) was somehow more natural to men. In a way her argument justified or 
excused the act as somehow natural, despite other discussants’ protests that it was 
hard to believe that this character, who also had a heart condition, could commit 
such an act. Thankfully, the workshop organizer and presenter, both men, were of 
the opinion that the film revealed the patriarchal privilege accorded to men in 
Iranian society. The presenter, an Iranian film critic, claimed that the skill of Farhadi 
was in opening up for discussion such topics, rarely discussed by Iranians. I hope my 




Chapter 3: Moving Towards a “Modern” Marriage: Men’s Desires 
and the Requisite Changes 
 
 
Me: What do you think women look for in a man? 
Mehran (31): Three things, in this order: A man’s responsibility and his ability to take 
care of the woman, his love of her, and money.  
[…] 
Me: What about men?  
Mehran: I think beauty and charm is their priority.  
 
 
Look, we have something called marriage, and we have something called love. These two 
things are very different. Marriage is pretty much a bartering transaction (mo`āmele-ye 
payapayi). –Ali, 31.  
 
 
Throughout the time I spent working on data analysis, thinking about my findings, 
and presenting at conferences, I was repeatedly asked, “but what did the men say?” I 
continually put off the task of revisiting my interviews with men, until one day one of my 
women interlocutors presented to me a dilemma she was having. Maryam had been a 
university acquaintance beforehand and would ask me about my research whenever I ran 
into her. We had gotten together for lunch and were having an extended conversation 
covering various topics of mutual concern, including our respective job prospects and 
what we needed to do to succeed in the job-hunting process, as well as relationship 
issues. Maryam had been with her Iranian boyfriend for two years, and was hoping to get 
married. She felt that in her current situation, she was unrooted, floating and uncertain of 
her future (similar to women described by Tremayne (2006)). She was still a virgin, but 
her boyfriend had suggested that it would be ok if they had sex. Maryam pressed me 
several times during our conversation to tell her, based on my own findings, whether it 
was “actually true” that Iranian men valued virginity. I told her about the various 
limitations of my own research, and what I had read in the literature (in particular, I 
discussed some findings from Mahdavi’s 2009 book Passionate Uprisings, which I had 
just finished), but was reluctant to give her any personal advice, not knowing how to 
tactfully approach the issue. Maryam remained unsatisfied, telling me that she felt 
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perhaps men (like her boyfriend) told their girlfriends that premarital sex would be ok 
only “to get what they wanted”. “Yes, that is sometimes the case.” I replied.  
After Maryam left I felt uncomfortable with the fact that I had been unable to help 
her. A few aspects of our conversation left me particularly puzzled. She was 30 years old, 
and had been with her boyfriend for two years. Did she not feel secure enough in her 
relationship to be able to assess her boyfriend’s intentions? Was sex not also something 
that she wanted? It was apparently not something she felt comfortable engaging in—even 
with someone who, despite ups and downs, seemed, from what she told me, to love her—
at least, not until she had secured something she clearly did want: marriage. It seemed as 
if Maryam, like so many other women, was using her virginity as a bargaining chip in the 
lottery of marriage, and felt that without it, she would be at a disadvantage.  
I reflected on Maryam’s lack of expression of sexual desire. In our interview, she 
had told me she felt Iranian boys were interested in women who were virgins but “in bed, 
were like porn stars”, and that they wanted to empty out all their sexual oqde (complex, 
obsession59), on these poor women. I had noted this, but not asked Maryam whether girls 
did not have fetishes as well. Maryam’s seeming disinterest in an exploratory sexuality 
was in fact prevalent among the women I talked to: another woman told me she had gone 
to a psychologist to discuss her issues with being unable to or uncomfortable in starting 
relationships (even friendships) with men if she was not certain of their motivations or 
end goal. Yet another, who had told me stories about how the other young women in her 
dormitory in Iran would masturbate, told me that she did not understand why they would 
do that “when there were so many willing boys around”. “Well, that has its own 
complications”, I replied. When I mentioned “sexual need” (niāz-e-jensi) she told me that 
perhaps she had a low libido but that this concept was not something she had ever 
understood.  Even Shirin had claimed that she had “sardi-e-jensi” (was sexually “cold”).  
Women’s lack of discussion of, or claims of lack of understanding of or interest in 
sex was in stark contrast to the discussions of some of the men I interviewed. I had been 
particularly uncomfortable beginning my interviews with men, and was surprised at how 
candidly some of them spoke to me about issues that would normally be considered taboo 
by Iranian social norms, especially if discussed between members of opposite sexes. This 
                                                        
59 Maryam seemed to be discussing sexual fetishes. 
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was the case with Ali, who repeatedly invoked male (but not female) sexual desire as the 
reason behind many marriages.  
Ali: Love, Money and Marriage  
 
Ali, the first man I interviewed, was a thirty-one year-old student who had arrived 
in Canada a year before, but had also spent some time in Europe. Ali told me that he was 
from a small town where people were very religious and traditional, but had spent some 
portion of his life living in dormitories while studying in Tehran. My entire interview 
with Ali seemed to revolve around a major conflict in Ali’s personal life, which 
concerned the ideal of romantic love (which conflicted with sonnati societal norms), the 
heavy reality of the economic demands of marriage (for men in particular, but also for 
women who had to collect the goods for their jahizieh) as well as the problems caused by 
the inability to fulfil one’s sexual needs. “It’s very rare, in our religious society, that you 
marry someone you love,” he had asserted.  
Ali had, in his second year of university, fallen in love. Unable to express his 
interest directly to the woman in question for fear of the embarrassing consequence of 
gossip among his peers, he had e-mailed her, and experienced rejection. He told me that 
“this story continued for 11 years” and that he suffered depression as a result. He blamed 
“the societal conditions” for many of the woes of youth, as he saw them, but when 
pressed, seemed unable to propose alternatives. Ali seemed unable to reconcile strict 
religious rules of gender segregation with the requisites of romantic love. He also had 
come to realize the economic demands that Iranian marriage norms placed on young men, 
who had to wait years to complete their studies and find a suitable job in order to be 
considered eligible for marriage. A family would not allow their daughter to marry a 
jobless man, he asserted. Ali continued to insist that love could solve all problems, but 
told me that women seemed not to recognize such love. He gave the example of the 
beloved woman of a friend of his, who had married another (wealthier) man while the 
former was pursuing his studies in order to later get a job and ask for her hand. This 
friend, feeling that God had not helped him, had, in retaliation, become a heavy consumer 
of pornography.  
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 Like many of my interviewees, Ali told me Iranian marriages were transactional, 
and criticized this state of affairs. His focus on passionate romantic love, was, however, 
unusual. Most interviewees told me love was all about hormones, and stated that the 
companionate love that followed the hormone-charged passionate phase was more 
important than the former. Some explained that it was important to use one’s reason in 
choosing a mate.  
Throughout the interview, I made attempts to hinge onto some of Ali’s criticisms 
of society as a starting point for further critical discussion, but he would inevitably thwart 
my attempts by explaining the issues away as due to some other factor, such as the issue 
of men’s marriage crises being due to Iran’s poor economic situation, and not, apparently, 
due to a need for change in customs that had failed to adapt to the times. Religion was 
apparently never to blame. In a few instances Ali had seemed almost to support gender 
equality, telling me that the issue of staggeringly high mahriyeh demands was due to the 
fact that women didn’t have many rights in Iranian society. He also believed that it was a 
problem that it was impossible to tell how many sexual relationships a man had had, but 
that for a woman, whether she had had sexual experience was evident. He told me about a 
friend of his whose fiancée had had an affair in his absence of a year and a half, and when 
she told him “she didn’t have a hymen”, he had divorced her60. But I was disappointed, as 
although he touched upon these many issues faced by women, he didn’t go any further, 
and through most of the conversation seemed only to see men’s issues as he had 
experienced them and not to concern himself with how the women he spoke of may feel.  
 Ali had mentioned, early in our interview, that he had come from a conservative 
religious background and that he used to be religious, but had (for a time) turned his back 
on religion. Adding to this the fact that he was not fasting (I met him in the daytime 
during Ramadan, and he offered me tea of which he also partook), I had assumed he was 
no longer religious. I was therefore somewhat taken aback when he messaged me some 
time after our interview, asking if I knew any hijabi young women that I could introduce 
to him to meet with the intent of marriage. I suggested he attend one of the local Iranian 
mosques and try to meet someone there, and gave him the addresses.   
                                                        
60 They had performed and “aghd” ceremony but not an “aroosi”, so they were married but had not 
consummated the marriage.  
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 I had been unable to decipher Ali, but he was nevertheless a good informant. As 
my first male interviewee, he had opened a window into a world I was wholly unfamiliar 
with.  He had also been the first to tell me about the practice of hejle and give me that 
word for it. His failure to follow through on his criticisms, however, left me perplexed.  
Perhaps Ali was more jaded than critical: his inability to marry the woman with 
whom he had fallen in love had resulted in his finding fault with the traditional system of 
marriage and courtship but not with many of its underlying premises. He now understood 
that as a man of little means, he would not have been able to adequately financially 
support that woman, who enjoyed a more comfortable socio-economic position. He also 
told me that he had backed off when someone told him that, due to the fact that he was 
shorter than the woman he was interested in, she would have been terribly embarrassed 
just standing next to him. Nevertheless, he claimed that in love, a couple would be able to 
put up with anything. After my many interviews with women and further thinking on the 
unequal gender relations in Iran, I would put to Ali the following question: “How can 
there be love between men and women when economic and sexual inequalities separate 
them?” 
The difference in economic opportunities available to men and women in Iran is 
something I have touched upon in the first chapter. The idealization of hypergyny and 
gender roles within marriage, with men being the de facto breadwinners, aggravates 
inequality within marriage. Many of my women interlocutors, despite working or 
intending to work in their field of study, seemed to assent to this situation. Even Sara, a 
self-proclaimed feminist, not only tolerated large age differences between herself and her 
partners, but sought them, telling me she couldn’t accept anything less than a large age 
gap (her current partner was also about ten years older than herself) because younger men 
were too immature. At least one man, however, wasn’t comfortable with large age 
differences. Nevertheless, our discussion, like the one I had with Ali, strikingly revealed 
the continued inequalities in men’s and women’s sexual lives.   
Mehran: Mixing the Old and the New 
 
I met Mehran, a 31-year old student who had been in Canada for about five years, 
at an Iranian-owned café in downtown Montreal. It was my first time there, and I found 
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the space cozy and charming. It was not more charming than Mehran himself, however, 
who was handsome and had a friendly demeanour. Mehran seemed to me to be quite the 
open-minded, caring, thoughtful young man. My interview with him stands in sharp 
contrast with the interviews with women I present in the first chapter, revealing the very 
different experiences of young Iranian girls and boys growing up, as well as their 
different concerns upon reaching young adulthood and beginning to form relationships. 
At the same time, Mehran’s account reveals his attempts at reconciling different systems 
of courtship in a changing and interconnected world. In his words, many Iranian couples 
nowadays use a mix of sonnati and moderne practices in their courtships, and he himself 
seems to have vacillated between the two. Mehran’s approach, like that of many of my 
interviewees, reveals the messiness of contemporary Iranian discourse on marriage. As 
discussions in the foregoing chapters have also suggested, the binaries of love marriage 
versus arranged marriage or marriage of convenience, of Eastern versus Western, and of 
traditional versus modern, do not do justice to the complexity of actual practice. Another 
point that rings true here is one I made in the introduction, inspired by Adelkhah (2016), 
is that it is misleading and inaccurate to consider Iranian populations in the home country 
as separate from those living abroad: the ease of travel and the possibility of marriage and 
other material and cultural transfers across transnational borders renders a strict 
distinction inaccurate.    
Mehran told me he was born in a village in central Iran, the last of seven siblings. 
At the age of 12 he went to Tehran and became independent. “It was hard but it took 
some time and I got used to it”, he told me. Partly because he was the youngest and partly 
because he had become independent early on, he told me, his family had not pressured 
him to marry (although his sister occasionally worried about him being alone) and did not 
attempt to make decisions for him, trusting him to take care of his own affairs. A couple 
of years after arriving in Canada in 2011, he had decided it was time for him to marry.  
Me: Have you ever done khastegari?  
Mehran: Yes I have.  
Me: What about having girlfriends?  
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Mehran: Ummmm… I have had girlfriends. Yes. I’ve had them in Iran and here 
[…]. But none of my girlfriends were serious. I don’t know why but [the 
relationship] would always end quickly.  
Me: They were not serious or …?  
Mehran: Usually my choices for girlfriends were not [made] with thought. Or not 
with me thinking how similar I am to this person. Maybe it was mostly about 
sexual issues. […] And when [the relationship] went forward a little, then I would 
realize that from a [manner of] thinking perspective and from an alāghe (love, 
interest) perspective they don’t match.  
Me: Continuing on this topic […], do you feel for example,  I’ve heard some 
things regarding what in Iran, girls are after and what boys are after. Do you think 
the girls for example liked, their intention, did they like themselves… 
Mehran: They themselves had the intention of marriage? 
Me: Did they themselves have the intention of marriage? 
Me: Umm… the Iranian [girl]friends I had yes you would see this in them that 
they like to marry and, meaning, it wasn’t like this, that I say well [she] doesn’t 
want it or doesn’t like to. For all of them it was like this that they liked [to marry]. 
Now maybe they didn’t say it directly but they would talk about it. Either about 
their future or their marriage. It was clear that it was really important and they like 
to.  
Me: Ok. And then khāstegāri you said was separate from this?  
Mehran: That I went in Iran. I pretty much didn’t have anyone here. And I didn’t 
have any candidates (gozine). Then, when I went to Iran I wanted to practice 
(ejra) that sonnati way. That the family finds someone for me that they feel is 
appropriate and we go khāstegāri. I had picked two or three people and I had 
given them the responsibility (beheshun seporde budam). They had picked a few 
[girls]. I remember the first one, before we went to their home, I had told the 
family I’d like to meet the girl in a café or something to see if I even like her. I 
saw that no, they don’t like such a thing to happen […]. With the second one it 
was a similar story. When I was supposed to go, then the woman I had designated 
to find me the girl saw me and told me no, you don’t match. For those two options 
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we ended up being unable to go. We went for the third option. We went and it 
was a very young girl61. I had insisted that they let us go out and they had not 
allowed it. I said maybe everyone is like this and there’s no choice, we have to go. 
It was like the past (ghadim). [They told us] you go for an hour in the room and 
talk to the lady.  
Me: It's interesting but I have a strange feeling about that62.  
Mehran: And it was the first time I was seeing her with the two families. I didn’t 
even know who is who (because she had two sisters) until they told us to go in the 
room. After half an hour, I went and saw [… ] I said what kind of practice was 
this? How was it in the past? Is it possible in ten minutes, in half an hour, to get to 
know someone? I saw I can’t think of anything [to say]. How wrong is this 
practice! I realized that this way is a mistake. Even though maybe she was a good 
girl, it was a good family […] And sometimes I feel maybe it’s a right way, I 
don’t know. But then when we arrived, then I saw that no, it’s not a right way […] 
I decided not to think about it [the possibility of this union].     
[…] 
Me: Why did you choose to [go] this traditional way?  
Mehran: There were two reasons. One reason was that we didn’t know anyone, 
and neither did I have a friend.  
Mehran went on to explain that some people are shy and have trouble in the 
system “here” (in Canada). He gives the example of a Mexican friend who, upon hearing 
about the khāstegāri system from Mehran, expressed interest in going to Iran to get a 
wife, as he has trouble even finding a date in Canada. He told me about how Iranian 
courtships nowadays are a combination of modernity and tradition, and that families 
                                                        
61 Later in the interview Mehran tells me that she was around 20 and he was around 30 and it was mainly 
the age difference that he was uncomfortable with (it was not that the girl was too young in the absolute 
sense): “If you ask men, they really like the girl to be younger. I personally ag… I like her to be younger 
than me. I prefer for her to be younger than me. But I think than ten years is a lot. It’s important for me in a 
thinking perspective…”.   
62 I am referring here to my surprise that such a situation is possible. As I explained to Mehran later in the 
interview, I had been taught that unrelated men and women could not be alone in a room together. Mehran 
explained to me that this was a special case because everyone is waiting outside to hear the young people’s 
decision (of whether to pursue the courtship, which will in later stages involve negotiations among the 
families over such things as mehrieh).  
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often allow the two young people to get to know each other for six months or a year, but 
that this is also “under control”. He then explained the problem with such arrangements: 
Mehran: If I go out with this girl, it’s a bit heavy for me. I feel that maybe this girl 
or that family will become subject to sadness [if I reject her]. A torture of 
conscience takes me that I have to for sure say that I want her. I still see a bit of a 
problem in it. I feel like if you say no, the girl’s worth will come down with her 
family […] the family questions what was the problem, why didn’t [he] want 
[her]? 
Although the traditional system in Iran had its problems, so did Canadian dating 
and marriage norms. After his failure to find a bride in Iran, Mehran had returned to 
Canada and wondered why he had ever made such a decision:  
Me: Was it always clear to you that one day you will marry? 
Mehran: Yes. It was always in my plans […] I felt it was a very big stage in my 
life. I wanted to be ready for it from the perspective of work and economics. 
When I came here, after a year or two I felt the time has come […] but I don’t 
know, in six seven months, I suddenly concluded that marriage … nothing big is 
supposed to happen.  As a matter of fact why did I see it as such a big thing? It 
lost its importance for me. Mostly this part is left that if only someone in my 
life… if my hāl (psycho-emotional state) can get better I want to get married. But 
if not and it is supposed to make me worse, I don’t want it. Overall the concept of 
marriage has become a bit colder for me. Maybe living here had an effect. It was 
for the first time that I saw people living together without marriage […]. One of 
my Quebecer friends invited me to his wedding. He [already] had two kids with 
the person he was marrying.  When I saw these things I said no, I don’t accept 
this. For the first or two years I would debate: “no this concept is not right, you 
have to first get married”. Because I saw it as a contract. When you buy a house 
you sign a contract […]. Between two people, there has to be this contract of 
marriage, in order for commitment to form (ta’ahhod shekl begire). And I really 
strongly defended it. But after a while I felt, no, it doesn’t necessarily need to be 
like this. You can get to know someone… but not in this way that children are 
born and you wait 10 years… 
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Mehran also revealed to me some of the debates he would have with his 
university peers in Iran about sexual relationships with women:  
Mehran: There were two points of view. One opinion was that it’s best that before 
marriage you don’t have any relationship with any woman. And the reason was 
that you should keep your love and interest and excitement for your spouse. For 
the first person that you’re going to be with. But the second group would say that 
no, you should have relationships with other women. It’s better this way… 
Me: from a sexual perspective?  
Mehran: Any way, friendship, sexual. One of the reasons was that if you have 
relationships and then you want to be with your spouse there is always a feeling 
of comparison. You always think that you can easily obtain it with other people. 
As a result it is not as valuable or strong for you. Because you think “before I was 
with other people”, and you think that you could probably be with other people 
too. With your first experience with your wife you certainly think everything is 
over. The other group was against this. They said you better have lots of 
relationships, and you will be better prepared.  
Mehran also had moral qualms about initiating sexual relationships with virgin 
women:  
Mehran: We knew that for a woman it is very hard if you have a sexual 
relationship and then you don’t marry her. What will become of her? And we 
knew that society accepts this with difficulty. And this girl will have a lot of 
problems. How is she going to justify why she had a sexual relationship? This 
very thing would protect us so that we don’t go and enter relationships. Which we 
as boys knew that no-one would find out. But what would happen to that girl? 
Meaning sometimes this would result in… we knew that if we don’t want to 
marry her, problems would be created for her. This would protect us.  
Me: (laughing) So you’re an ethical person.   
Mehran: Umm… this is my personal view. And I would see around me people 
who did not think like this. It was not important to them. They would start sexual 
relationships. And they knew they would not marry [this person] and they would 
leave her and go. Now this girl would be left and either had to solve this issue for 
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herself, or she would have psychological issues. Or bad and bad and worse events 
would befall her. There were my friends; we would talk about it. Yes, I would 
see, I would hear about it in my surroundings.  
Mehran then went on to describe a friend of his who was apparently open-minded 
with regards to sex, and would advise his (male) friends to go ahead with sexual 
relationships. This friend befriended a girl and after a while proposed to her. She rejected 
him and after he pursued her a while for the reason, she told him “I am not a girl 
(dokhtar), I am not a virgin, don’t think about marriage”.  
Mehran: In her mind she had thought that if the boy knew she was not a virgin he 
would end the relationship […] This boy was very open-minded and would say 
the issue is ok, and on the one hand really loved the girl, even the fact that she had 
been so honest with him and told him, [but on the other hand] for himself it was 
hard to accept […] and he saw that he couldn’t [continue the relationship and 
marry this woman]. 
[…] 
Me: had he himself had sexual relationships?  
Mehran: he himself hadn’t; he said he hadn’t. He would say if it comes up it’s ok. 
He would say if it came up I would do it. In thinking he had come to [terms with] 
this issue but not in practice.        
At this point I asked Mehran for a clarification:  
Me: When someone says girlfriend or boyfriend, in my mind I automatically think 
they have a sexual relationship.  
Mehran: Oh no no no for Iran it is not like this.  
I asked him about his own relationships. He laughed and avoided answering the 
question, speaking instead in general terms:  
There are different styles in Iran. There’s a style where you go out together. There 
is a style where you have [sex]; either you have decided to get married, you have 
it, at any rate something has happened that you have it. Or, the person doesn’t 
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have a problem. They’re63 not a virgin. You don’t see a reason to protect 
yourself64. They have had sex before. For the case in which they are a virgin, 
that’s when you get stuck wondering what to do. Sometimes till the end, the 
relationship ends and they stay a virgin. For the case in which they weren’t [a 
virgin] there will be a sexual relationship too. 
I appreciated Mehran’s candid discussion of the issues faced by young women in 
sexual and romantic relationships, and of the attitudes of young men towards these same 
issues. As regards these comments on the various styles of dating in Iran, other 
interlocutors also made similar comments regarding the difference in the meaning of 
boyfriend or girlfriend in Iran and Canada. Mehran’s comments were especially 
interesting in the way they showed that, from a male perspective, having sex with a non-
virgin was not a problem, but a woman’s virginity presented a very real barrier. Mehran 
and Ali both told stories of friends who had rejected women they loved on the basis that 
they had confessed to not being virgins. These candid accounts were often more revealing 
than the accounts of women, many of whom were less forthcoming on matters of 
sexuality.   
From Tradition to Modernity: A Fallacy of Binaries 
 
My interviews with Ali and Mehran show that some young Iranian men appear to 
be conflicted between “traditional” and “modern” marriage systems and systems of 
gender relations. While Mehran discussed the pros and cons of each of khāstegāri and 
dating as well as whether it was advisable to have sexual relations before marriage, Ali 
was concerned with the inability to foster love in a gender-segregated (and unequal) 
society in which women married for economic and men for sexual need. Both of these 
men, while expressing some glimmer of concern for women, revealed the inequality 
inherent in the gender systems with which they engaged, and seemed ultimately 
interested in virgin wives.  
                                                        
63 My use of “they” here reflects the fact that Farsi lacks gendered pronouns. Although we have seen there 
is a gender difference that suggests the person in question is female, I have preferred to use “they” here as it 
better reflects the fact that the language Mehran is using in this case is not gendered.  
64 Throughout this conversation Mehran seems to use the term “protect” in reference to stopping oneself 
from having sex. His usage seems to be in the sense of impulse control.  
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While my questions in this domain tended to be oblique, the responses were clear 
enough. When I brought up sighe, Ali discussed how many men sought divorced women 
with whom to have such arrangements. If her family was able to support her, Ali told me, 
a divorced woman would find another husband, but likely one who was himself divorced. 
At this point in the conversation I took the opportunity to direct his attention to the 
“unwantedness” of the non-virgin woman, trying to arouse his sympathy. He interrupted 
me, telling me that “there is a situation in which a woman is born a non-virgin. This is 
something a legal doctor (pezeshke qānuni) will diagnose65. If a woman has had sex 
before marriage, it is clear that she is a faithless (bi-deen) person”. Mehran, on the other 
hand, told me, after our interview was over, that “I have come to terms with this issue, 
but I would still prefer a virgin wife”, telling me that such a wife would be more likely to 
be emotionally faithful. Although my sample size was small, I expect many Iranian men 
have similar opinions66.  
When I asked another, married man, Ghasem, about female virginity, he first 
asked whether I had lived in Iran, concluding that since I had not, I could not fully 
understand. He then told me, “From the perspective of the urf of Iranian society, from the 
generation from which I come (Ghasem was 35), in which pre-marital relations were not 
yet very normal, I concluded that it was important”. He told me regarding non-virgin 
women,  “I can’t say she’d be completely unmarriageable, but to a great extent one must 
question […] The lifestyle of this person is not for me.” I found this response somewhat 
surprising given that Ghasem had told me that his family, although religious, was quite 
open with himself and his sister. They had even had a sit-down with their children, 
explaining to them that sex is not a big deal, and that if they wanted to experience it they 
could, and if they wanted to learn more about it they could. Ghasem’s views on the 
matter were further expressed by his comments on hymenoplasty: “I don’t know why it is 
done but if [..] someone wants to hide a khata (transgression) meaning something that 
they themselves consider a transgression, it’s very bad. Very objectionable”. The other 
                                                        
65 We have seen, in the previous chapter, the trauma of medical examinations of this sort, something Ali’s 
comment appears to ignore.   
66 Mahdavi (2009) suggests this as well, although she fails to adequately critique this situation, opting 
instead to repeat her claims of a sexual revolution even immediately following the horrific story of a man 
whose fiancée committed suicide when he called off the marriage after she did not bleed when they first 
had intercourse.  
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men I interviewed had similar responses on this issue and for the most part critiqued the 
act without giving any comment on the context, while some women were more 
sympathetic.   
Another interviewee, himself a reporter, had suggested that he assist me by 
interviewing men on the topic, suggesting that as a man he knew how to ask men these 
questions regarding which they may respond to me dishonestly. I declined the offer, 
which occurred near the end of my fieldwork, as I knew I would be unable to process any 
additional interviews.  
There was one exception among my male interviewees who explicitly stated that 
“if you ask me about whether I prefer a virgin wife, I can tell you that it is important for 
me that she not be [a virgin]”. Part of his reasoning was that he believed it was 
psychologically harmful for a person to wait 30 years (the minimum age for a woman he 
would consider as a marriage partner, himself being 34) before experiencing sex. This 
man, Erfan, had just responded to my question about hymenoplasty by saying it was 
something completely immoral (gheire akhlaghi), but then conceded that it was 
sometimes necessary for “preservation of life”. Erfan told me he hoped the need for this 
practice would soon end and that my research would contribute to its ending.   
Erfan had also told me, near the beginning of our interview, that he had himself 
put the question of preference for virgin brides to his friends in Iran. Out of about ten 
people, he estimated, at least four or five had responded that they did prefer their wife to 
be a virgin at marriage. He told me that he had asked the same of Iranians “here” (I 
assume in Montreal), and only one person had responded that they did hold such a 
preference67. He asked this person if they would have the same criterion for a non-Iranian 
woman. They had responded in the negative. Erfan also told me that he had asked Iranian 
women living in Montreal whether they would be willing to live with someone without 
having married them. The response was “yes, but not with an Iranian man”. One of his 
female friends had told him “no Iranian man has the liāghat (worth) of living with 
without marriage”. It is interesting that, from what Erfan tells me, Iranians living in 
                                                        
67 Though I did not pose the question directly, my results seem to be different from those of Erfan. Perhaps 
Erfan’s friends resembled him ideologically, affecting his “sample” and thus making it different from mine.  
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Canada seem to hold each other to the standards of their culture of origin, while being 
more lenient with non-Iranians.  
It seems overall that many of my interviewees, both men and women, while 
favouring some aspects of a “modernized” or “westernized” approach to courtship and 
marriage, wished to maintain certain aspects of older Iranian social norms. I, having 
prepared my questions in such a way as to avoid offence to more conservative 
individuals, was quickly surprised to learn that most of my interviewees, even if they 
expressed religiosity, accepted at least some form of dating or extended (but, for some, 
such as Mehran, not too extended) courtship and betrothal period. As the daughter of 
religiously conservative Iranian migrants, I had been taught that dating was out of 
question, and, from the time I began high school until I married at 21, my parents had 
attempted to regulate my comings and goings and interactions with peers. I thought that 
those who maintained a religious identity would ascribe to the rules to which I had been 
subjected, but this seemed not to be the case.  
This change in the mode of meeting potential mates is perhaps unsurprising. In 
today’s globalized world, young people of all geographical and cultural origins are 
exposed to various discourses on love and marriage, and, as beings endowed with 
personal agency, will likely want to exercise it. As young Iranians become educated and 
more independent, move to cities and migrate internationally and away from extended 
family members that can arrange khāstegāri, this form of courtship becomes modified or 
replaced by other forms. Still, some young Iranians, for various reasons, continue to 
practice some form of khāstegāri. Importantly, however, the shift from khāstegāri to 
dating does not appear to be accompanied by a deeper shift in attitudes towards gender 
and sexuality.  
As I have mentioned, there were several feminists among my female 
interlocutors. Irsaa, whose further comments I discuss later in this chapter, notably 
claimed that “a woman’s body is her own”, but most women did not engage with me in 
such discourses and did not emphasize a claim to own their sexuality, and were more 
concerned with the issues stereotypically depicted as concerns of women, notably, 
marriage. Men likewise often asserted gender differences in love and sexuality. The 
depiction of sexual relations I had as a teenager found laughable, that men are interested 
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in sex while women long for committed relationships (i.e. marriage), seemed to ring true 
among the majority of my interlocutors. In the following section I wish to reflect a bit on 
why this is so.  
On the one hand, there are the benefits of the old system. Women and men both 
seem reluctant to let go of these: for women, the prospect of having a husband who will 
take care of their economic needs is not to be turned down. For men, the promise of 
sexual and emotional exclusivity suggested by a woman’s virgin status seems to be 
important. While such patterns may appear in “Western” societies as well, they 
nevertheless come into conflict with other aspects of the “modern” companionate 
marriage. That is, if we assume the latter implies a relationship that is based on equality. 
As we saw in the narratives of Ali and Mehran, gender segregation and a traditional 
khāstegāri system appear to be at direct odds with love and even the basic ability to get to 
know one’s future wife. As I have suggested earlier, I question the possibility of 
companionate love in hierarchical relationships entered into by parties with an a priori 
power asymmetry that mirrors the hierarchy68. But more equal gender relations seem not 
to be the concern of the majority of my interlocutors. Their narratives are largely 
accepting of a gender ideology that suggests strong innate differences between men and 
women. By accepting such a discourse, I claim that my interlocutors recreate these 
differences. The example of differences in sexual desire is especially pertinent and I 
discuss it further here.  
Pleasure and Power 
 
Ali repeatedly invoked male sexual desire, but never that of women. On one 
occasion where, misunderstanding his use of the general “you” to include myself as a 
woman, I asked him, for clarification, whether, when he stated that many marriages 
occurred simply to satisfy sexual needs, he was referring to female sexual desire. He  
simply responded “no, men’s”, and moved on. I was amused at Ali’s exclusion of women 
from his discussion of sexual desire, but, especially as he was quite talkative and 
repeatedly took my questions in his own direction, didn’t bother to further query him on 
                                                        
68 This leaves open, in principle, the possibility of such love in relationships in which the parties, beginning 
from an equal footing, consensually engage in power exchange.  
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it. It seemed that Ali was following a line of thought that did not attribute sexual desire to 
women. At the time, this made little sense to me, but after my recent encounter with 
Maryam, I came to the realization that perhaps this idea had a grain of truth, not because 
women were somehow biologically or psychologically desire-less, but because lack of 
discussion of female sexual desire made it so that women did not perceive themselves as 
sexual beings69.  
A similar attitude is noted by El-Feki (2013) in her interactions with Egyptian 
housewives, who are interested in improving their sex lives with their husbands but are 
ultimately more preoccupied with increasing their husbands’ pleasure in order to better 
ensure their fidelity. El-Feki explains that studies of the sexual satisfaction of women in 
Egypt who have undergone genital cutting suggest that it must be taken into 
consideration that in Egypt, women’s sexual pleasure is often linked to the satisfaction of 
their husbands. They seem to place less emphasis on their own physical pleasure. But the 
crux lies here: although some of the husbands in question complain that their wives are 
“boring” in bed, too much initiative in some cases leads to suspicion on the part of the 
husband regarding where their wife might have picked up any new sexual knowledge (El 
Feki 2013). Women’s sexual passivity is thus encouraged, which might result in women 
who, as a result of the internalization of such values, define their pleasure otherwise. Nor 
is the phenomenon exclusive to the Middle East, as we are reminded by the famous 
phrase “lie back and think of England”, apparently from the 1912 journal of one Lady 
Hillingdon, where she wrote "When I hear his steps outside my door I lie down on my 
bed, open my legs and think of England." 
The realization that women might be socialized not only not to express, but also 
to believe they lack, sexual desire, led me to think more about sexual desire and pleasure, 
which were not originally a focus of my inquiries. My mentor Homa Hoodfar had 
suggested, when I expressed interest in researching virginity, that I also look into 
pleasure. At the time, I felt perhaps she had misunderstood my line of inquiry: I was not 
interested in sexual practice and sexuality per se; I was interested in the power dynamics 
inherent in the gendered structures that impose virginity on women, who were enmeshed 
                                                        
69 My findings in this area are consistent with the findings of the sociologist Paul Vieille, who conducted 
research on peasants and industrial workers in Tehran and its peripheries from 1960 to 1968, which pointed 
to the conclusion that only men had the right to express their sexual desire (as cited in Afary 2009).  
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in systems that depended on the exchange of their bodies between men. Only much later, 
that is, after my encounter with Maryam towards the middle of my writing process, did it 
occur to me that pleasure itself was subject to these power dynamics. Could it not be said 
that denying female sexual desire would facilitate the continuation of the Iranian 
khāstegāri marriage system, that is, a system in which men chose women, to use Ali’s 
words, to “meet their sexual needs”, whereas women, apparently lacking sexual desire, 
were perhaps more easily persuaded to accept mates that met other criteria—wealth and 
the ability to provide—more advantageous to both the woman’s family of origin, as well 
as to the family of procreation that was to be the outcome of the marriage union?  
Another very interesting tidbit of information that Ali recounted to me is 
revealing of the attitudes of some young Iranian men to sex. Prefacing this statement with 
an account of his credentials (he had spent time in Iranian men’s university dormitories 
where young men from all over the country gathered and had intimate discussions on 
these topics), Ali told me that, as his many dormitory acquaintances had revealed to him, 
“When you are in love with a woman, never, in your mind, do you have sex with her. It’s 
impossible. Love is something holy”.  
I will dissect this statement. Love is holy, and therefore completely separate from 
sex. Sex is therefore unholy, profane, as it were. It follows, taking into account 
everything else said about virginity, that sex is dirty and defiling, particularly for a 
woman. I am unsure what happens after marriage that suddenly renders sexual contact 
acceptable (perhaps it is only to fulfill her duty of satisfying her husband’s desire that the 
woman here assents to what would otherwise be defiling). Nor am I able to reconcile the 
unholy status of sex with another statement of Ali’s, that a man in love doesn’t want to 
“cheat on” his beloved by having sex with other women, and will not do so if he doesn’t 
have “bad friends”—if he can’t have sex with her (as sex would defile her), yet 
experiences a need for sex (clearly, based on Ali’s narrative, it is so), but sex with 
someone else, or masturbation or pornography, would all mean “cheating”, how does he 
have sex? Apparently he doesn’t, resulting in all the pent-up frustration Ali described. 
But it’s not hard to see where this attitude toward sex leads: if one does not have sex with 
a woman whom one loves, as sex is unholy, a woman who has had sex is by that act 
made unholy, and therefore becomes an object of disrespect.  
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At the same time, once again, if one does not have sex with a beloved woman, 
perhaps it is a despised woman with whom one does have sex. Erfan gave me an example 
of a friend of his who held such an attitude. When a friend of his told Erfan that he had a 
girlfriend, Erfan had congratulated him and asked whether they also had sex. His friend 
had become extremely offended and responded, “No, for those things there are others. 
But her, I love her”. Erfan had emphasized his friend’s inability to verbalize “sex” here 
and his need to replace it with the term “those things”, as if sex were such a dirty word 
that it ought not to be verbalized. The friend’s attitude shows that one cannot have sex 
with a woman one loves. Therefore a woman one does have sex with is not loved. 
Women available for sex, usually those who lack virginity, are objects of disrespect.  
Hence Ali’s claim that men who pursued sighe (temporary marriage) with 
divorced women were underserving of respect. According to Ali, Sighe had been 
appropriate at a time when men needed to fulfil their sexual needs when separated by 
long distances from their wives, but today the institution was being abused. Further, Ali 
invoked gheirat (honor) by telling me that “the first question that would be asked (of a 
man who wanted to engage in sighe ) would be ‘would you let your own sister become a 
sighe?’ No-one would say yes”. A proper arrangement would be (permanent) marriage. It 
appears that here, once again, Ali is invoking that same gender difference in the marriage 
contract: men want sex, women want security, and a proper man ought not to “use” a 
woman for sex, but should meet her need for a permanent bond instead. The existence of 
such attitudes sheds light on why women are less likely to express a desire for sex (and 
even sighe): if sex is dirty, a woman who wants it must also be.  Such discourses may 
even encourage women to suppress any sexual feelings they do experience, or lead them 
articulate such feeling in some other manner.  
A clarification is necessary here: women’s sexuality has, historically, not been 
fully denied in Iran. Indeed, some early Islamic texts and more contemporary clerics’ 
interpretations of them suggest women’s sexual urges are stronger than those of men (a 
young junior cleric I talked to in Iran in Fall 2016 held such a view), hence justifying the 
need for additional safeguards on women’s sexuality (Mir-Hosseni 2004). Looking at 
Iranian history from the turn of the 19th century, movements advocating women’s rights 
have repeatedly been met by conservative pushback suggesting that increased 
 93 
participation of women in the public sphere would result in a state of fitna, or chaos (see 
Afary 2009). There has repeatedly been particular concern with any attempt to modify 
marriage and family law and increase women’s sexual freedoms. Hence, it is not that 
women’s sexuality is not acknowledged. Rather, there is an anxiety that surrounds 
women’s own recognition of their sexuality. This anxiety is perhaps what leads to lack of 
discussion of sexuality, and women’s in particular.  In fact, many of my interlocutors 
attested to a lack of discussion of sex in their families.  
Among my interviewees, almost no one had had discussions about sex with their 
parents (although one man told me this situation changed after marriage). One woman 
told me that her mother would pass her reading material in an attempt to somewhat 
passively educate her on sexuality. Another had learned from medical textbooks since 
several members of her family were in the medical field. Some indicated that they had 
been shocked upon discovering detailed discussions of sex in religious tozih-ul-masā’el70 
(explanation of problems) books. However, by and large, my interviewees told me they 
had learned about sex through their friends. For those involved in the fields of health and 
sexual education, such a situation is concerning, as it was for Mahdavi (2009), but the 
attitude of many Iranian parents seems to be well-expressed by one of my female 
interviewees, Narmin, who told me that “My mother felt if she didn’t talk about certain 
things they would just go away”. Several scholars confirm that sexuality has long been a 
taboo subject in Iran (Rahbari 2016, Mir-Hosseini 2004), although Mahdavi (2009) tells 
us that things are changing.  
Whether and to what extent things are changing with regards to sexuality among 
Iranians is one of the big questions motivating this research. In the previous chapter I 
highlighted the fact that some women were simultaneously critical while at the same time 
performing virginity, and also related the stories of women such as Sara, who indicated 
that change was needed. In the following sections I aim to further highlight some of this 
internal dissent, and to further probe the question of why the absence of dissent seems to 
be more prevalent.  
                                                        
70 These are books written by shi’ite clerics that aim to clarify correct Islamic behavior in specific 
situations. One of the major focuses is ritual purity, and sexual activity is an act that requires particular 
ritual ablutions, in addition to being subject to detailed regulation regarding what acts are acceptable or not. 
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Feminism and its Frustrations 
 




This was what one of my female interlocutors told me when I began asking her 
about virginity. This quotation strongly expresses that there is something about the 
hymen that is problematic. But it is not the flesh itself: biology cannot be blamed for 
structures of domination and inequality. “Dolphins have hymens too”, Irsaa, another 
female interlocutor, had repeated several times, a statement71 which she used to refute the 
idea that the hymen is God’s proof that women are to remain virgins until marriage. 
Rather, it is the meaning with which humans, and, in particular, patriarchal societies, 
have imbued the hymen that is at issue, especially where this meaning is the difference 
between a proper, marriageable woman and one who is unworthy and defiled. As we 
have seen, such meanings and the systems and structures surrounding them are so deeply 
woven into the societal fabric that that they are extremely difficult to extract. So much so 
that Taraneh considers the physical excision of the hymen as a simpler solution to what 
clearly is, to her, a big problem.  
It would seem that, with such a harsh distinction attributed to so fine a piece of 
flesh as the hymen, women would be in an uproar, and that an obvious avenue for 
critique would be a feminist approach. Feminists have begun to extend the long-standing 
fight for equality into the domain of sexuality. Contemporary middle-eastern and Muslim 
feminists who have taken on such issues include Fatima Mernissi, whose arguments in an 
essay entitled “Virginity and Patriarchy” I have discussed in Chapter 2. The Egyptian 
activist-journalist Mona Eltahawy has also taken on “The God of Virginity” (Eltahawi 
2015). In her book Sex and The Citadel, Shereen El-Feki (2013) highlights feminist 
activism on sexuality in Egypt and throughout the Arab World. In Iran, the immensely 
popular poet Forough Farrokhzad in the 1960s opened the taboo door of discussing 
female sexuality and desire, an act that earned her censorship by the clerical 
                                                        
71 I have been unable to verify this claim, but it appears that a number of other animals do have hymens.  
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establishment (Afary 2009). Activism continues in Iranian communities inside and 
outside the country to this day. I hope myself, in the preceding sections of this thesis, to 
have made it adequately clear that equality needs to begin in the bedroom.  
Early in my interviews I began asking women, as a final question, whether they 
identified as feminist. Occasionally, I was surprised by the answer that they were not, 
given that in the foregoing discussion they had seemed to express feminist ideas. There 
were, nevertheless, several vocal critics who did identify as feminists. What was going on 
here? Before attempting an explanation, I will illustrate with an encounter from my 
participant observation in the field.  
During my fieldwork I attended an art vernissage hosted by a group I found on 
Facebook called “affection&solidarity group montreal”. There, I met Zoya Tavangar, 
who had two paintings on display there, and was also handing out pamphlets advertising 
art classes she taught. One of the paintings was of a woman of elegant appearance, 
surrounded by lipsticks in the form of bullets. “A woman’s beauty is her weapon”, Zoya 
explained to attendees. Another painting, which I found more interesting, was of a 
feminine mouth that had been sewn shut.  As I was gazing at the painting I overheard two 
middle-aged men nearby commenting on it in Farsi. As the men were muttering between 
themselves, they began a conversation with the artist:  
 
 “It’s political”, one man said.  
“It’s not political,” Zoya interjected. “It is social”.  
“Why is it a woman’s mouth?” the man asked.  
“Women are usually the ones whose voices are silenced” Zoya had replied.  
The man had displayed an incredulous look, and moved on.  
 
Three interesting things happened here. First, Zoya expressed a view, also clearly 
depicted in her painting, that could easily be described or categorized as feminist. 
Second, she denied the political nature of the painting and the view expressed therein by 
relegating its nature to the social realm, which implies that she sees the social as separate 
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from the political72. Such a move goes against the now worn-out feminist adage that “the 
personal is political”, for the realm of “the social”, if, for argument’s sake, it is neither 
overlapping with the “personal”, nor “political”, is certainly located somewhere between 
the two. Zoya’s disjunction of “social” and “political” realms therefore renders more 
remote the possibility of joining the personal and political spheres. I did not ask Zoya 
whether she was a feminist, but I imagine that, like many of my women interlocutors, she 
may not identify as such73 despite her awareness and expression of women’s silencing, a 
silencing that is reinforced and redoubled by the third interesting aspect of this encounter, 
the incredulous expression of the man viewing her painting.  
This encounter was just one manifestation of a broad phenomenon of silencing of 
women’s voices, even those that do not out themselves as feminist. I would occasionally 
attempt to engage with people on this issue. When I had met Mohammad Rad74 and some 
of his colleagues late in my fieldwork, I mentioned my feminism, and also the fact that 
many of my interlocutors had not identified as feminist. The women told me that 
feminism was a crime in Iran, that it was possible to get arrested on charges of 
feminism75. I took note of this as something I should look further into. Clearly the arrest 
of Homa Hoodfar, who was incarcerated in Evin prison at the time of my fieldwork, was 
an instance of this, I thought. I also read, around that time, an article by Ziba Mir-
Hosseini about the broad silencing of feminists in Iran (Mir-Hosseini 2016).  But Dr. 
Hoodfar, once herself released, argued that it was not the case that feminism was illegal. 
Indeed, her knowledge of the Iranian constitution and the fact that feminism was not a 
                                                        
72 As Dr. Hoodfar pointed out to me, in Iran, distinguishing between “social” and “political” realms, and 
claiming certain ideas are social, makes their communication easier because the term “political” is 
associated with the state, while the “social” has to do with culture.  
73 As also explained by Dr. Hoodfar, the fact that feminism is often presented as an extreme position in 
Iran and sometimes associated with lesbianism, women familiar with that discourse may claim that they are 
not feminist while objecting to women’s inequality.  
74 Rad conducted a brief interview with me, which he posted on the Telegram channel of his media 
company, Hodhod. Rad told me that I would now receive a flood of responses, but, barring the interest 
expressed by Rad and his colleagues, I did not find any new interest or research participants directly 
through this channel. In the interview with Rad, I had been braver than I had in my previous postings, and 
had specifically mentioned that I was interested in virginity, as well as my feminist orientation.   
75 This is an oversimplification, but feminists in Iran have been arrested and jailed under various pretexts 
(personal communication with Dr. Hoodfar).  
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crime had helped her in her discussion and counter-arguments with her captors76. 
Nevertheless, as multiple media outlets cited and re-cited, a cleric involved in her case 
had accused Dr. Hoodfar of “dabbling in feminism”77. Although feminism is not illegal in 
Iran, these kinds of accusations are part of efforts to squelch feminist movements by 
creating difficulties for those who do identify as feminist.  
Hoodfar’s arrest and its surrounding circumstances do indicate one thing: to be a 
feminist in Iran can be a dangerous position to take. Nevertheless there are Iranian 
feminists, myself among them. But of course feminism comes in many flavours. During 
my preparation for my fieldwork, I had been advised by a department colleague78 to look 
in particular into Islamic Feminism. Mir-Hosseini (2004) and Afary (2009) both argue 
that variants of such a feminism exist in Iran, given that secular feminists are often 
ignored and shut down, and sometimes considered “agents of Western imperialism”79. 
The unfortunate association of feminism with the secular and monarchical institution of 
the Women’s Organization of Iran that, under the Pahlavi regime, made several advances 
in women’s rights, including in the sexual and marital domains, led “conservative clerics 
[to portray] feminism as a foreign, elitist concept aimed at the destruction of the Muslim 
family” (Afary 2009, 218), and it appears that not much has changed regarding attitudes 
to feminism since then.  
Thus Islamic feminists look to advance women’s rights in Islamic contexts by 
arguing that the patriarchal frameworks in which many Islamic societies function are not 
part of Islam but are due to patriarchal interpretations of the Quran and Ahādith.  
Discovering this brand of feminism was exciting, but I was hard-pressed to find any 
Iranian Islamic feminists in the field. I did venture into Facebook groups related to 
Islamic Feminism and a local Islamic Feminist group in Montreal (several of these 
perhaps go well beyond anything currently possible in Iran, as they also advocate for 
LGBTQ rights and the end of gender-segregation in places of worship). I met one young 
                                                        
76 Dr. Hoodfar mentioned this at the CASCA/IUAES2017 roundtable presentation: Rosita Henry, Faye 
Harrison, Chandana Mathur, Homa Hoodfar.“A conversation with Homa Hoodfar.” Roundtable 
presented at Mo(u)vment: CASCA/IUAES2017, Ottawa, Canada, May 2017.   
77 This was the first direct charge of feminism, even though feminism is not a crime under the law 
(personal communication with Dr. Hoodfar).  
78 Thank you to Aryana Soliz.  
79 Dr. Hoodfar explained it thus in one of her talks after being released from Evin and returning to Canada.   
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Iranian woman at the group I visited in person, who was very excited by my fieldwork. 
Unfortunately, I confused her in my contacts with someone else who told me she could 
not participate in an interview as her husband was not comfortable with it, and did not 
realize my mistake until much later, when I met her again at a later event linked to the 
group. While my requests for interviews were frequently turned down, I found this case 
(which turned out to be a case of mistaken identity) particularly vexing.  
Where was the voice of feminist critique in Iranian contexts? Fortunately, it isn’t 
entirely absent. I have mentioned my several feminist interlocutors, but suggest that I 
may have oversampled feminists both because several were in my immediate networks 
and because my research topic is probably more likely to draw feminists to volunteer as 
interviewees. Nevertheless, I wish to, and have, highlighted those voices, as they draw 
attention to issues that deserve consideration. I also recognize the choice not to identify 
as feminist, and think it is important to attempt to address these issues from positions that 
are not overtly feminist. As feminist voices have, as I have illustrated, systematically 
been silenced in this domain, it is essential to consider how such messages can be 
communicated in a manner that will be adequately received by a broader public.  
 And here I divert my attention to publics, because it is with respect to the public 
that the claim that “the personal is political” is made. If the personal is aligned with the 
private, it is the political that is aligned with the public, and this distinction needs to be 
untangled.  
Private Parts and Their Publics 
 
Virginity, and sexuality in general, is popularly construed as a private matter. 
However, being as these are "matters of concern" (Habermas, 1989[1962] as cited in Cole 
and Phillips 2013) to more than solitary individuals and even small groups of individuals, 
it is important to consider the extent to which these matters are also public. There is a 
significant tradition of literature on the distinction between public and private spheres, 
which has been taken up in anthropology.  
Jürgen Habermas defines the public sphere as "the political space within which 
citizens of liberal nations deliberate issues of 'common concern'” (1989 [1962]: 36 as 
cited in Cole and Phillips 2013). Habermas' concept separates out the public from the 
 99 
private, which other scholars have taken up. However, this interpretation has been 
debated by a number of scholars. Wright ((2010) as cited in Cole and Phillips 2013) has 
used the term 'public:private' to reflect how the two domains are co-constituted. Cole and 
Phillips (2013), who take up Wright's term as useful to their analysis, have argued that "to 
conceive of the public as a uniform, stable, politically consensual 'sphere' is not only 
theoretically inadequate but also politically misleading" (3-4). They argue that there are 
multiple scales of publics (2013, 4) and that publics are "cultural spaces with unwritten 
rules about who is included and who is not, and why" (2013, 6). Philips and Cole further 
argue that publics are constantly in formation (2013, 8), and that "we need to ask […] 
how they might be re-invented (or invented) in ways that germinate, circulate, and buoy 
equality projects rather than re-entrenching inequalities" (2013, 8). These numerous 
critiques have usefully expanded the concept of the public sphere, and we might ask, 
when considering virginity, whether women are included in the “public” that deliberates 
it. As noted above, it appears that they are not. The question becomes, then, “how might 
we re-invent this “public” to be more inclusive of women and their experiences of 
virginity and marriage imperatives?    
The institution of marriage, too, can be usefully regarded in the framework of 
publics. Marriage is an agreement, or contract, between a number of parties: while being 
a personal matter between the bride and groom (aroos va damaad), but also of their 
families, it is in addition a legal and religious matter, and thus the correctness of the 
contract is a 'matter of concern' to state and religious authorities. As an implicit part of 
that contract, women's virginity becomes "a matter between men" (Mernissi 1982, 183). 
Sexuality, likewise, is not "just a certain set of physical relationships among individuals", 
but should be regarded "as bodily reproduction and the construction/reconstruction of 
power relations in public as well as private spheres" (Sadeghi 2008, 251). Sadeghi's 
analysis builds on that of Foucault, who pointed out the policing of sex and "the necessity 
of regulating sex through useful and public discourses" (1978, 25).  
From the foregoing discussion in this chapter, it appears that women are largely 
excluded from the public discourse on sexuality, even their own. Many do not even 
attempt to engage with this discourse. The question, for those women who want change, 
is how women ought to position themselves vis-a-vis the publics that regulate their 
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(supposedly private) bodies. How can women reinsert themselves into the discussion of 
which their bodies are the subject?  How can women seek inclusion in these publics, and 
how do they legitimize or undermine them? Can women constitute an alternative public, 
a parallel public (Dewey 2009 as cited in Cole and Phillips 2013) or counter-public 
(Fraser 1990 as cited in Cole and Phillips 2013) to the "concerns" of marriage, virginity, 
and sexuality? In order to achieve equality in the domain of sexuality, women must make 
themselves heard, and thus must achieve recognition in the public sphere. And yet many 
continue to avoid opening up such discussions. The following section offers further 
analysis of the situation.  
Gender Inequality and the Patriarchal Bargain 
 
Irsaa was one of the women I spoke to who was passionately vocal against the 
system of the virginity imperative.  
For whom is [women’s] virginity important? Irsaa had asked me, switching the 
roles of interviewer and interviewee.  
“Men?” I quietly suggested.  
“Not really”, she had said.  
“It’s the [men’s] mothers. […] Iranian women have an anti-woman culture […]”.  
[…]  
“Why does the mother care?” I asked. 
“To show her daughter-in-law was completely pure”, came the reply.  
Me: “For herself, or for others?”  
Irsaa: “To show others!”  
 We see here the enactment of the patriarchal bargain (Kandiyoti 1988); older 
women, once themselves subject to the exigencies of the virginity imperative, are now 
the ones imposing it on younger women. Perhaps they are the ones teaching their sons, 
men like Ali and Mehran, to value a woman who abides by these rules. And young 
women, hoping for a ‘good catch’, or, according to Shirin, “shohar’e sartar”, that is, a 
husband whose status is above her own, are obliged to demonstrate their compliance 
because, in these societies, other forms of social and economic participation will also be 
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closed to them if they do not participate in the bargain. Men and women of different 
generations here collude in reproducing the virginity imperative.  
Kandiyoti's (1988) concept of "The Patriarchal Bargain" expresses the idea that 
by accepting certain restrictions during their youth, women could expect to be integrated 
as respectable members of society and exercise certain powers in their older age. 
Kandiyoti claims that the patriarchal bargain exists in the form of “subservience and 
manipulation” under the “classic patriarchy” characteristic of South and East Asia as well 
as the Muslim Middle East, and specifically cites Iran as one such society. Afary 
confirms the status a woman in Iran could traditionally achieve if she assented to the 
patriarchal bargain in her youth:  "As she grew older, the wife could become a powerful 
matriarch who exercised control over the life of her sons and her daughters-in-law, 
thereby also asserting increased authority over her husband in his old age" (Afary 2009, 
8). Afshar likewise emphasizes the desirability of "becoming something of a matriarch 
within the domestic sphere", and the necessity of maintaining traditional values so that 
"all mothers have the prospect of power and prestige" (Afshar 1989, 117).  
Thus, the mother in Irsaa’s story is taking advantage of her newfound power, 
which is valuable in itself, even if it is limited. If the daughter-in-law accedes, she too 
will one day be able to wield such power. Thus, in other words, patriarchy wins over 
women through inviting them to participate in a system of delayed gratification80. 
Interestingly, Afary (2009) notes, citing Mahnaz Afkami, the leader of the Pahlavi-era 
Women’s Organization of Iran, that in the brief pre-revolutionary years in which the WOI 
made some advances in women’s rights, it was poorer, working class women who were 
the bravest and most vocal critics of their current situations. Middle-class women were 
too vested in the existing patriarchal system. As we have seen, some of the upwardly-
mobile women I interviewed were also vested in the existing system by which they could 
attain some form of socioeconomic prosperity. Due to intersections of violence, poorer 
women are more likely to be subject to sexual and domestic violence (see, for example, 
Sokoloff and Dupont, 2005). Due to the location and methodology of my research, I did 
not have access to these women, but it would be interesting to hear what they have to say 
                                                        
80 Thanks to Homa Hoodfar for this idea.  
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on these topics. I have nevertheless attempted to focus on stories that reveal the difficult 
circumstances women must endure under strict virginity imperatives.  
Finally, Nicole-Claude Mathieu offers another perspective explaining why 
women may accept structural oppression. In her view, it is not that women desire to be 
oppressed, but that they do not have the means to contest their oppression. Mathieu 
argues that "[o]ppressor and oppressed are not equal subjects with identical 
consciousness" (Mathieu 1991d:217, cited in Cole 2016, 4), with material constraints 
causing limitations on the consciousness of the oppressed (women) (Cole 2016, 4). In the 
absence of outward resistance, for which a "raised consciousness" would be necessary, 
Mernissi argues that "each time a woman is cornered between the satisfaction of her own 
needs and conformity with a contradictory set of demands imposed on her by her social 
group, she resorts to trickery, which is the corollary of inequality" (Mernissi 1982, 188). 
Thus, where women are relegated to an unequal status, they employ "weapons of the 
weak" (Scott 1985, cited in Afary 2009, 7). This may be the most attractive, if not the 
only viable option, in societies that regard "sex [as] defilement, sexual contact [as] a 
degrading experience which degrades the woman, and by the same token, any men who 
are linked to her by ties of blood or marriage" (Mernissi 1982, 185). For women in 
patriarchal societies, who "live with the consequences of cultural conflations of male 
honour and sexual prowess" (Cole 2015, 5), shame may prevent them from voicing their 
dissent (Mathieu 1991d:145, cited in Cole 2016, 5), leading them to find other means of 
coping and navigating social expectations.  
My discussion of marriage in the first and second chapters has already 
demonstrated the unequal basis on which gender relations are laid in Iranian society. In 
chapter two I have discussed how women sometimes use “weapons of the weak” and 
occasionally “resort to trickery” in order to acquire a means to a liveable life in a society 
that does not afford them equal opportunity to independently support themselves and 
participate in the public sphere. In this chapter I have discussed the idea of “sex as 
defilement” and how it contributes to the unequal consciousness of young Iranian men 
and women. Wary of an interest in sexuality leading them to being viewed as “defiled” 




Conclusion: A Sexual Revolution?  
 
 At the outset of this research I had one big question: Why does the emphasis on 
female virginity persist among Iranians, even those who claim to be more “modern”, 
“secular” or “enlightened” (roshanfekr) ? In this work I have highlighted some of the 
contradictions experienced by young Iranians living in Montreal. I reiterate here that 
these are young people of diverse origins, educated, and who for the most part recently 
arrived in Canada and spent some formative period of their lives in the metropole of 
Tehran. Many of the experiences they recount, and much of their formation, took place in 
Iran. Many experienced some difficulty adjusting to Canadian social and cultural norms, 
and some attempted to relieve some of that dissonance by embracing or re-emphasizing 
certain aspects of their Iranian identity.  
 One might ask why women continue to abide by certain restrictive norms and 
rules of sexual propriety in Canada, where other discourses on sexuality (specifically, 
feminist and “sex-positive” discourses) are available to them, and where they may have 
access to potential partners who are not concerned with virginity imperatives. There may 
be many reasons for this, including the desire to satisfy parental expectations, or the need 
to belong that is fulfilled by maintaining connections with the Iranian communities in 
Montreal, which necessitates following the rules of those communities. Shirin told me 
that she had considered seeking a husband of a different national origin, but he would 
have to have a culture similar to her own, because she wouldn’t be able to understand 
someone from a completely different culture. The alternative was to go with an Iranian 
man, wait until marriage for sex, and get hymen reconstruction surgery. Perhaps 
significantly, out of the three divorced women I interviewed, one was single and the other 
two had partners who were not Iranian.  
 The foregoing chapters have made clear that female virginity continues to be a 
focus for both men and women. While a few of my female interlocutors rejected virginity 
imperatives based on their traumatic experiences or their feminist identification (if not 
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both), many did not outwardly reject virginity imperatives, perhaps offering some mild 
critique in our interview but not openly and publicly taking arms. Indeed, for these 
women, performing to the standards of such imperatives was instrumental to living 
liveable lives, for saving (or maintaining) face, and for ensuring a chance at what they 
considered a good marriage, something that remains incredibly important in the lives of 
young Iranians, women in particular. Specifically, hypergyny entails financial benefits 
for women that it seems many aren’t ready to let go of, and with justification. The 
support and stability of marriage seems to be something these women are interested in, 
while sexual relations are something they tended to downplay, even if they conceded that 
a good sexual relationship was important to marriage.  
 Many women I interviewed didn’t appear to seek more equality in their marriage 
relations. Continually surprised by women choosing to marry “above themselves”, I 
recently had a conversation with my mother on the topic. I questioned why someone 
would want to put themselves in the inferior position of unequal power dynamics. My 
mother agreed with me that financial dependence was harmful, but reasoned thus: even if 
women don’t have the same education or economic resources as their husbands, they may 
still exert power in the relationship. Some women, being clever, are able to tip the 
balance of power in their favour through their power of persuasion. Those who lack such 
an ability may well find themselves in a poor situation, but lacking strictly egalitarian 
appearances, a marriage relationship does not have to result in all power being in the 
hands of the husband, simply on the basis of his having a better education and a job.  
 But while this may well be the case, there remains a problem. My mother seems 
to be discussing a certain feminine charm and quiet behind-the-scenes calculation, 
something I am sure women living in patriarchal societies have used for centuries, as we 
have seen with the examples of navigating virginity imperatives, including their physical 
aspect. What is at issue is that women here are nevertheless operating from a position of 
inequality. They are employing “weapons of the weak” (Scott 2008). As Mernissi (1982) 
puts it, their situation of apparent submission forces them to “resort to trickery”. As my 
conversations on hymenoplasty with men suggest, men are not appreciative of such 
“trickery”. But they generally were unconvinced by my attempts at arousing sympathy 
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for women who were obliged to engage in these practices. When I mentioned to one man 
that some women broke their hymens in other ways, such as sports, he replied to me, 
“Yes, well, what percentage of Iranian women do horseback riding or gymnastics? Not 
very many.” The idea was that the vast majority of those seeking hymen reconstruction 
were doing so in order to “milk” the men they were marrying. This man, who had studied 
and practiced law, told me that he knew of cases where women married men “as virgins” 
with the aim of divorcing them later, in order to receive the higher mahriyeh that would 
be given to them because of their virginal status.   
 While I concede that such cases may exist, this argument disregards structural 
inequalities that may lead women to resort to such schemes. In a world where women 
have equal opportunities to acquire economic wealth, and are not differentially valued 
based on the status of their hymens, there could be no such schemes. Further, the 
argument disregards the emotional difficulties that women undergoing such procedures 
may experience: there was the case of a friend of my interlocutor Narmin, who “just 
needed to feel normal again”, and that of Shirin, who did not consent to the breaking of 
her hymen by a man she was seeing at the time. It’s just a piece of flesh,” he had told her 
when she confronted him. “A piece of flesh that was not yours to break” she had 
corrected him.  
In their outright unqualified rejection of hymen reconstruction as deception, men 
ignore women who have been sexually abused and women whose hymens broke through 
no fault of their own. In suggesting that “there are cases that can be distinguished by a 
doctor”, men subject women’s bodies to devices of power and take “medical evidence” 
over a woman’s own word. What happens to the woman who never realized that her 
hymen had been broken? Must she be obliged to suffer because her husband requires the 
proof of her “purity” in blood? Must the girl who breaks her hymen by accident be 
subject to scrutiny by her family and doctors, and either be obliged to undergo a surgical 
procedure or forever need to explain to her husband why her hymen was broken? I 
prompted, but did not press, men on these issues. I took it practically for granted that 
there would be a shared understanding of such instances, which create a problem for the 
equation of the hymen with virtue and purity. I now realize that this is not the case.   
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 The woman who resorts to hymen reconstruction and the woman who does not 
bleed upon intercourse are here subject to suspicion rather than sympathy. And yet men 
expect women’s love. Can a woman love a man that requires her to subject herself to an 
intrusive medical examination rather than take her at her word? And when men have sex 
with other women and yet expect their wives to be virgins, the ultimate hypocrisy, can 
they expect to be loved by the women they marry? It is no wonder that women do not talk 
about these issues when so much hangs in the balance.    
Let us also remember that these “other women” are regarded with contempt. As 
Irsaa told me, “ ‘A girl who doesn’t have bekārat (virginity/a hymen) is good. You can 
use her, enjoy her, then, like a dirty tissue, through her away’ I have heard this many, 
many times from the tongues of Iranian boys”.  “I know a twenty-six year-old girl whose 
[maternal] uncle (dayi) rapes her,” Sara told me. “She can’t say anything because it 
would become clear that she had a boyfriend [before that]”. That an uncle would have a 
coercive incestuous relationship with his niece in the full security of knowing that she 
could not speak up because doing so would result in criticism being turned on her rather 
than him, is revolting. But if women expect things to change, they ought to speak up. If 
those women who find themselves in a position to speak do so, those who have been 
forced and threatened into silence may have a fighting chance.  
And, if women were to have the audacity to claim their bodies as their own and 
not as goods to be bartered between men, it is not just women who would benefit. When 
men claim that they desire such things as love and companionship in marriage, they must 
allow for a structure that allows such emotions to be cultivated. When women cannot 
claim their sexuality, they are not equal participants in the pleasures of sex, love, and 
marriage. Is it surprising that they instead select their husbands using criteria based on 
economic rationality? What else do they have to gain from the marriage contract?  
 
* * * 
 
The present moment in the consciousness of many Iranians, including those I 
interacted with in Montreal and those “back home”, is characterized by a seeming 
conflict between the old and the new, between the “traditional” and the “modern”. The 
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influx of technology during the lifetime of the present generation of youth has certainly 
changed their world. New patterns of courtship and dating have emerged, aided by the 
ease of communication using social media. Sexuality is more openly discussed among 
youth than among the previous generation (Mahdavi 2009). However, I contend that 
despite these changes, many of the values surrounding marriage and sexuality still 
remain. Mahdavi (2009) claims that the secular youth of upper Tehran are leading a 
"sexual revolution", but her work focuses solely on this group. Afary (2009) also alludes 
to an incomplete sexual revolution in the works in Iran, citing the feminist movement that 
is ongoing.   
Mahdavi’s work unfortunately disregards many issues of class and gender 
differences. While she does discuss the issue of virginity, she ignores the dynamics of 
virginity imperatives, even while telling us the story of an interlocutor whose fiancée 
committed suicide after he told her the marriage was off when she did not bleed after they 
first had sex. Perhaps Mahdavi’s idea of a sexual revolution is based on the fact that the 
women she is working with have acknowledged and claimed their own sexual pleasure, 
something that I did not observe with my own interlocutors, although I must admit that 
this may have been partially due to the short period for data collection and the lack of a 
prolonged period in which to get to know people and conduct multiple interviews. But 
there’s a caveat: the women Mahdavi describes are engaging in their “sexual revolution” 
in semi-private conditions. They have sex before marriage, but not with men they expect 
to marry, to whom they perform virginity. Some, as men do with women, drive to poorer 
parts of Tehran in order to pick up young men for sex. At the same time they are 
desperately in search of a husband who will meet their economic needs, with many of 
them pursuing lavish lifestyles of constant partying and going to beauty parlours. They do 
not feel complete without a husband, and thus subject the unmarried to harsh scrutiny. 
Marriage and “conjugal debt” (which I take to mean the concept of meeting the sexual 
needs of one’s husband, or tamkin) are among her interlocutors’ favourite topics of 
discussion, Mahdavi tells us.  
In my view, the situation described by Mahdavi does not represent a sexual 
revolution, but rather, a rupture between private and public life. I believe that meaningful 
change for women can only come when the personal meets the political; that is, when 
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these issues women have long managed secretly and in private are brought to, and 
discussed in, the public sphere. The behaviours Mahdavi regards as subversive and 
revolutionary remain enmeshed in a social structure that emphasizes and normalizes male 
dominance and privilege (Sadeghi 2009), and privatizes and genders women’s situation 
and concerns (Phillips and Cole 2013). I contend that the changes in behaviour observed 
by Mahdavi are not accompanied by changes in deeply engrained ways of thinking about 
sexuality and virginity, that, in particular, make life more difficult for women, and result 
in marriages that are not based on mutual understanding and equality. Moreover, these 
recent changes, without a change in thought and value systems, are dangerous for 
women, as is painfully clear in the case of the young woman whose uncle rapes her as a 
sort of “blackmail”. A true sexual revolution means the opening up of a space in which 
egalitarian sexual relationships are conceivable, and working towards such a goal. If there 
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